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This Article examines the work of organized feminism in the forma-
tion of new international criminal tribunals over the course of the 1990s.
It focuses on the statutes establishing the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). It offers
a description of the evolving organizational style of feminists involved in
the legislative processes leading to the establishment of these courts, and
a description of their reform agenda read against the outcomes in each
court-establishing statute. At each stage, the Article counts up the femi-
nist victories and defeats, giving (I hope) a clear picture of how
"feminist" the resulting codes really are.
The goal is to produce an assessment of the ideological/political in-
vestments that feminists brought to their work on the statutes for the
international criminal tribunals (ICTs) and the ICC, and of the degree to
which the statutory regimes contain rules that allow participants in adjudi-
cation under these statutes to put those ideological/political investments
into action.
This Article is one of a series. In an essay recently published in the
Melbourne Journal of International Law, I read representations of rape
both in a literary text and in law reform sought by feminists in the prose-
cution and adjudication of actual cases in the ICTY and ICTR.' In yet
another paper currently in draft, I examine the litigation and adjudication
of the ICTs and the prosecutorial output of the ICC to date in far more
detail than I attempt in the Melbourne essay, with the same goals that I
pursue in the present Article's examination of statutory rulemaking.2
My conclusions in this Article are two. First, feminist organizational
style and capacity evolved rapidly over the course of the 1990s. Second,
though there were some disagreements among the feminists involved,
the organizational style was overwhelmingly coalitional, resulting in a
literary "trace" of feminist work that is almost devoid of manifest inter-
nal conflict. The consensus that emerged as the feminists' joint
representation of their worldview, argument repertoire, and reform
agenda was not, as one might expect, a median liberal feminist view that
split the difference between conservative and leftist feminist ideologies.
Instead, the manifest consensus view was an updated radical feminism,
strongly committed to a structuralist understanding of male domination
and female subordination. There was some tension on a few issues be-
tween structuralist and liberal-individualist femininists (a distinction I
I. Janet Halley, Rape in Berlin: Reconsidering the Criminalisation of Rape in the
International Law of Armed Conflict, 9 MELB. J. INT'L L. 78 (2008) [hereinafter Halley, Rape
in Berlin].
2. To be entitled, Rewriting Rape: Feminist Reforms in the Prosecution and Adjudica-
tion of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict.
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will describe in detail below),3 but it was muted by the coalitional style
adopted by feminists and compromised usually in the direction of struc-
turalist rule choices.
INTRODUCTION TO "GOVERNANCE FEMINISM"
Chantal Thomas, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir, and I have de-
scribed a new feminist organizational style that has evolved over the
course of the 1990s as Governance Feminism (GFeminism). We devel-
oped this term in part because it captures the strong resemblance of the
new, muscular non-governmental organization (NGO) formations
adopted by feminists to the prescription for political engagement with
law produced by the "new governance" (NG) school.5 Amy Cohen de-
scribes the project of the NG literature as follows:
[N]ew governance proponents aim to design a wide-scale prob-
lem-solving praxis that is both maximally efficient and
normatively (democratically) legitimate. They envisage myriad
individual stakeholders grouped into "problem-solving 'publics"'
3. See infra Part II.D.b.iv.
4. Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir & Chantal Thomas, From the Inter-
national to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex
Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER
335, 337 (2006).
5. See id. at 340-42 (discussing the "new governance" (NG) project as it relates to
GFeminism). See generally DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EM-
POWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003); LAW
AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US (Grdinne de Bdrca & Joanne Scott eds.,
2006); Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L.J. 313, 313-
42 (1997); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimental-
ism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267-473 (1998); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 543-675 (2000); Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Lieb-
man, Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 261, 261-327 (2004);
Oliver Gerstenberg & Charles F. Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy: An Institutional Ideal
for Europe?, in GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE'S INTEGRATED MARKET 289 (Christian Jo-
erges & Renaud Dehousse eds., 2002); Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal
Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L.
REV. 471, 471-97 (2004); James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey
Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 183, 183-304 (2003); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV.
342, 342-470 (2004); Charles F Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016, 1016-1101 (2004); Joanne Scott &
Susan P. Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 13
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565, 565-94 (2007); William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming
Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 127-
212 (2004); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Ap-
proach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 458-568 (2001).
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... that negotiate about issues of social concern and that openly
compare their learning with and against other problem-solving
publics. By coordinating and monitoring (but not defining or
driving) these horizontal processes from above, moreover, new
governance proponents aim to ensure that these local delibera-
tions are inclusive, transparent, justified by a record of
demonstrable reason, and progressively evolve towards maxi-
mally informed, collaborative, and efficient solutions.6
While dissenting from the sunny optimism about NG formations (we
were more skeptical that norm follows form in any necessary way),7 we
did think that the literature captured something important, descriptively,
about the newness and the complex, fluid, temporally variable, and net-
worked rather than pyramidal character of NG organizational styles. In
particular, we recognized the complex way in which NG formations in-
vaginate the State with non-state elements and their porosity to NGOs
aiming to advance specific social interests. GFeminism has grown up
along with NG, and surely not accidentally, has co-invented its most sa-
lient features.
We also noted the paradox that feminists working on male sexual
wrongs against women in the NG mode nevertheless imagine the inter-
national and national legal orders as heavy, consolidated, top-down
sovereign powers. Their ambition is to wield sovereign power from on
high, and to use it to produce absolute results! In Foucault's terms, they
have not learned-they do not want to learn-how to cut off the head of
6. Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 503, 514 (2008).
7. See id. (locating blindspots shared by the NG literature and new work on negotia-
tion as development strategy); William E. Scheuerman, Democratic Experimentalism or
Capitalist Synchronization? Critical Reflections on Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 17
CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 101 (2004) (criticizing the NG assumption that the sup-
posed democratic dimensions of NG will also be progressive).
8. Of course, male domination through rape and other sexual wrongs is not the only
focus of international feminist engagement, and the legal modalities to which they have turned
for remedial strategies are as diverse as the international legal order. See HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994) (demon-
strating the awakening of new feminist energy in international law directed at problems as
diverse as HIV/AIDS, structural adjustment, land reform, marriage rules, and abortion); IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS; TEXT AND MATERIALS
885-967 (Henry Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 1996) (providing an overview of human rights,
including many feminist interventions and achievements that are not about sexual violence
and that do not use criminal law as their remedial model); RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law 1993); see also
Valerie L. Oosterveld, The Canadian Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution: An Evalua-
tion, 8 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 569, 570 (1996) (classifying women as a distinct sub-class of




the king. They seek to wield the sovereign's scepter and especially his
sword. Criminal law is their preferred vehicle for reform and enforce-
ment; and their idea of what to do with criminal law is not to manage
populations, not to warn and deter, but to end impunity and abolish.
Elizabeth Bernstein has done extensive participant-observation field
work on the coalition for abolition of "sex trafficking" between feminists
organized as what Thomas, Shamir, Kotiswaran, and I call GFeminism,
on one hand, and religious conservatism, on the other. She calls the re-
sulting feminist engagement with positive law carceral feminism-that
is, "the commitment of abolitionist feminists to a law and order
agenda."9 Kotiswaran, Shamir, Thomas, and I hypothesized that these
descriptors would match the ideological stance of GFeminism working
both on trafficking reforms, and on reforms relating to rape within two
intersecting branches of international law, international humanitarian law
(IHL) and international criminal law (ICL). This Article argues that they
do work well in the IHL and ICL contexts.
But something unique happened in GFeminist involvement in the
criminalization of sexual wrongs over the course of the 1990s, some-
thing different from what we discovered on the sex-trafficking side of
feminist activism. As Thomas indicated in her contributions to our arti-
cle, GFeminists were in complete agreement that women selling sex
should be immune from punishment, but they disagreed fundamentally
beyond that. Some of them were structuralists, committed to the view
that prostitution or sex work was equivalent to sexual slavery, could not
be meaningfully consented to, and should be abolished.0 Other feminists
took a different position, which Thomas dubbed individualist, committed
to the views that sex work could reflect a woman's considered judgment
about her best options. For these feminists, only the harmful forms of
sex work and only the bad actors in it should be criminalized." Still
other feminists saw sex work as work and sought to legalize and (some-
times) to regulate it.12 To be sure, the latter were not important players in
the development of the current international regimes governing "sex traf-
ficking," but they are an important part of feminist theory and politics,
and are politically involved in grassroots and state-based organizing of
sex workers as workers. However important the sex-work position was in
9. Elizabeth Bernstein, The Sexual Politics of the "New Abolitionism", 18 DIFFER-
ENCES 128, 143 (2007).
10. See Halley, Kotiswaran, Shamir & Thomas, supra note 4, at 347-60 (providing an
analysis leading to the following taxonomy of feminist positions on trafficking in the 1980s
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feminist politics and local struggles, the contest in international law was
between the structuralists and the individualists.
My most important finding about the substantive politics of femi-
nism in the formation of the ICTs and the ICC: almost without
exception, the consensus feminist stance that almost completely domi-
nates the law review literature and pervades the activist literature is
structuralist-feminist. Overwhelmingly, the structuralist-feminist world-
view animates both argumentation and rule preference.
There are three sub-findings to note here: the fact of near-seamless
performance of consensus; the radicalism of the position that became the
object of this consensus; and the placid calm with which male interna-
tional law elites from the West received this GFeminism as the voice of
sweet reason about how to condemn wartime rape. Though feminism is
uniformly experienced by feminists as a highly contentious field, per-
haps even defined by its inability to reach consensus, GFeminism
working on sexual violence in IHL and ICL in the 1990s, especially the
part of it that worked on the big tribunal-establishing statutes, was nearly
consolidated in its feminist ideology and in its goals. Just as GFeminism
learned to walk the halls of power-now dressed not in the butch street
clothes of the marginal radical feminists of yesteryear but in power suits
from Nieman Marcus-its consensus ideology became as radical and as
structuralist as anything we ever got from Mary Daly, Adrienne Rich, or
Andrea Dworkin. And-except for some very alarmed and entrenched
resistance from the Holy See and States that use Islamic law as a source
of law-mainstream international lawyers accepted GFeminists as au-
thoritative on the badness of rape and the need for many specific reforms
to end the impunity of rapists.
My second most important finding is that the substance of this struc-
turalist feminism vision evolved over the course of the 1990s. It changed
without producing a literature of internal dissent. The legal agenda
started out as a fairly simple commitment to assure that IHL/ICL ex-
pressly and explicitly prohibit rape in war and that the ICTs and the ICC
prosecute it vigorously. Not to do so was thought to trivialize or even
condone rape. But over the course of the decade, the feminists doing this
work discovered ways of implementing their structuralist view that rape
was not merely a tool of belligerent forces (Croat vs. Serb, Serb vs.
Muslim, Hutu vs. Tutsi, etc.) but part of a global war against women. As
those reforms took shape, a new feminist idea was clarified, one I call
feminist universalism. In this view women are not a particular group of
humanity but a universe of their own. In the new feminist universalist
worldview, humanitarian law and international criminal law norms relat-
ing to armed conflict could be about women.
[Vol. 30:1
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The result was not only a much stronger representational practice but
also a much bolder reform agenda. The legal reforms involved annexing
human rights law to IHL/ICL and vice versa, and extending the explicit
prohibitions-the key term evolved from rape to sexual violence to sex-
ual slavery to gender violence-beyond wartime rape to everyday rape,
beyond war as men define it to war as women experience it. War not as
an event but as a situation, as the life of everyday. The literary practices
of feminist universalism-made manifest not only as rule proposals but
also as their supporting arguments-simultaneously clarified. It made
ever more sense to look at the eruption of ethno-nationalist conflict in
the Balkans, for instance, and to see and show it as a war against
women. And it made ever more sense to describe that war without any
acknowledgement that men died in it.
Most legal progressives regard the many successes of the GFeminist
work that I am about to examine as perfectly benign, if not as precious
examples of humanitarian progress. Perhaps they will turn out to be so:
perhaps their enforcement will reduce rape, war, human cruelty, and hu-
man suffering. That will depend on how the rules are deployed by the
tribunals, by military institutions, by belligerents, and by political forces.
This Article is limited to the advocacy campaign and the rule successes
and defeats it encountered. I do not take up the crucial question, "What
will the new rules really do in the world?" I have tried to tackle that
question elsewhere.' 3 Here, I ask readers a much narrower question:
whether the formation of the GFeminist consensus described here is
what they want for legally active feminism today and in the future.
It is very possible that some feminist and feminist-fellow-traveler
readers will answer that question in the negative. I hope I can show in
the following pages that, unless you are a radical feminist holding a
structuralist view of sexual subordination and seeking to abolish as male
domination sex work/sex trafficking and sex between formal enemies in
war even when women elect to participate in them, you were not repre-
sented by the feminists who advocated and designed the reforms studied
here. If you disagree with this strand of feminism-and many feminists
as well as non-feminists do-the following story may persuade you to
repoliticize feminist thought and law reform action on rape and sexual
violence.
The Article has two parts. Part I examines the ICTY and ICTR stat-
utes and the Rome Statute as a single process. Part L.A begins by listing
the most important documents and the dates of their negotiation and
promulgation. Part I.B then shows how GFeminism took shape in the
13. See Halley, Rape in Berlin, supra note 1, at 110-20 (suggesting some steps in the
consequentialist analysis of these reforms).
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context of that process. Part II is a story of feminist law reform. It first
presents a nutshell statement of IHL against which the feminist interven-
tion had to struggle in Part II.A. Part II.B continues by telling the story
of feminists' efforts to intervene in the formation of the ICTY and ICTR
statutes. Part II.C then assesses those statutes for the degree to which
they reflect feminist reform efforts. I trace the emergence of the GFem-
inist reform agenda in the run-up to the Rome Diplomatic Conference in
Part II.D. Finally, Part II.E assesses the Rome Statute for the degree to
which it reflects the much more ambitious feminist agenda that emerged
over the course of the mid-1990s. I conclude with a brief statement about
why one might be-why I am--concerned about the developments de-
scribed in this Article.
I. THE ICTY AND ICTR STATUTES AND THE
ROME STATUTE SEEN SYNOPTICALLY
The 1990s saw an explosion of lawmaking in international criminal
law intended to govern war and armed conflict, prompted in part by con-
flicts in the Balkans and Rwanda that included widely published
incidents of rape, sexual mutilation, and sexual humiliation of women.
By 1993, feminists engaged international humanitarian law both as a
means to address these terrible wrongs and as a site for feminist lawmak-
ing. This Part describes the legal instruments that these feminists worked
on and the evolution of their organizational style.
A. The ICTY and ICTR Statutes and the Rome
Statute as Events in lime
The ICTY and ICTR statutes were promulgated by the United Na-
tions in 1993 and 1994, respectively, to define the subject matter
jurisdiction, procedures, and institutional roles and rules for the new
special tribunals. In defining the crimes that could be tried by the ICTs,
these statutes selected from the immense body of IHL then suspended
across a wide range of treaties, trials, and other authorities, the specific
crimes that the tribunals would have jurisdiction to enforce.14 They au-
thorize prosecution and conviction following already existing forms of
international criminal liability. The Statutes modify these bodies of law
both formally and substantively: they are codes with crisp boundaries.
They not only picked and chose from the tradition on which they relied,
14. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal




but also modified it. Moreover, they are not identical. They can be com-
pared with their precedents and with each other.
The ICTs were in the somewhat awkward position of promulgating
their own rules of evidence and procedure.'" In the story of feminist ac-
tivism that follows, we will have occasion to study the feminist effort to
influence the resulting ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence.'
6
The ICTs proceeded to litigate and adjudicate cases. The cases that
will call for our attention because they constituted partial feminist victo-
ries in adjudication that subsequently influenced the Rome Statute
discussions are Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Prosecutor v. Furund~ija, and Prose-
cutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovi6 (Kunarac) in the ICTY;'7 and
Prosecutor v. Akayesu in the ICTR.'8
Meanwhile, momentum built in IHL circles for the establishment of
a permanent international criminal court. The ICTs were ad hoc courts,
with subject matter jurisdiction over particular conflicts. Many of their
proponents wanted more: a general international criminal court with the
authority to punish crimes in armed conflicts generally. Discussions and
deliberations leading to the establishment of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) were elaborate and generated a huge number of drafts of the
authorizing statute, proposed amendments, and so on. A U.N.-authorized
Preparatory Committee (PrepComl) met six times between March 25,
1996, and April 3, 1998,'9 and produced the first official draft of the stat-
ute.20 Then there were several "intersessional" meetings, each revising
15. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Viola-
tions of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
Since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.13 (June 13, 2006); Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Evidence and Procedure, U.N. Doc.
ITR/3/Rev. 1 (June 29, 1995).
16. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.41 (Mar. 8, 2008).
17. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovi6, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1 -A,
Appeals Judgment (June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Furund~ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals
Judgment, 205 (July 21, 2000); Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Corrigendum to
Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 15 July 1999 (Nov. 19, 1999); Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case
No. IT-94-I-A, Appeals Judgment (July 15, 1999); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovi6,
Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/I-T, Trial Judgment (Feb. 22, 2001); Prosecutor v. Fu-
rundlija, Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, Trial Judgment (Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case
No. IT-94-I-T, Trial Judgment (May 7, 1997).
18. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, Appeals Judgment (June 1, 2001);
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998).
19. Fanny Benedetti & John L. Washburn, Drafting the International Criminal Court
Treaty: Two Years to Rome and an Afterword on the Rome Diplomatic Conference, 5 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 1, 6 (1999) (providing a timeline of the Preparatory Committee meetings as
well as other meetings that were important moments in the negotiations).
20. MODEL DRAFT STATUTE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT BASED ON
THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE'S TEXT TO THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE, ROME, JUNE 15-
JULY 17, 1998 (Leila Sadat Wexler ed., 1998).
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the statute. Then the big Conference, meeting for six weeks in Rome to
hammer out a final document.2' Afterwards a Preparatory Commission
(PrepComll) was convened to do the follow-up documents on procedure,
22
evidence, and further definition of the crimes.
The result was the Rome Statute.23 This is the highest-order code for
the ICC. The Rome Statute specifies the scope of the ICC's jurisdiction,
sets up the various institutional authorities of the Court, provides for in-
terpretive rules for the ICC to use in construing the Statute, and
authorizes the promulgation of rules of evidence and further definition of
crimes.
The Rome Statute is a treaty; only States that expressly consent to be
bound by it are even nominally governed by it. As of the time that this
Article went to press, 108 "States Parties" had ratified the Rome Stat-
24 
2ute. Notoriously, the United States is not among them. The Rome
Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002, an event triggered by the
member status of sixty States.26 Prosecutions in the ICC have begun, and
at the time of this writing, several cases involving charges of sexual vio-
27lence are under investigation or are at the indictment stage.
This story could mislead readers into thinking of the ICT and the
Rome processes as distinct, separate, hermetically sealed from each
other. Instead, they were simultaneous. Here is a timeline putting the two
processes back into the context of each other:
21. Valerie Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court: Advanc-
ing International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 605, 611 n.27 (2003) [hereinafter Oosterveld,
Sexual Slavery] (noting that this meeting was officially designated the U.N. Diplomatic Con-
ference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court); see also
Forward to Developments in International Criminal Lw, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1999).
22. Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court:
An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 406-34 (2000). Leila Nadya Sadat and S. Richard
Carden-both of them active participants in the process-call the Preparatory Committee
PrepComl and the Preparatory Commission PrepComl. I will follow this somewhat confusing
practice because it seems to be the conventional thing to do. See id. at 383-84 nn.4-5 (noting
that there was only one Preparatory Committee prior to the Conference).
23. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Rome Statute]; U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Estab-
lishment of an International Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17,
1998).
24. International Criminal Court [ICC], About the Court, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/about.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2008).
25. Rome Statute, supra note 23.
26. Id. art. 126.
27. ICC, Situations and Cases, http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html (last visited Dec. 12,
2008). The appointment of Catherine A. Macinnon as Special Advisor on Gender Crimes to
the ICC Prosecutor while this Article was in press may lead to changes in the Prosecutor's
investigation and charging practices. Press Release, ICC, ICC Special Prosecutor Appoints
Prof. MacKinnon as Special Advisor on Gender Crimes (Nov. 26, 2008), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.intlpress/pressreleases/450.html (last visited Dec. 17, 2008).
[Vol. 30:1
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1993: (May 25) ICTY Statute promulgated.
1994: (Nov. 8) ICTR Statute promulgated.
1995: Ad Hoc Committee for the Establishment of an international
criminal court commences work.
28
1996: (June 26) First Kunarac indictment (sub nomine Gugovie).29
1997: (May 7) Tadi,6 Trial Chamber Judgment.
1998: (June 8) ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence promul-
gated.
(June 15) Rome Diplomatic Conference begins.
(July 9-10) ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence
promulgated.
(July 13) First Amended Indictment in Kunarac (filed Aug.
19, 1998).
(July 17) Rome Statute promulgated.
(Aug. 27) Second Amended Indictment in Kunarac (filed
Sept. 6, 1998).
(Sept. 2) Akayesu Trial Chamber Judgment.
1999: (July 15) Tadie Appeals Chamber Judgment.
(Aug. 27) Third Amended Indictment in Kunarac (filed
Sept. 6, 1999).
(Nov. 8) Fourth Amended Indictment in Kunarac (filed Nov.
8, 1999).
2000: (June 30) ICC Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure
and Evidence adopted)0
2001: (Feb. 22) Kunarac Trial Chamber Judgment.
2002: (June 12) Kunarac Appeals Chamber Judgment.
(July 1) Rome Statute enters into force.
28. Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery, supra note 21, at 611 n.27; see also Patricia Viseur
Sellers & Kaoru Okuizumi, Intentional Prosecution of Sexual Assaults, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 45, 78 (1997) (indicating that less formal discussions were underway in
1994).
29. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovi6, Case No. IT-96-23, Indictment (June 26,
1996).
30. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE Xxxvii-xxxviii (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001).
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The record thus makes it clear that the simultaneity of these parallel
processes-the legislation and adjudication in the ICTs and ICC-were
vividly real to the participants in them, including the feminist activists.
As Patricia Viseur Sellers concluded, "The ad hoc Tribunals by trying
and convicting perpetrators [of sex-based crimes] fomented a legal cli-
mate beyond its jurisdiction that made it conducive to draft several sex-
based crimes into the Rome Statute of the ICC."'' Arguments and "law"
jumped from one forum and document to another constantly. We see, for
instance, feminists arguing in the Rome Statute process-unsuccessfully,
as it happened-that ICT indictments and judgments framing rape as
torture and thus as one or another grave breach of the Geneva Conven-
tions constituted authority for including rape in the Rome Statute's list of
grave breaches . We will occasionally see GFeminists devising strategy
in one forum in light of their gains and/or losses in the other; we will
hear them invoking their gains in one forum as authority for similar
gains and against similar losses in the other. The two processes, for in-
siders, were one.
B. Feminist Organizational Capacity and Rhetorical Strategy
Across the course of this legal activity, legislative and prosecutorial,
GFeminism emerged as a powerful participant. One of the most striking
facts about it is the sea-change in GFeminist organizational capacity and
the constant evolution of the feminist strategic repertoire.33 Another is the
emergence of a wide range of roles for GFeminists-from judge to
prosecutor to special rapporteur on sexual violence to law professor run-
ning a clinic and writing advocacy documents to law professor writing
purportedly objectively in law reviews about what international humani-
tarian law is.3
1. The Emergence of GFeminism as an Important NG Force
We can begin the story in early 1993, when the press was full of
news of atrocities in the Balkan conflict and when the United Nations
was in the midst of its agonized debate about what, if anything, to do
about them. Within the International Human Rights Law Group-what
we would now call an NGO, describing itself as having been active since
31. Patricia Viseur Sellers, lndividual('s) Liability for Collective Sexual Violence, in
GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 10 (Karen Knop ed., 2004) [hereinafter Sellers, Individual('s)
Liability].
32. See, e.g., Barbara Bedont & Katherine Hall-Martinez, Ending Impunity for Gender
Crimes Under the International Criminal Court, 6 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 65, 72 (1999).
33. For that story, see infra Part I.B. 1.
34. I discuss the various kinds of documents that GFeminists produced over the course
of the 1990s in Part I.B.2, infra.
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1978-emerged a Women in the Law Project (WILP) aimed at forming a
"delegation" of human rights lawyers to investigate rape and other sexual
violence.35 In February of 1993, four women-Laurel Fletcher, Karen
Musalo, Diane Orentlicher, and Kathleen Pratt-traveled to the region,
conducted extensive interviews, and published a short report (WILP No
Justice, No Peace Report). They recommended that a special criminal
tribunal be formed and that rape be included in prosecutions for grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other war crimes.36 Meanwhile,
Jennifer Green, Rhonda Copelon, Patrick Cotter, and Beth Stephens (the
Green/Copelon Group) rushed to influence United Nations insiders as
they drafted the ICTY Statute. They later published their blueprint for
the new tribunal in what I will call the CUNY Clinic Memorandum.37
The Green/Copelon group held talks with the U.N. Office of Legal
Counsel and some governments, including the U.S. State Department.
Green and her co-authors make no claim that they had any effect on the
ICTY Statute. Instead, they concluded that "the status of rape and other
sexual and reproductive crimes against women will need to be liti-
gated."38
WILP and the Green/Copelon Group emerge in this story as voces
clamantes in deserto, setting up the alarm to women's groups that they
had to mobilize fast to clarify the feminist line about needed reforms if
they were to have an impact on the United Nations.
By the time the ICT Rules of Procedure and Evidence were being
negotiated in the fall of 1993, the CUNY Clinic, working with the
Green/Copelon Group, had allied with staff and students at the Harvard
Law School Human Rights Program. The sense of urgency was clear:
"[L]aw students ... threw themselves into this project on very short no-
tice."3 9 Looking back, the footnote listing the participants in the
preparation of their submission to the court (the Green/Copelon Working
Group Proposals) manifests a very small, but highly motivated and
skilled, team of ten professionals and fourteen law students.4°
35. No Justice, No Peace: Accountability for Rape and Gender-Based Violence in the
Former Yugoslavia, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 91 & n.a (1994) [hereinafter No Justice, No
Peace].
36. Id. at 121.
37. Jennifer Green, Rhonda Copelon, Patrick Cotter & Beth Stephens, Affecting the
Rules for the Prosecution of Rape and Other Gender-Based Violence Before the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Feminist Proposal and Critique, 5 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 171, app. B at 235-41 (1994) [hereinafter CUNY Clinic Memorandum] (dis-
cussing a memorandum prepared by the International Women's Human Rights Clinic of the
City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law).
38. Id. at 176.
39. Id. at 177.
40. Id. at 183 n.42; id. at 183-221 (suggesting proposals to the judges of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) regarding the prosecution of rape
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In ICTY and ICTR litigation, as soon as it got going, the feminists
were willing to play hardball. In both tribunals they worked with judges
to arrest the process when prosecutors failed to charge crimes of sexual
violence."a A distinct strategy for forcing the prosecutor's hand emerged
early and was used at least twice.
The first time was in Tadi. The feminist gambit transformed this
case into a pivotal moment for the reclassification of rape and other
forms of sexual violence as priority crimes in the ICT. On November 11,
1994, Prosecutor Richard Goldstone, a former justice on the South Afri-
can Constitutional Court, sought to transfer jurisdiction over Dusan
Tadi6 from a German court to the ICTY. 42 This must have been one of his
very first motions in the case. According to Copelon, his affidavit "gave
decidedly secondary consideration to the conditions affecting women
and to the severity of rape, for example, treating it as less serious than
beatings or omitting discussion of it. '4 3 The affidavit described an epi-
sode in which one Muslim man was forced to bite off the testicle of
another as "what was worse," presumably, than the rapes also alleged."
At this point in the trial, a remarkable story of feminist intervention
and prosecutorial responsiveness unfolded. "At the hearing on the defer-
ral application, Judge Odio-Benito"-the only woman on the ICTY trial
court panel trying the case 41-"questioned the Prosecutor on these defal-
cations and an amicus brief, filed by the International Women's Human
Rights Law Clinic, the Harvard Human Rights Program, and the Jacob
Blaustein Institute, underscored the trivialization of violence against
women.4 6 According to Copelon, Prosecutor Goldstone very promptly-
on November 22, 1994-wrote a personal letter to Copelon and other
feminists on the amicus brief, in which he stated:
We essentially concur with your comments as to the characteri-
zation of rape. The Declaration's discussion of rape does not
sufficiently reflect our policy of equating rape to other serious
and other gender-based violence); id. at 177 n. 19 (indicating that a preliminary draft of their
proposals was submitted to the ICTY judges in November and December 1993 and that the
document was revised and resubmitted in early 1994).
41. I have found no evidence that they were also working with witnesses, but the stories
that I am about to tell strongly suggest that they were.
42. Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes Against Women in Hu-
manitarian Law, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 243, 253-54 n.46 (1994).
43. Id. This reportage is not included in Surfacing Gender, presumably because these
events happened after that version of the article went to press.
44. Joanne Barkan, As Old as War Itself: Rape in Foca, DISSENT, Winter 2002, at 60,
63, available at http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=633.
45. Kellye L. Fabian, Proof and Consequences: An Analysis of the Tadi6 and Akayesu
Trials, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 981, 998 n.156 (2000).
46. Copelon, supra note 42, at 253-54 n.46; Barkan, supra note 44, at 63.
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transgressions of international law. Apart from the relevance to
charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, rape and other
sexual assaults will be prosecuted under the Statute's provisions
for torture, inhumane treatment, willfully causing great suffering
or serious injury to body, and inhumane acts, and other provi-
sions that adequately encompass the nature of the acts
committed and intent formulated 7
Feminists had finally gotten a purchase on events. And they were re-
markably successful in recruiting Prosecutor Goldstone to their cause.
He later recalled the effect of feminist NGO activism in this way:
Let me start with the enormous strides that have been made by
the tribunals in the development of the normative law. There has
been substantial progressive development of humanitarian law as
a consequence of the establishment of the ICTY. Of real impor-
tance are developments in the law with respect to gender
offenses. From my very first week in office, from the middle of
August, 1994 onwards, I began to be besieged with petitions and
letters, mainly from women's groups, but also from human
rights groups generally, from many European countries, the
United States and Canada, and also from non-governmental or-
ganizations in the former Yugoslavia. Letters and petitions
expressing concern and begging for attention, adequate atten-
tion, to be given to gender related crime, especially systematic
rape as a war crime. Certainly if any campaign worked, this one
48worked in my case ....
Feminist activist Joanne Barkan concludes: "Even in the early stages of
the tribunal's work, the lobbying to get prosecutors to pay attention to
sexual offenses paid off.
' 49
Feminists deployed a similar strategy in the ICTR. Akayesu was al-
ready being tried as a case involving widespread murder and other
violence when two witnesses and Judge Navanethem Pillay intervened.
Kelly Askin tells the story:
The initial indictment charged Akayesu with twelve counts of war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide for extermination,
murder, torture, and cruel treatment committed in his commune.
47. Copelon, supra note 42, at 253-54 n.46 (quoting Letter from Justice Richard Gold-
ston, Prosecutor, to Rhonda Copelon, Felice Gaer & Jennifer Green (Nov. 22, 1994)).
48. Richard Goldstone, The United Nations' War Crimes Tribunals: An Assessment, 12
CONN. J. INT'L L. 227, 231 (1997) [hereinafter Goldstone, United Nations' War Crimes Tribu-
nals] (emphasis added).
49. Barkan, supra note 44, at 63.
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In the midst of trial, a witness on the stand spontaneously testi-
fied about the gang rape of her 6-year-old daughter. A
subsequent witness testified that she herself was raped and she
witnessed or knew of other rapes. Fortunately, the sole female
judge at the ICTR at that time, Judge Navanethem Pillay, was
one of the three judges sitting on the case. Having extensive ex-
pertise in gender violence and international law, Judge Pillay
questioned the witnesses about these crimes. Suspecting that
these were not isolated instances of rape, the judges invited the
prosecution to consider investigating gender crimes in Taba and,
if found to have been committed and if attributable to Akayesu,
to consider amending the indictment to include the charges for
the rape crimes.
The trial was temporarily adjourned while the prosecution inves-
tigated the reports of rape in Taba. It found significant evidence
of rape and forced nudity, often in the presence of Akayesu and
with his encouragement or acquiescence. Indeed, many of the
gender related crimes had been committed on the grounds of his
office, where women and girls throughout the area had sought
refuge. Consequently, an amended indictment was filed, charg-
ing Akayesu with three counts of rape and other inhumane acts
as crimes against humanity. The genocide court [sic] in the
amended indictment also referred to the alleged sexual vio-
lence.5 °
Feminist advocates quickly intervened. A Working Group on Engender-
ing the Rwanda Tribunal, the International Women's Human Rights
Clinic, and the Center for Constitutional Rights, together representing
eighty feminist NGOs, promptly filed an amicus brief urging the
amendment of the Akayesu indictment to include rape and sexual vio-
lence. This brief indicates that the ICTY's prosecutor had already
indicted sexual violence crimes (and even took a little of the credit for
50. Kelly D. Askin, A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes in International
Courts and Tribunals: 1993 to 2003, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 16, 17 (2004) [hereinafter Askin, A
Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes]; see also Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecuting
Rape as a War Crime, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 277, 282 (2002) [hereinafter Goldstone,
Prosecuting Rape] (commenting that Judge Pillay's "actions, combined with the amicus brief
of the Coalition for Women's Human Rights in Conflict Situations ... resulted in a postpone-
ment of the trial during which the indictment was amended to include charges of sexual
violence .... "). But see Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, 23
(Sept. 2, 1998) (noting that the end of the first part of the trial came on May 24, 1997). The
Prosecutor then made an oral motion to amend the indictment on June 16, 1997, and sought
leave to add the rape counts. The Prosecutor's motion was subsequently granted, and the trial
recommenced on October 23, 1997. Id.
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that), and shames the ICTR equivalent for lagging behind.5 The Prosecu-
tor's Office complied,52 an amended indictment was filed, and Akayesu
produced the first convictions on charges of rape and sexual violence in
the ICTs.
Both episodes are stories of intense legal drama, of moments when
feminist activists emerged from the sidelines with spectacular sudden-
ness. Feminism was there, active and alert, in the persons of Judge Odio-
Benito, Judge Pillay, the NGOs, and perhaps, in Akayesu, the witnesses.
But it was scrambling for a place at the table."
The picture changed completely between 1994, when negotiations
about a possible international criminal court began, and 1998, when the
Rome Statute was adopted. During this period, the ICTs were getting off
the ground as operating courts, and, as we have seen, feminists were
forming NGOs with highly articulate, explicitly feminist agendas for
ICT prosecution and advocacy. Soon they had allies who served as
judges and as legal advisors to the ICTs and as Special Rapporteurs on
Sexual Violence examining conflicts around the world and issuing expert
statements about sexual violence in those conflicts. As we have also
observed, feminists acquired male allies holding equally elite positions in
the ICT and Rome Statute processes. Valerie Oosterveld is a good
51. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Amicus Brief Respecting Amendment of the Indictment and
Supplementation of the Evidence to Ensure the Prosecution of Rape and Other Sexual Vio-
lence Within the Competence of the Tribunal et al. as Amici Curiae, Case No. ICTR-96-4T,
41 (Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment (Sept. 2,
1998). The Brief argued,
[T]he failure of the Prosecutor of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to
prosecute rape and other sexual violence in the case of Akayesu, and in every other
indictment which has been confirmed thus far, is an unfortunate departure from the
precedent set by the Prosecutor and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia which, after initial criticism from a number of the undersigned amici
curiae, have taken leadership in ensuring the prosecution of rape and other forms of
sexual violence.
Id. See generally SHATTERED LIVES: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DuRING THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE
AND ITS AFTERMATH (Human Rights Watch 1996); see also Barbara Bedont, Gender-Specific
Provisions in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in I ESSAYS ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 183, 203 & n.71 (Flavia Lattanzi & Wil-
liam A. Schabas eds., 1999).
52. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998)
(noting that the original prosecutor in Akayesu was Pierre-Richard Prosper). Prosecutor Louise
Arbour signed the amended indictment. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-1, Acte
d'accusation (June 17, 1997), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA, REPORTS OF ORDERS, DECISIONS AND JUDGEMENTS, 1995-97, at 8-13 (Eric David,
Pierre Klein & Anne-Marie La Rosa eds., 2000) [hereinafter RWANDA REPORTS].
53. See generally Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape, supra note 50, at 281-82. Former-
Prosecutor Richard J. Goldstone seems to have confused Tadi6 with another very early case in
the ICTY, Prosecutor v. Nicolie. Compare id., with JOHN HAGAN, JUSTICE IN THE BALKANS:
PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES IN THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL 71-92 (2003).
Fall 20081
Michigan Journal of International Law
example of the scope and depth of this inclusion. Not only has she
written two law review articles bringing us deep into the negotiation of
the Rome Statute and its ancillary documents, M she was a "Legal Officer,
United Nations, Human Rights and Economic Law Division, Foreign
Affairs, Canada" and was a member of the Canadian delegation to the
Rome Statute conference and to the subsequent Preparatory Commission
and Assembly of States Parties, which conducted the drafting and
promulgation of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the ICC
Elements of Crimes.55 She was involved.
The Rome Statute process was an important stage in the institution-
alization of GFeminism in part because it was an important stage in the
institutionalization of NGOs as governance institutions of United Na-
tions bodies. Of course, the emergence of NGOs and their incorporation
in international legal institutions as participants in lawmaking often on
par with, if not superior to, nation-states, is a much broader event of the
1990s and was by no means the sole invention of feminists 6
The two most thorough accounts of how this process affected the
Rome Conference are by Fanny Benedetti and John L. Washburn and by
Zoe Pearson. Benedetti and Washburn indicate that they both partici-
pated in PrepComl, attending all of the public and many of the private
meetings at Rome; Pearson interviewed other participants in the process
who, in every case, declined to be identified.5 These two studies amply
demonstrate that PrepComl and the Rome Diplomatic Conference saw a
new reliance of the state delegations on NGO activists for advice. Ac-
cording to Benedetti and Washburn, early in the PrepComl process,
William R. Pace formed the Coalition for an International Court (CICC)
in order to coordinate pro-ICC NGOs5 The initial common goal of
member NGOs was to promote the existence, strength, and independ-
ence of an ICC. But in the course of its work, the CICC became a strong
force for the involvement of NGOs in what otherwise would have been
largely an encounter of state delegations. Beyond these common goals,
Pace's policy was to keep the CICC neutral as to the inconsistent agen-
54. Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery, supra note 21; Valerie Oosterveld, The Definition of
"Gender" in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Step Forward or Back
for International Criminal Justice?, 18 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 55 (2005) [hereinafter Oosterveld,
The Definition of "Gender" in the Rome Statute].
55. Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery, supra note 21, at 605 n.*; Oosterveld, The Definition of
"Gender" in the Rome Statute, supra note 54, at 55 n.*.
56. Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50 (1997).
57. Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 19, at 34 n.1; Zoe Pearson, Non-Govermental
Organizations and the International Criminal Court: Changing Landscapes of International
Law, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 243, 243 n.* (2006).
58. Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 19, at 8-9.
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das of member NGOs. Pace insisted on consensus, and CICC NGOs
largely complied.
The CICC found its state allies in the so-called Like-Minded Group
of States (LMG), a coalition of state delegations committed to the forma-
tion of a strong ICC. This strategic convergence led to a tactical one, as
this strong bloc of delegations came to favor ever-increasing NGO in-
volvement, especially when it was managed by Pace's strong hand in the
CICC. The CICC was remarkably successful in gaining official status for
NGOs. When the time came to organize the Rome Diplomatic Confer-
ence, the United Nations issued a resolution requesting the Conference
to allow participation by registered NGOs.' 9 At its third meeting, Prep-
ComI decided to hold all of its formal meetings and informal meetings
open to registered NGOs.6°
The kinds of participation that CICC NGOs found possible evolved
over time. At first, they provided wise assistance: their role was "consul-
tative."6' But Benedetti and Washburn indicate that the CICC changed
strategy at Rome, as it consolidated the NGOs into a single solidaristic
bloc, assigned them to work on thirteen 62 (or twelve63) distinct parts of
the draft Statute, and focused their work on providing friendly delega-
tions with consolidated drafts, amendments, and arguments. They were
no longer merely consultants: they were by this time, in Benedetti and
Washburn's minds anyway, "experts." 6 And they were omnipresent:
"[T]his shared coverage, together with an extended meeting schedule,
... made it much harder for conference delegates to get away from
NGOs in Rome. 65
Pearson's research sought to identify the key features of NGO par-
ticipation, and she confirms and extends Benedetti and Washburn's
assessments. According to Pearson, the CICC worked closely with the
LMG,66 provided representatives to augment the delegations of small
59. G.A. Res. 52/160, 7 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/160 (Dec. 15, 1997).
60. See Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 19, at 23; see also Christopher Keith Hall,
The Third and Fourth Sessions of the UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 124, 125 (1998).
61. Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 19, at 22. This would not be how they describe
their involvement: as we will see, from inside of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
that I have studied, the process was understood to be explicitly political, and they perceive
themselves as havingfought hard. See infra Parts I.B.2.b, II.D.2.b.ii-iii.
62. Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 19, at 32.
63. Sadat & Carden, supra note 22.
64. See Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 19, at 32.
65. Id.
66. Pearson, supra note 57, at 266.
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states,67 and, overall, "played a significant role in the ICC
negotiations.
'68
The rhetorical value of NGO participation was of course volatile.
Claims that NGOs were a large part of the process could be invoked, on
the one hand, to legitimate the process or the outcome. For example,
heavy NGO participation could be invoked to show that the Conference
was transparent, enjoyed lots of civil society buy-in, and so on. The di-
versity of CICC members could be cited to argue that contentious issues
had been thoroughly aired.69 On the other hand, these very claims could
be invoked to de-legitimate it. For instance, the importance of NGOs
could be cited to argue that delegations and the process were captured by
ideologically motivated forces.70 And NGOs were not always welcome:
the Argentinean Asociaci6n de las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo was at
one point ejected "for disruptive behavior."7' Clearly, NGOs were toler-
ated only so long as they hewed to an implicit code of conduct.
Delegates reported to Pearson that they resented NGOs' hardball tactics
and valued NGO input to the extent that it felt less like lobbying and
more like expertise:
72
The reputation that NGOs earned as reliable and knowledgeable
sources of information, prepared to engage in a professional way
about the subject matter of the ICC issues, greatly contributed to
the receptiveness of [S]tates to their positions and assisted the
good working relationships that evolved between many NGOs
and state delegations.73
As long as they spoke with the voice of sweet reason and especially of
expertise, they could be included almost on par with state delegations.
General statements that the NGOs had a large substantive impact on
the outcome at Rome are plentiful in the pro-ICC, pro-NGO law review
literature. For example, in his series of interim reports on the work of the
third PrepComl meetings published in the American Journal of Interna-
tional Law, Christopher Keith Hall concluded that the decision to keep
the meetings open made it "possible for NGOs and governmental delega-
tions to continue their constructive working relationship in which NGOs
supplied the delegations with detailed analysis and recommendations
67. Id. at 266-67.
68. Id. at 244.
69. Id. at 259-65.
70. Id. at 269.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 278-79 (concluding that it was important for NGO representatives to establish
personal rapport with state delegates and to maintain the reputations of NGOs as credible
sources of knowledge).
73. Id. at 272.
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concerning the [International Law Commission (ILC)] draft statute. The
NGO recommendations have had a significant impact on governments'
proposals ... Here is how Hall saw their role in the fifth meeting of
PrepComl:
The increasing effectiveness of the coordinated lobbying of the
316 members of the NGO Coalition for an International Crimi-
nal Court [the CCIC], including the four groups of
nongovernmental organizations, each working on a particular is-
sue such as prohibited weapons and the rights of children,
victims and women, was marked. The value of NGO commen-
taries was widely acknowledged by government delegates and
the drafting of the consolidated text reflects their input. 5
Though NGOs used a different tone than Hall, they agreed with him in
substance. Human Rights Watch, for instance, congratulated itself exul-
tantly: "That the ICC has come into force today and is potentially a
powerful instrument for protecting women's rights is a testament to this
indefatigable activism and determination. 76
My main goal in Part I is to determine, as far as possible, what con-
stituted feminism in this process. In order to do that, I have needed to
figure out who represented women, broadly speaking, in the PrepComl
and Rome meetings. More specifically, who thought that women were a
distinct human group suffering distinct harms and requiring distinct ad-
vocacy in the formation of the new Statute?
77
No fewer than thirty NGOs with the word "women" in their titles
appear on the list of NGOs accredited to participate in the Rome Confer-
ence.7 1 Of course, this number does not take into account the other NGOs
74. Hall, supra note 60, at 125.
75. Christopher Keith Hall, The Fifth Session of the UN Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 331, 339 (1998).
76. Human Rights Watch, International Justice for Women: The ICC Marks a New Era
(July 1, 2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/icc-women.pdf.
77. I use my own definition of "feminist" here: thinkers and actors for whom a
male/female and m/f distinction matters, who hypothesize that, at least sometimes, in some
domain of human affairs, male is greater than female (m>f), and who direct their efforts to
carrying a brief on behalf of female or f more generally. See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECI-
SIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 17-20 (2006).
78. The Secretary-General, Note by the Secretary-General on the Non-Governmental
Organizations Accredited to Participate in the Conference, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 1 83/Inf/3 (June
5, 1998). This number is up from the one, then two, then three feminist organizations engag-
ing in the first stages of the ICT statute and litigation processes described supra notes 35-38
and accompanying text. It is much more on the scale of the eighty organizations signing the
amicus brief in Akayesu. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Indeed, given the much
larger organizational capacity needed to participate in the Rome Conference process, as op-
posed to that required to sign an amicus brief, the active involvement of thirty women's NGOs
suggests further growth in the scale of the feminist NGO establishment.
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that would have had feminists on board and that worked on the issues of
concern to the women's organizations. Describing this collaboration, Hu-
man Rights Watch indicates that "women's rights activists throughout the
world-of every political stripe, faith, sexual orientation, nationality, and
ethnicity-mobilized at each step of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) process ... ."" Rana Lehr-Lehnardt indicates that the Feminist
Majority Foundation, the Women's Division of Human Rights Watch,
Amnesty International, "and others" participated actively in the feminist
reform effort.8° These statements suggest a range of feminist NGOs cou-
pled with a range of feminist views.
Despite the large number of participating NGOs advocating for
women, every single explicit statement that I have been able to find iden-
tifying the NGOs that actually influenced the process for setting rules
relevant to a feminist agenda leads to one entity in particular: the
Women's Caucus for Gender Justice (WCGJ).
This is certainly the conclusion of feminists writing about their ex-
perience of the Rome process.8' But we need not depend on feminist
sources for this conclusion: nonfeminist recorders of PrepComl and the
Rome Statute support it as well. Leila Nadya Sadat and S. Richard
Carden credit the "Women's Caucus and many State delegations" with
producing "a much stronger gender perspective throughout ... [the
Rome Statute's] text" than in any prior IHL document.82 Benedetti and
Washburn indicate that, in PrepComl, there were four "main groups of
the [CICC] coalition"; the first one they mention was the WCGJ and the
list does not include any other group devoted to women's issues. 83 Hall
reports that "[t]he NGO recommendations have had a significant impact
on governments' proposals ... , and, in the absence of summary records
in the Preparatory Committee, these recommendations will aid in under-
standing the history and meaning of many provisions of the statute......
79. Human Rights Watch, supra note 76.
80. Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, One Small Step for Women: Female-Friendly Provisions in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 16 BYU J. PuB. L. 317, 339 (2002).
81. Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes Un-
der International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles, 21 BER ELEY J. INT'L
L. 288, 347 (2003) [hereinafter Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape] (emphasizing that efforts
by organizations working alongside or under the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice (WCGJ)
in the International Criminal Court (ICC) secured the inclusion of rape and other feminist
reforms in the ICC); see also Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery, supra note 21, at 613 n.33;
Oosterveld, The Definition of "Gender" in the Rome Statute, supra note 54, at 58 n.21. See
generally Bedont, supra note 51; Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32.
82. Sadat & Carden, supra note 22, at 396 n.73.
83. The others listed are Amnesty International, the Association of the Bar of New York
City's Committees on International Law and International Human Rights, Human Rights




He then lists the position papers of five NGOs as the effective legislative
history of PrepComl, and again the WCGJ is the only women's NGO
listed. ' And he publishes the same list, omitting the New York Bar Asso-
ciation and adding the World Federalist Association, in his report on the
fifth meeting of PrepComl8 Jennifer Schense, Legal Advisor to the
CICC, includes the WCGJ as the only nominally women's or feminist
organization on the Steering Committee of the CICC as of March 2002.86
We are warranted in concluding, I think, that though a large number
of NGOs was involved, the WCGJ successfully became their coalition
leader. And this fact alone is indirect evidence that it also mastered the
behavioral codes that gave some NGOs legitimacy. In the intense advo-
cacy and fierce resistance that ensued when the WCGJ proposed that
"enforced pregnancy" be included among the prosecutable crimes, the
WCGJ was included directly in the negotiations and at one point it was
negotiating directly with the Holy See.87
In effect, what the CICC was to the pro-ICC NGOs, the WCGJ was
to the feminist ones: the decisive legitimate NGO, enjoying the power,
conceded by NGOs and Like-Minded Group delegations alike, to organ-
ize and speak for member NGOs.
And what was the WCGJ? Officially recognized at the third meeting
8of PrepComl, it was a coalition of women's NGOs, counting about 200
affiliates at the time the Conference began. It consolidated a coherent
platform for feminist reform and lobbied hard in the Rome Statute nego-
tiations.89 In addition, as we will see in Parts H1.D and II.E below, it had a
rich platform of proposed reforms, arguments, and strategic practices.
Feminists were not shy to claim credit for making a difference in the
Rome Statute negotiations, and when they did so they spoke the lan-
guage not of expertise but of politics. Writing in the law reviews, they
testified to their hard work and their partial success. Barbara Bedont and
Katherine Hall-Martinez indicate that "[w]omen's rights activists viewed
the negotiations for the ICC as a historic opportunity to address the fail-
ures of earlier international treaties and tribunals to properly delineate,
investigate, and prosecute wartime violence against women." 9 They de-
scribe the WCGJ as an active lobbying entity with the leverage to change
84. Hall, supra note 60, at 125 & n.7.
85. Hall, supra note 75, at 339 n.17.
86. Jennifer Schense, Necessary Steps for the Creation of the International Criminal
Court, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 717, 717 n.* (2002).
87. See Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 66-74; Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery,
supra note 21, at 620-21.
88. Nicole Eva Erb, Gender-Based Crimes Under the Draft Statute for the Permanent
International Criminal Court, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 401,425 n.97 (1998).
89. Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 67.
90. Id. at 66.
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some States' negotiating positions: "Few, if any, government delegations
would have been willing to expend the political capital needed to secure
the provisions [on the WCGJ agenda] ... without the persistent lobbying
efforts of the Women's Caucus."9' Christine Chinkin concludes that the
success of the intense lobbying by women's groups both at
Rome and then throughout the first meeting of the Assembly of
States Parties shows that it is possible to gain provisions for eq-
uitable gender representation within the constitutive instrument
of an international court and also to insist upon voting proce-
dures to ensure that the commitment is met.92
Hilary Charlesworth concurs: "This recognition [of sexual violence as a
potential crime of genocide, a crime against humanity, and a war crime
in the statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals and the ICC] was the result of
considerable work and lobbying by women's organizations .. .,,9
Meanwhile, as we have seen, feminists played many explicitly po-
litical roles in the ICTY/ICTR charging and adjudication process.94 From
outside the institutional structure of the tribunals, they intervened in the
form of activist NGOs, writing letters, submitting amicus briefs, and put-
ting face-to-face pressure on ICT officials. They also brought pressure
by writing law review articles and treatises assessing the tribunals' pro-
gress. One of the things that they pushed for was inclusion in the
tribunals' processes as official players. A particularly important goal was
the appointment of ideologically sympathetic judges. As we have seen,
they were finally invited inside, and got appointed as experts, special
rapporteurs on sexual violence, investigators, prosecutors, and judges.
Feminists repeatedly claimed that they mounted a concerted cam-
paign that made concrete differences in the outcomes. The consensus
among feminists writing about these achievements is so smooth that my
collection of quotations testifying to them is highly duplicative. Femi-
nists were in complete consensus about the need for political pressure,
the fact that they brought it to bear, and the fact that it produced a meas-
ure of success.9 Two examples may suffice. According to Barkan,
91. Id. at 69; see also Lehr-Lehnardt, supra note 80, at 345-54 (arguing a more pessi-
mistic assessment that was entirely sympathetic to the WCGJ's aims but more aggrieved about
its defeats).
92. Christine Chinkin, "Reconceiving Reality": A Ten-Year Perspective, 97 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 55, 56 (2003).
93. Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 Am. J. INT'L L.
379, 386 (1999).
94. See supra text accompaning notes 35-53.
95. See, e.g., Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 81, at 317 ("The prosecu-
tion of gender crimes in the Tribunals is typically fraught with inherent difficulties and
gratuitous obstacles, and the crimes are usually investigated and indicted only after concerted
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[T]he new International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia looked
like an exceptional chance in 1993 for advocates of human rights
for women to make some progress. But every step forward, as it
turned out, required a lobbying campaign. Nongovernmental or-
ganizations and university-based institutes wrote briefs and
letters, requested meetings, did press work, and held seminars
and conferences.
The struggle was often intense: "The advocates' work had to be thor-
ough, and there was a lot of it."97 Barkan attributes the only real
successes of the ICTY to this feminist intervention and to the "many
prosecutors and judges [who] were responsive, some even courageous. '"9
In light of these achievements, Barkan abandoned some of her cynicism
about the tribunals: "From the start, most observers considered the ...
[ICTY] a sop to human rights and feminist activists who wanted inter-
vention .... Almost no one expected it to succeed. And yet, to some
extent, at least for women, it did."'99
Askin tells largely the same story:
The cases demonstrate that female judges, investigators, prose-
cutors, and translators, particularly those with expertise in
gender crimes, are extremely useful in the prosecution of gender
pressure by women's rights organizations and feminist scholars to prosecute the crimes. None-
theless the progress made is nothing short of revolutionary."); Kelly D. Askin, Sexual Violence
in Decisions and Indictments of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status, 93 AM.
J. INT'L L. 97, 98 (1999) [hereinafter Askin, Sexual Violence] ("[T]he jurisprudence of the
United Nations Tribunals reflects women's participation."); Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra
note 32, at 75-76 ("The gradual shift toward taking rape and other sexual crimes seriously and
investigating them zealously can be traced to the participation of women in the ICTY and
ICTR as investigators, researchers, judges, legal advisors, and prosecutors."); Charlesworth,
supra note 93, at 387 (arguing that the ICTY recognition of sexual violence as a criminal act
under international humanitarian law (IHL) "was the result of considerable work and lobbying
by women's organizations"); Chinkin, supra note 92, at 55 (observing that the effort to secure
recognition of "gender crimes" from the ICTY has "met with considerable success"); id. at 63
("The work of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda-
once again driven by energetic outsider [NGOs] and committed insiders ... [crafted] gender-
sensitive procedure and case law [such as the Akayesu, Kunarac, and Furund~ija cases]");
CUNY Clinic Memorandum, supra note 37, at 173. The authors of the CUNY Clinic Memo-
randum stated,
[The ICTY] is ... historic in that it is the first to give distinct attention to gender-
based crimes. This is in no small measure the result of the persistent efforts of sur-
vivors and their advocates, as well as the growing global campaign for women's
human rights, which has made violence against women a major international issue.
CUNY Clinic Memorandum, supra note 37, at 173.
96. Barkan, supra note 44, at 63.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 62.
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crimes. They further demonstrate that there must be political
will to prosecute sex crimes, and that pressure exerted from
NGOs is often indispensable to ensuring that gender crimes are
investigated and indicted.' °
Nor are Barkan and Askin guilty of empty boasting. As we have
seen, ICTY/ICTR Prosecutor Richard Goldstone was willing to go pub-
lic claiming that his heart and mind had been changed by feminist
advocacy. Clearly he, at least, thought that announcing his susceptibility
to GFeminist pressure and persuasion added to, rather than impugned,
his credibility.'0 '
2. The Emerging Genres of GFeminist Rhetoric
So far the feminist strategy in legislative and prosecutorial reform
appears seamlessly identical. GFeminism, however, housed a vast array
of roles, each of which had a number of genres of writing available to it.
A judge could write opinions but would probably hesitate to write hard-
hitting advocacy op-eds; a hard-hitting advocate might denounce interna-
tional law for failing to recognize the harm of rape in war, provoking the
ire of a comrade who was writing in the law reviews to argue that inter-
national law has always recognized wartime rape as a violation and that
the only change needed now was to make this prohibition explicit.
I decided early on in the research summarized in this Article that I
would not interview participants in the processes I describe here: the
result, I thought, would simply have multiplied rather than reduced the
interpretive challenges of dealing with the written archive. So I have
made myself entirely dependent on genres of legal writing, ranging from
the judicial opinion to the op-ed, for the material on which I base the
conclusions of this Article. And this has in turn made me reckon with the
particular representational or literary capacities of these different genres.
When could I take a given text as reliable reportage of what happened,
and when was it an event in its own right? When was the patent spin ex-
aggerating a legal claim just misleading, and when did it tell me
something about feminist strategy and tactics?
In thinking about these problems constantly while composing this
Article, I came to the conclusion that, consciously or not, the feminists
made an allocation of rhetorical styles to occupants of different roles,
and that this allocation shifted over the course of the decade, always in
response to an advocacy/legitimacy tension that was immanent in differ-
ent ways in different institutional settings and various roles. Part of what
100. Askin, A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes, supra note 50, at 19.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
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makes the outsider activist feminists of the early 1990s so different from
the insider GFeminists of the late years of the decade was this new rela-
tionship to that advocacy/legitimacy tension.
One of the most dramatic changes over the course of the 1990s in-
volved the deployment of position papers, draft legislation, written
talking points, and the like. In the ICT phase, feminists published these,
but in the Rome phase, they did not. That is, in the very beginning, while
they were ignored by the United Nations personnel drawing up the ICTY
Statute, feminists decided to publish some of their blueprints for rule
reform-and when they did publish, they set out their agenda rule by
rule, rationale by rationale. They also ushered into print some of the
documents that they submitted to the rule-making bodies. Both kinds of
publications give us snapshots of what they were doing in their actual
interventions. Three such publications have been extremely useful to me
in my research:
1. The WILP No Justice, No Peace Report.0 2 The printed version
of this document does not disclose how or when it was circu-
lated in the United Nations. It was produced sometime between
the WILP delegation's February 1993 journey to the Balkans
conflict area and the print publication of the Report in the winter
of 1994, probably in the winter months of 1993.
2. The CUNY Clinic Memorandum.' 3 Submitted to United Na-
tions bodies involved in drafting the ICTY Statute, it is undated
but must have been in circulation in the early months of 1993.
3. The Green/Copelon Working Group Proposals.'° These were
submitted to the ICTY judges and were aimed at influencing the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence. They too are undated, but we
know that they were submitted to the ICTY in late 1993 and, re-
vised, again in early 1994.
By the time formal discussions leading to the Rome Conference were
underway, the practice of publishing this kind of material had fallen into
disuse. I have relied on documents I was able to obtain on the WCGJ
102. See No Justice, No Peace, supra note 35.
103. See CUNY Clinic Memorandum, supra note 37, app. B at 235-41.
104. Id. at 171.
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website (now closed),' and through the immensely appreciated generos-
ity of Valerie Oosterveld.'06
In my view, the GFeminists' attitude was not that these materials
were secret. Rather, GFeminism as it took shape shed the earlier strate-
gic impulse to publish position papers. There are many likely reasons for
this, probably including the vastly increased volume of such documents,
the increasingly minute detail that they encompassed, and the emergence
of distribution networks that did not rely on law review publication. In
its hammer-to-anvil work, GFeminism entered into discussion with itself
and with the world of IHL/ICL officials.
These "blueprint" documents aren't just direct evidence of the re-
form demands made by the feminists issuing them: they are those
demands. They give us unalloyed access to the feminist rule demands
and the arguments that feminists thought politically, ethically, and rhet-
105. WCGJ, Recommendations and Commentary for December 1997 PrepCom on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court United Nations Headquarters (Dec. 1-12,
1997) [hereinafter WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations] (on file with author); WCGJ, Summary
of Recommendations: Composition and Administration of the Court; Crimes Against Human-
ity, pt. 11.2 (March 1998) [hereinafter WCGJ, 3/98 Summary of Recommendations] (on file
with author).
106. See WCGJ, Recommendations and Commentary for August 1997 PrepCom on the
Establishment of an international Criminal Court [hereinafter WCGJ, 8/97 Recommendations
on the Court] (on file with author); WCGJ, Recommendations and Commentary for the March
1998 PrepCom, Reparations, pt. III (Mar. 18, 1998) [hereinafter WCGJ, 3/98 Recommenda-
tions on Reparations] (on file with author); WCGJ, Recommendations and Commentary for
the March 1998 PrepCom, Establishment of the Court & Relationship with the United Na-
tions, Financing the Court; Final Clauses, pt. V [hereinafter WCGJ, 3/98 Recommendations
on the Institutional Court] (on file with author); WCGJ, Recommendations and Commentary
for the March 1998 PrepCom, Composition and Administration, pt. I [hereinafter WCGJ, 3/98
Recommendations on Composition and Administration]; WCGJ, Recommendations & Com-
mentary for the March 1998 PrepCom, Article 5[20] Chapeau, Crimes Against Humanity, pt.
IV (Mar. 19, 1998) [hereinafter WCGJ, 3/98 Recommendations on Crimes Against Humanity]
(on file with author); WCGJ, Recommendations on Composition and Administration of the
Court (Apr. 14, 1998) [hereinafter WCGJ, 4/98 Recommendations on Composition and Ad-
ministration] (on file with author); see also WCGJ, Gender Justice and the ICC (addressed to
the Rome Conference) [hereinafter WCGJ, Gender Justice and the ICC] (on file with author).
See also the position papers composed to address specific controversies that arose around
WCGJ proposals during the Conference. These I subdivide, in turn, into two series, one on the
controversy about "gender violence" and the second on a controversy about "enforced preg-
nancy." Gender violence: WCGJ, Briefing Paper on Gender (Mar.-Apr. 1998) [hereinafter
WCGJ, 3/98 Briefing Paper on Gender] (on file with author); WCGJ, Applying the Most Re-
cently Negotiated Definition of Gender to the ICC Statute [hereinafter WCGJ, Negotiated
Definition of Gender] (on file with author); WCGJ, The International Community Has Re-
peatedly Reaffirmed the Need to Eliminate Gender Violence [hereinafter WCGJ, Need to
Reaffirm Gender Violence] (on file with author); WCGJ, Call to Delegates: Resist the Attack
on Gender Justice [hereinafter WCGJ, Call to Delegates on Gender] (on file with author).
Enforced pregnancy: WCGJ, Justice for Women: The Crime of Enforced Pregnancy (June 26,
1998) [hereinafter WCGJ, 6/98 Crime of Enforced Pregnancy] (on file with author); WCGJ,
Priority Concerns: Respecting War Crimes, art. B [hereinafter WCGJ, Priority Concerns (En-
forced Pregnancy)] (on file with author).
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orically apt to support them. To borrow J.L. Austin's terminology, they
are performative, not constative.' 7 But they are not transparent state-
ments of what their promulgators wanted the law to be or harbored as
their core ideological reasons for those desires. Controversy among
feminists could be hidden behind compromise language, and strategic
and even small tactical concerns could cause feminists to mute certain
demands and to advocate rules quite different from their ideal prescrip-
tions. It was only as I learned a lot about the process that I felt
comfortable attributing a "legal vision" and a "feminist ideology" to par-
ticular moves manifested in these materials. I try to be explicit about
how I came to my conclusions so that they can be challenged where I
have missed something or am wrong.
Even as the feminist law reform archive stopped going into print, a
parallel shift was happening in feminists' use of journals and other print
media. In the early days, before the existence of GFeminist insiders and
thus of GFeminism as a real possibility, feminist activists producing the
"blueprint" documents were also willing to publish guides to their legal
and rhetorical strategies. Rhonda Copelon published some extremely
frank assessments of the advantages and impediments offered to femi-
nists by existing humanitarian law.'0 8 She, Jennifer Green, Patrick Cotter,
and Beth Stephens set out their blueprint for the Green/Copelon Working
Group Proposals in an article bluntly entitled "Affecting the Rules." ' 9
They put political and strategic motivations directly on the table. Back
then.
Also in the early days, high feminist legal theory was blunt about the
failings of international law and invoked feminism as the source of its
norms. For example, Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Shelley Wright, in their
article essentially inaugurating feminist interventions in international
law," ° drew up a world in which international law and feminism were
distinct sources of normativity, the former sadly in need of help from the
latter. Though of course Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright invoke in-
ternational law as a source not only of legal but also of normative
authority, they also denounce it as "a thoroughly gendered system.' It
107. J.L. AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS 1-24 (J.O. Urmson & Marina SbisA
eds., 2d ed. 1976).
108. Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Reconceptualizing Crimes Against Women in
Times of War, in MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 197, 197-
218 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., Marion Faber trans., 1994); see also Copelon, supra note 42
(providing a substantially revised and republished version of her article entitled "Surfacing
Gender: Reconceptualizing Crimes Against Women in Times of War").
109. See CUNY Clinic Memorandum, supra note 37, at 171.
110. Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to
International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613 (1991).
111. Id. at 615.
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is feminist theory that constitutes the overarching normative reference
point for reform: "By taking women seriously and describing the si-
lences and fundamentally skewed nature of international law, feminist
theory can identify possibilities for change.'
12
This transparency, frank strategy, and feminist-as opposed to le-
gal-normativity gradually went missing from feminist publications on
rape, sexual violence, and related matters in international law. The first
sign of the shift was in feminist work on particular cases in the ICTs.
Feminists withheld many of the real-time documents that did not have to
be officially filed (letters, etc.); they stopped publishing articles setting
forth strategy going forward; and instead they published articles describ-
ing and assessing the work of the prosecutors and the courts ex post. By
the time of the Rome Conference, there was a small library of feminist
articles and even books restating and assessing what was actually in the
final Statute. In this bibliography, the outsiders-and some insiders-
describe, restate, praise, and criticize the already-existing law produced
by the insiders.
A word needs to be said about the problems involved in using this
subsequent, far more voluminous literature as evidence of what hap-
pened or of what those involved actually wanted, thought, or did. It is
precisely at the line between description/restatement on the one hand,
and praise/blame on the other, that the rhetorical complexity of this pub-
lished record emerges. The feminist legislative blueprints had a
manifesto-like clarity, and the frank strategy papers weighed pros and
cons and argued for risky but plausible approaches or for conceding im-
portant normative points for strategic gains. This relative directness is
almost entirely absent from the feminist law review literature describing
and assessing both the litigation/adjudication process in the ICTs and the
legislative process especially at and leading up to Rome. Instead, de-
scription is sometimes infused with assessment; assessment sometimes
gains its rhetorical punch from artful rather than na've description. In
several instances, which I will detail carefully below, feminists were
more willing to disclose strategic reasons for positions that they took
than to reveal the underlying intra-feminist disagreements that made
strategy trump normative assertion. We have here what you might call
literary nonfiction. The authorial stance is objectivity, descriptive accu-
racy, and legal rightness, but the writing itself is strategic and full of
spin. And sometimes the writing goes off the rails of descriptive accu-
racy altogether; when it does, I experience the work as literary fiction.
For my purposes, these deviations from simple restatement were ex-




desire was being revealed to me, perhaps even more clearly, if less di-
rectly, than in the declamations of the manifestos and the earnest
argumentation of the early strategy papers.
What follows is a brief analysis of the two main genres of GFeminist
writing: contributions by feminists who held official positions in the
ICTs, PrepComl, or at Rome;" 3 and contributions by feminists writing in
the mode of restatement, codification, and the objective transmission of
existing positive law."14 I am not aiming here to present an encyclopedia
of writing on the topic: for instance, strong feminist writing in the tradi-
tion of the inaugural Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright article did
occasionally appear,"5 and a critical literature also emerged,"' 6 and I set
them aside. The aim here is to take the measure of feminist writing as
feminism was increasingly merged into international law's common
sense.
a. Contributions by Feminists Who Held Official Positions in the
ICTs and PrepComl or at Rome
Extremely rarely would an insider don the label "feminist," and
Prosecutor Goldstone was far more willing to affiliate himself with a
feminist agenda than were any of the women holding official positions.
But women and men invested with official roles contributed decisively to
the feminist cause. It is I, not they, who designate them "feminist." I do
so on the grounds that they treated women as a distinct social group, saw
women as subordinated to men at least some of the time, and shared the
goal of finding for subordinated women some relief from, if not cessa-
tion of, their subordination.'
It is easy to see why the judges would have been circumspect. The
ICTs had to create themselves ex nihilo. For years, they operated under the
113. See infra Part I.B.2.a.
114. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
115. See Charlesworth, supra note 93 (departing completely from the restate-
ment/advocacy dichotomy).
116. Karen Engle, Feminism and Its (Dis)Contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, 99 Am. J. INT'L L. 778 (2005) [hereinafter Engle, Feminism and Its
(Dis)Contents]; Karen Engle, Liberal Internationalism, Feminism, and the Suppression of
Critique: Contemporary Approaches to Global Order in the United States, 46 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 427 (2005) [hereinafter Engle, Liberal Internationalism]; Elena Loizidou, Criminal Law
and Punishment: Indexical Permission, 6 PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 303 (2004); Elena Loizidou,
The Trouble with Rape: Gender Matters and Legal "Transformations", 7 FEMINIST LEGAL
STUD. 275 (1999); Diane Otto, Lost in Translation: Re-Scripting the Sexed Subjects of Inter-
national Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 318 (Anne Orford ed.,
2006); Annelise Riles, The Virtual Sociality of Rights: The Case of "Women's Rights are
Human Rights", in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES: GLOBALISATION AND POWER DIs-
PARITIES 420, 420-39 (Michael Likosky ed., 2002).
117. See HALLEY, supra note 77, at 17-20 (offering the definition of feminism that I use
here).
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constant danger that public confidence in them would collapse, funding
dry up, and a humiliating, violence-affirming institutional disintegration
ensue. They had to apply sui generis statutes to sui generis conflicts. The
ICTY had to do this during the conflict it was adjudicating. For the
ICTY, illegitimacy could come not in a charge of "victor's justice" but of
taking sides in an ongoing war."8 As a result, the ICTs labored under a
near-crippling legitimacy deficit."9
There were other legitimacy constraints. When it came time to con-
sider legal innovations, the tribunals had to pay obeisance to the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege. The Rome Conference too was
sometimes justified on grounds that it merely codified existing interna-
tional law, though it enjoyed some scope for explicit innovation in that it
was negotiating a treaty document that would apply only to signatory
States through a court that would enforce its terms only prospectively.
But both the ICTs and the ICC were and are supposed to be applying
existing law. For their convictions to mean "justice" to many consumers
of their output, the judges had to convince people that they were respect-
ers of right, neutral objective arbiters of guilt or innocence.
According to my research, the ICT judges limited themselves to le-
gal rulings and opinions and refrained from publishing in the law
reviews or political journals. Yet, as we have seen, they could be quick to
advance the GFeminist cause when the opportunity arose. 2° How could
this judicial activism be made to jibe with their obligations to remain
neutral and merely apply law? By representing feminism as justice and
representing feminism as knowledge.
Recall ICTR Judge Pillay's intervention in Akayesu to ensure that
testimony of sexual violence became the basis of an amended indictment
with new counts charging rape as the predicate crime for genocide,
crimes against humanity, and more.' 2' In its closing statement, the
Akayesu defense "questioned whether the Indictment was amended in
response to public pressure concerning the prosecution of sexual vio-
lence."'22 The argument was that these charges were not law but politics.
118. Why, someone might ask, were those who perpetrated the NATO bombing of Kos-
ovo not tried as war criminals?
119. See Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and Show Trials, 6 MAX PLANCK Y.B.
U.N. L. 1 (2002) (noting the dilemma of legitimacy that besets special tribunals, and that will
beset the ICC, as they adjudicate violations of international humanitarian law and international
criminal law).
120. Askin, A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes, supra note 50, at 17 (dis-
cussing the story about Judge Pillay intervening in order to get sexual violence testimony
expanded).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.




The Trial Chamber responded by translating politics into justice through
a series of verbal transpositions that successively displaced the former by
morphing it into the latter. Here is the first step in the Trial Chamber's
response:
The Chamber understands that the amendment of the Indictment
resulted from the spontaneous testimony of sexual violence by
Witness J and Witness H during the course of this trial and the
subsequent investigation of the Prosecution, rather than from
public pressure.123
Here we have gone from public pressure, to simple fact, to objective in-
vestigation. The Trial Chamber continues,
Nevertheless, the Chamber takes note of the interest shown in
this issue by non-governmental organizations, which it considers
as indicative of public concern over the historical exclusion of
rape and other forms of sexual violence from the investigation
and prosecution of war crimes. The investigation and presenta-




We have successfully navigated from the rocky coast of public pressure
to the calm, smooth isthmus of justice. Note the transvaluation of the
term "interest." The NGOs are represented as interested not in the sense
that they form an interest group or have a stake in the outcome, but in the
sense that their attention has been focused on events in the trial. They
make manifest generic "public concern" that the "interest" not of any
politically self-interested group but "of justice" itself be done.
The idea that the commitments of feminism are justice, I would argue,
is going to make them more palatable among international-law insiders
bound to norms of neutrality. It will also make them more difficult to de-
tect: as they become part of international law's common sense, they also
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. (emphasis added). I think that someone at the ICTR was worried about the
charge that the Prosecutor's amended indictment in Akayesu was politically motivated and
sought to shape the docket to make the charge difficult to lodge. I was unable to find anywhere
in the official publications of the ICTR records in Akayesu, or on the ICTR website, any trace
of an original indictment lacking charges of sexual violence crimes. Both the official paper
publication and the website begin with an indictment including crimes of sexual violence.
RWANDA REPORTS, supra note 52, at 8-13. Moreover, this indictment pre-dates by several
months the tribunal's order permitting the amendment of the original indictment. Id. at 52-53.
It seems likely that these official sources substitute the amended indictment for the original
one, which remains unpublished. And it also seems at least possible that this substitution is not
accidental but the result of a desire to keep the official docket innocent of the startling events
leading to the first indictment's amendment.
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lose their fingerprints, become generic, become capable of being hidden
in plain sight. They will be ever more difficult to discern as feminist.
The same could be said of the second accommodation GFeminism
has made to the demands of IHL/ICL legitimacy: feminism as expertise.
Joanne Barkan, whose writing I will classify below as outsider-activist
GFeminist, shows an extremely nice sense of who could fight and who
had to know:
The cases demonstrate that female judges, investigators, prose-
cutors, translators, particularly those with expertise in gender
crimes, are extremely useful in the prosecution of gender crimes.
They further demonstrate that there must be political will to
prosecute sex crimes, and that pressure exerted from NGOs is




Barkan claims for feminism the full range of roles, from NGOs on the
outside, to judges on the ultimate inside. And whereas the outside forces
exert "political ... pressure," the inside players have "expertise in gen-
der crimes." Feminism as knowledge could wear judicial robes and wield
prosecutorial discretion without sacrificing legitimacy.
We see this defensive re-characterization again and again. For exam-
ple, William R. Pace and Jennifer Schense describe a sharp conflict in
the PrepComl between a group of Arab States and the WCGJ in ho-
mologous terms:
[T]he advocacy-oriented activities of the Women's Caucus en-
countered difficulties because of the sustained opposition of a
small number of delegations to what they perceived to be the
pursuit of a purely political agenda rather than the contribution
of legal expertise based on the real-life experiences of war-
affected women and survivors of sexual violence.
26
Of the three italicized modes of operation, Pace and Schense were will-
ing to defend the WCGJ's engagement in a lot of the first from attacks
that they were really doing the second as long as their work could be
described as, really, instead, the third.
Feminist judging was really expert judging. Askin praised Judge Pil-
lay's intervention in Akayesu for its abrupt effectiveness, concluding that
"it is highly unlikely that the Akayesu decision... which exemplifies a
125. Askin, A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes, supra note 50, at 19.
126. William R. Pace & Jennifer Schense, Coalition for the International Criminal
Court at the Preparatory Commission, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS




heightened awareness of crimes committed against women, would have
demonstrated such gender sensitivity without South African Judge
Navanethem Pillay's participation in both the trial and the judgment.''27
That is to say, her intervention worked. And this powerful intervention
brought not politics, but knowledge: "Having extensive expertise in gen-
der violence and international law, Judge Pillay questioned the
witnesses about these crimes."1 21 Similarly, Askin tells us, Judge Odio-
Benito, who, by the relevant time, was "one of the three female judges
appointed to the Yugoslav Tribunal, was sitting on ... [Celebici], and her
extensive expertise in gender crimes had a significant impact on adjudi-
cating female sexual torture and male sexual violence."'29
In fact, the ICTY has actually held that experience as a feminist ac-
tivist in international legal work can be a qualification for service as a
judge on the court. In one important ICTY prosecution, the accused, An-
ton Furundiija, moved to disqualify Judge Florence Ndepele
Mwachande Mumba on the ground that her participation in the Trial
Chamber proceedings created an appearance of bias. She had been a
member of the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women (UNCSW)
during the Yugoslav war, and had participated in its work on allegations
that mass rapes were occurring there. Moreover, complained the defen-
dant, the prosecutor in his case-Sellers-and three authors of an
amicus brief filed in his case had participated with Judge Mumba in the
United Nations fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in Sep-
tember 1995. And finally, all four of these women-including, again,
Judge Mumba-had also participated in an Expert Group Meeting after
the Conference that produced recommendations to the United Nations to
ensure that rape be prosecuted under IHL as a war crime. The accused
argued that these activities and associations created the appearance of
bias. The Appeals Chamber rejected this challenge, citing Judge Mumba's
experiences on the UNCSW as positive "qualifications ... which, by their
very nature, play an integral role in satisfying the eligibility requirements"
for ICT judges. 3° Summing it all up, Mappie Veldt concluded, "Judge
Mumba's membership of the UNCSW and her general experience in the
127. Askin, Sexual Violence, supra note 95, at 98 n.8.
128. Askin, A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes, supra note 50, at 17 (em-
phasis added); see also Katy Glassborow, Apartheid Legacy Haunts ICC Appeals Judge, INST.
FOR WAR & PEACE REPORTING, July 25, 2006, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=
322493&apc state=henh (providing a biography of Judge Pillay, and, in particular, noting that
she has been a member of Equality Now and is a staunch advocate of defendants' rights in
international tribunals).
129. Askin, A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes, supra note 50, at 17 (em-
phasis added).
130. Prosecutor v. Furundiija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals Judgment, 205 (July
21,2000).
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field were, by their very nature, an integral part of her qualifications for
nomination as judge of the ICTY.""'
The neutrality of the resulting new official cadre was often subtly
indicated by designating their sole qualification as their biological sex,
but the real driver was the expertise that feminism had become. For in-
stance, Askin describes ICT decisions that represent progress, and
indicates that in each of them
a female judge was a member of the Trial Chamber hearing the
case, and occasionally it was her skillful intervention, expertise
in women's issues, or judicial competence that facilitated the ju-
dicial redress process and impacted the development of gender
crimes .... There is little doubt that the presence of qualified
female judges, prosecutors, investigators, translators, and facili-
tators (for example in the Victim and Witnesses Unit) has
improved the record in affording redress for gender-related
crimes.'
We should not be deceived: Phyllis Schlaffly would not have been wel-
come. Female here is code for feminist. Men can be-and did become-
feminists: "The ICTY and ICTR are case studies on why it is so crucial
to include women as well as men with appropriate expertise in interna-
tional bodies charged with investigating war and conflict situations."'33
But the call for women was a call for feminists.
So much for the judges: what about the Prosecutor's Office? Prose-
cutors were far more willing than judges to write in the law reviews, and
to publish their conference papers and after-dinner remarks. We have
already heard what Prosecutor Goldstone has had to say in these ven-
ues. 3' Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour published a lecture in which she
both espoused the feminist agenda and distanced herself from it, per-
forming her neutrality while incorporating parts-but by no means all-
131. Mappie Veldt, Commentary, in 3 ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGO-
SLAVIA 1997-1999, at 357, 358 (Andrd Klip & G6ran Sluiter eds., 2001).
132. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 81, at 346 (emphasis added); see also
Askin, Sexual Violence, supra note 95, at 98 ("The jurisprudence of the United Nations Tribu-
nals reflects women's participation."); Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 75-76 ("The
gradual shift toward taking rape and other sexual crimes seriously and investigating them
zealously can be traced to the participation of women in the ICTY and ICTR as investigators,
researchers, judges, legal advisors, and prosecutors.").
133. Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 75 (emphasis added).
134. Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape, supra note 50, at 277 (revealing how willing then-
Prosecutor Goldstone was to disclose the political vexations and moral affiliations of his
work); Goldstone, United Nations' War Crimes Tribunals, supra note 48, at 23 1.
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put in by Sellers. Sellers was Senior Trial Attorney in the Office of the
Prosecutor for the ICTY and prosecuted several of the cases that will
interest us most. 36 In 1994, then-Chief Prosecutor Goldstone created the
post of Legal Advisor for Gender-Related Crimes and appointed Sellers
to fill it.137 It should be noted that Sellers was an adviser to the Prosecu-
tor's Office, not to the judges or defense counsel: feminism as legal
expertise has the same carceral consciousness as the GFeminist effort in
IHL/ICL generally. While occupying this post, simultaneously prosecut-
ing cases, and advising the Prosecutor's Office, she also published a
series of unusually hard-hitting feminist law review articles, basically
putting pressure on herself to do something, finally, about the scandal of
IHL indifference to rape and sexual violence.
An interesting aspect of Sellers's persona is the sheer absence of per-
sonal historical information about her in the voluminous archive of ICT
information. I have found only three claims made by others documenting
that she was in any way effective.' These three acknowledgements of her
interventionist capability are aberrational in the ample commentary I have
read about the judges and prosecutors of the ICTs. Generally, the femi-
nist activist practice was to pay no attention to the feminist behind the
135. Louise Arbour, Crimes Against Women Under International Law, 21 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 196 (2003) (reflecting on her years in the ICTY Prosecutor's Office).
136. Sellers, Individual('s) Liability, supra note 31 (indicating that she had served as
trial attorney in Furundija, co-counsel in Akayesu, and "principal legal advisor to several
cases including the Kunarac case").
137. Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape, supra note 50, at 280 (indicating that Goldstone had
appointed Sellers as the "legal advisor to the Office of the Prosecutor for Gender Crimes");
Patricia Viseur Sellers, Sexual Violence and Peremptory Norms: The Legal Value of Rape, 34
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 287, 287 n.al (2002) [hereinafter Sellers, Sexual Violence] (indicat-
ing that Sellers served as Legal Advisor for Gender Related Crimes to the Prosecutors' Office
of the ICTs from 1994 until at least 2002).
138. Payam Akhavan, Theodor Meron, W. Hays Parks & Patricia Viseur Sellers, The
Contribution of the Ad Hoc Tribunals to International Humanitarian Law, 13 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 1509 (1998); Sellers, Individual('s) Liability, supra note 31; Sellers & Okuizumi, supra
note 28; Sellers, Sexual Violence, supra note 137; Patricia Viseur Sellers, The Context of Sex-
ual Violence: Sexual Violence as Violations of International Humanitarian Law, in
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERI-
ENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS 263-332 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald &
Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000) [hereinafter Sellers, The Context of Sexual Violence];
Patricia Viseur Sellers, The Cultural Value of Sexual Violence, 93 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoC.
312 (1999) [hereinafter Sellers, The Cultural Value of Sexual Violence].
139. Dorothea Beane, Human Rights in Transition: Freedom from Fear, 6 WASH. & LEE
RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY L.J. 1, 22-23 (2000) (describing Sellers as "one of the Gender
Crimes strategists for the" ICTs); Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape, supra note 50, at 280 (indicat-
ing that many of the developments within the Prosecutor's Office and in its prosecutions were
"the result of her initiatives and her imaginative approach"); Lehr-Lehnardt, supra note 80, at
324 ("[Patricia Viseur Sellers] has been a leading force ensuring that war crimes against
women are punished.").
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curtain, and instead, to introduce her, if at all, only as the embodiment of
justice or expertise.
Those familiar with the simultaneous evolution of GFeminism in the
domain of human rights will surely be thinking of the parallel phenome-
non there: the appointment of Special Rapporteurs on Violence against
Women and the publication of reports that give elements of the GFem-
inist agenda official status within the U.N. human rights bureaucracy.
4 0
Several provisions in the Rome Statute authorize, and even purport to
require, the appointment of experts in sexual violence to the judiciary, to
the Prosecutor's Office, and to the Victims and Witnesses Unit. A new
NGO, the Project on International Courts and Tribunals (PICT), has gen-
erated a strategy for empanelling judges with legal expertise on violence
against women and children. PICT's goal: "[J]udges with competence in
international humanitarian law, human rights law, and with legal exper-
tise on specific issues, such as violence against women and children, will
be crucial for the work of the Court given its intended subject matter."'42
For PICT, at least, it is sufficient if an ICC judge is merely competent in
law, as long as he or she is an expert in gender. 1
43
Does that last claim seem extreme? Here is one Special Rapporteur's
version of the story I told in Part I.B. 1 of this Article:
Many positive jurisprudential and structural developments have
taken place since 1994; the international community has devel-
140. This bibliography is voluminous. The following have been relied on by GFeminists
in the Rome process: U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Integration of the Human
Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, 60th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2004/66 (Dec. 26, 2003) (prepared by Yakin Ertiirk); ECOSOC, Integration of the
Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women, Report of the
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, 59th Sess.
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/75/Add.1 (Feb. 27, 2003) (prepared by Radhika Coomaraswamy)
[hereinafter Coomaraswamy, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women];
ECOSOC, Sub-Comm. on Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Contemporary Forms of Slav-
ery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices During Armed Conflict, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/21 (June 6, 2000) (prepared by Gay J. McDougall).
141. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 36.8(b) (providing that, when nominating judges,
States "shall . .. take into account the need to include judges with legal expertise on specific
issues, including, but not limited to, violence against women or children"); id. art. 42(9) ("The
Prosecutor shall appoint advisers with legal expertise on specific issues, including, but not
limited to, sexual and gender violence and violence against children'"); id. art. 43(6) ("The...
Victims and Witnesses Unit within the Registry ... shall include staff with expertise in
trauma, including trauma related to crimes of sexual violence.").
142. Thordis Ingadottir, The International Criminal Court: Nomination and Election of
Judges 39 (Project on Int'l Courts & Tribunals, ICC Discussion Paper No. 4, 2002) (emphasis
added).
143. Query whether the Project on International Courts and Tribunals (PICT) goal is the
appointment of experts in gender as the Pope understands it or gender as the GFeminists af-
filiated with the WCGJ know it.
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oped precise legal standards that confirm that rape and other
gender-based crime can be war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and components of the crime of genocide, as well as torture or
other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and enslavement.
The [ICTY and ICTR] ... have set jurisprudential benchmarks
for the prosecution of wartime sexual violence. In addition ...
the entry into force of the ... Rome Statute ... now specifically
defines rape and other gender-based violence as constituent acts
of crimes against humanity and war crimes .... Women's rights
activists, and principally the International [sic] Caucus for Gen-
der Justice'" played a significant role in every major United
Nations preparatory meeting on the ICC: (a) to ensure that the
range of abuses that happen to women was accurately reflected
in the list of crimes over which the ICC would have jurisdiction;
and (b) to ensure that the rules and procedures governing how
the court functions would be responsive to gender-specific
crimes. It was a significant success in the struggle to end impu-
nity for crimes of sexual and gender-based violence. 
45
Aside from the idea that legal rules are "jurisprudential benchmarks,"
every word of this paragraph can be matched by statements in the liter-
ary nonfiction of GFeminists writing in the law reviews (to whom we
will soon return). I could offer quotations from Askin, Bedont, Bedont
and Hall-Martinez, and Oosterveld using every important word and
phrase that comes to us here as official knowledge. This is the feminists'
version of what happened in the ICT/Rome Statute process. In this vi-
sion, the WCGJ becomes the ensurer of legally correct outcomes:
politics is translated, once again, into justice. We also see here the state-
ment, very common in GFeminist assessments of the Rome Statute, that
"gender-based violence" was actually made a crime in that document.
The Special Rapporteur does not bother to note that, though "gender vio-
lence" was included in several provisions relating to the required
expertise for various institutional roles in the new ICC, the WCGJ effort
to insert this new term into the crime-defining provisions was soundly
defeated.146 Citing a Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence
against Women for such tentative verities is much stronger than citing
the law review literature, however, precisely because the persona of the
Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women institutionalizes femi-
nism as an objective expertise.
144. Coomaraswamy must be referring here to the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice.
145. Coomaraswamy, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women,
supra note 140, 8.
146. See infra Part I.B. 1.
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A particularly delightful indication of the close dependence of exper-
tise on the work of advocates can be detected in the paragraph just cited. 1
47
The WCGJ, as we have seen, was a strong feminist-activist NGO that par-
ticipated full-bore in the development of the Rome Statute. Special
Rapporteur Radhika Coomaraswamy invokes the WCGJ's work as a
warrant for the validity of the Rome Statute. And in one of its submis-
sions to PrepComl for the Rome Statute, the WCGJ cited the report of
another Special Rapporteur on Sexual Violence for expert knowledge
that the right legal term for the "comfort women" forced to have sex with
Japanese soldiers was "military sexual slaves"-a term derived directly
from a highly distinctive branch of American feminism, as we will see in
Part II.B. 1 below. In that submission, the WCGJ includes a block quote
from the Special Rapporteur's Report-in which the Rapporteur argues
for reaching this expert conclusion on the grounds that activist NGOs
and "some academics" advocate it!'
4 8
How did the WCGJ, its constituent NGOs, and feminists on state
delegations resolve the advocacy/legitimacy tension in PrepComl and at
Rome? The feminist members of state delegations and feminists repre-
senting NGOs that were officially cut into the process were far less
tethered by the expectations of objectivity and detachment that attended
judicial or prosecutorial power in the ICTs. But legitimacy constraints
were not wanting, even in this process of explicit negotiation. For an
NGO wanting to play an important role in the CICC, the ticket of admis-
sion to PrepComl was to behave not like a pugilist but like a consultant
and an expert. This was partly an accommodation to the effort to pro-
duce a Rome Statute that could be represented not as the product of
interest groups in struggle but as the consensus of world nations.
Oosterveld looks back on the intense but doomed effort of the WCGJ
147. See supra text accompanying note 145.
148. ECOSOC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes
and Consequences, Report on the Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the
Republic of Korea and Japan on the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery in Wartime, 52nd Sess.,
$T 8-10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.1 (Jan. 4, 1996). The Report reads,
[T]he practice of "comfort women" should be considered a clear case of sexual
slavery .... [T]he Special Rapporteur concurs entirely with the view held by mem-
bers of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, as well as by
representatives of non-governmental organizations and some academics, that the
phrase "comfort women" does not in the least reflect the suffering, such as multiple
rapes on an everyday basis and severe physical abuse, that women victims had to
endure during their forced prostitution and sexual subjugation and abuse in war-
time. The Special Rapporteur, therefore, considers with conviction that the phrase




and its allies to include "crimes of gender violence" in the crimes-
defining sections of the Statute and defends the WCGJ against accusa-
tions that it violated these norms:
In the author's experience, some have viewed the debate on the
term "gender" as overly confrontational (and emotional) within
a U.N. process that works on the basis of consensus. It is true
that such debates tend to become polarized and are used as a tac-
tic by those wishing to restrict or eliminate the term. However, a
debate can be helpful for international law if chaired, moderated,
or guided by a person who understands the issues, both stated
and unstated.
49
According to Oosterveld, if it got too emotional, that was not the GFem-
inists' fault. One wonders whether Pace, mastermind of the CICC and its
strategy of consensus, agreed.
The legitimacy of the ICC also rested in part on the representation of
the Rome Statute as merely a codification of existing humanitarian law.
Christopher Keith Hall, for instance, praises NGOs involved in Prep-
ComI meetings for the degree to which they forbore from representing
their reforms as advances: "Human rights organizations usually sought
to ensure that the court would embody the current status of international
humanitarian law." And Hall criticized them for "sometimes suc-
cumb[ing] to the temptation to try to use the PrepCom to advance the
current status in international law of issues such as war crimes and
crimes against humanity."'5 The rhetorical strategy for feminists wishing
to participate in the consensus, then, would be to represent advances as
restatements.
What is the literary output of PrepComl/Rome GFeminist insiders?
Official records of these discussions and debates do not exist." It is an
indication of the stature of the WCGJ as a legitimate player in the eyes
of the CICC that Hall can point to the WCGJ Recommendations as our
best source on the legislative history for the otherwise unrecorded meet-
ings of PrepComl. "'52 Oosterveld, as we know a member of the Canadian
delegation to the Rome Conference, has provided two highly detailed
and astute insider accounts of feminist goals, strategy, and struggle, one
concentrating on "sexual slavery" and the other on "crimes of gender
149. Oosterveld, The Definition of "Gender" in the Rome Statute, supra note 54, at 83
n.164.
150. Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 19, at 15.
151. Hall, supra note 60, at 125 n.6.
152. Id. at 124 n.7.
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violence."'53 In addition, we have two fascinating law review articles by
Barbara Bedont and Katherine Hall-Martinez, feminists who disclose
that they were direct participants in the Rome process and who affiliated
themselves with the WCGJ.' 4 That is to say, GFeminist insiders used the
law review article as a strategic and tactical tool. I will discuss the liter-
ary status of these interventions and the voluminous law review output
by GFeminist outsiders in the next subsection.'55 Here, just two com-
ments on these articles seen as reports by insiders.
First, Oosterveld, Bedont, and Hall-Martinez all use the law review
venue to address the feminist legal community. They report on successes
and losses in a way that assumes a consensus on what the goals were.
Oosterveld in particular defends the compromise that the WCGJ reached
in the fierce fight over "gender violence" from a voluminous law-review-
based feminist attack. As will become apparent, I hope, in Parts II.D and
II.E below, her articles provide no sign of any significant dissent-in the
insider GFeminist project or in the attacks on them from feminists back
home-from the WCGJ agenda. Instead, the attack literature Oosterveld
tackles blamed the GFeminist insiders for not achieving the full WCGJ
agenda, leaving the strong implication that the agenda itself was shared
by everyone. Whether dissent existed or not is another question; dissent
was not performed. For anyone accustomed to the strong tendency of
feminists to disagree amongst themselves, this express and implied
GFeminist and feminist consensus is quite breathtaking.
Second, Oosterveld, Bedont, and Hall-Martinez also addressed the
international legal community, praising it for its successes in adopting
WCGJ reforms and expressing dismay at the backwardness, social con-
servatism, and patriarchal intransigence that led to its failures. Here
again, there is no publicly detectable light between the GFeminist insid-
ers using the law reviews as a venue and the WCGJ's expressed agenda.
Once again, performed consensus.
b. Contributions by Feminist Activists Writing in the Mode
of Restatement, Codification, and the Objective
Transmission of Existing Positive Law
As Bedont acknowledged, feminists "had the paradoxical task of
showing that the existing standards were inadequate and had to be reme-
died ... while also showing that sufficient progress had been made
153. Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery, supra note 21, at 605; Oosterveld, The Definition of
"Gender" in the Rome Statute, supra note 54, at 55.
154. Bedont, supra note 51, at 183 n.* (disclosing that Bedont was an attorney for the
WCGJ); Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 66-67 (praising the efforts of the WCGJ).
155. See infra Part I.B.2.b.
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under customary international law to close the existing gaps. ' All pro-
ducers of GFeminist law review articles, whether the author was an
official insider, a professor, or a student writing a note, faced the chal-
lenge of mediating between legal advocacy and law. They had to perform
restatement while pursuing advocacy.
Here is an example of the dilemma they faced. The post World War
II criminal tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo offered significant prece-
dent for convicting people of IHL crimes when they had participated in
sexual violence, had supervised troops who raped, or had forced women
into prostitution. 7 To that extent, feminists depended on the judgments
and opinions of these tribunals as legal authorities. Invoking these prece-
dents was a way of legitimating their claims as consistent with nullum
crimen sine lege and the (supposed) nonpolitical character of the Rome
process. But feminists were aggrieved that--despite the massive number
of sexual assaults of all kinds that women suffered in Europe, the Soviet
Union, and the Pacific-none of these trials emphasized sexual violence.
And they had to let their grievance become audible. How to do both?
One way was to see-saw: they could invoke pre-existing IHL instru-
ments because they treated sexual violence and enforced prostitution as
clearly admissible as evidence of war crimes and because a number of
convictions included sexual crimes in the panoply of predicate wrongdo-
ing-while also representing this legacy as legally defective because
neither the Tokyo nor the Nuremberg Charter named rape as a predicate
crime, and because rape and sexual violence never stood alone as the
sole focus of a count or a conviction. You cannot take both positions at
once, so writing that does this tends to swing back and forth between
them like a pendulum. Askin provides us with an example of this com-
plex maneuver:
[see] In part because of the [Nuremberg] trial's focus on those
responsible for waging aggressive war, [saw] sexual violence
was largely ignored.
... [saw] [T]he IMT Charter failed to include any form of sex-
ual violence, and the tribunal did not expressly prosecute such
crimes, even though they were extensively documented through-
out the war and occupation. [see] Nonetheless, the trial records
contain extensive evidence of sexual violence. [saw] While not
explicit, [see] gender-related crimes were included as evidence
156. Bedont, supra note 51, at 184.
157. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 81, at 295 nn.36-37 (tabulating evi-
dence admitted in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials that could have supported charges of rape
and other sexual violence but that was instead considered to support charges of other, non-
sexual crimes).
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of the atrocities prosecuted during the trial and can be consid-
ered subsumed within the IMT Judgment ....
Similarly, in the subsequent Nuremberg trials held by the Allied
forces under the auspices of Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL
10), [see] which did explicitly list rape as a crime against hu-
manity, [saw] gender crimes were given only cursory treatment
In the post-World War II trials held in Tokyo, [see] rape crimes
were expressly prosecuted, [saw] albeit to a limited extent and in
conjunction with other crimes.'
Good lawyering. And it all checks out: there is plenty of spin here, but it
is all visible on the surface.
Askin has been an immensely prolific producer of GFeminist re-
statements with an advocacy intention, or, if you like, advocacy articles
that restate/describe while praising and blaming." 9 It is interesting to
compare Askin's articles, which are mostly about adjudication in ICTs,
with Oosterveld's accounts of the Rome Conference. Oosterveld is far
more explicit than Askin about feminist strategy, and far more likely to
invoke feminist values instead of legal rightness as her source of norma-
tive ideas. It is a small measure of the different places they inhabited in
the emerging distribution of roles in the task of building feminist legal
legitimacy.
Far less trustworthy are the several tomes that have been published
as restatements of the statutory and case law reforms.' 60 These codifica-
158. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 81, at 301-02.
159. See, e.g., KELLY D. ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN IN-
TERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (1997) [hereinafter ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST
WOMEN]; Askin, A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes, supra note 50; Kelly D.
Askin, Gender Crimes Jurisprudence in the ICTR: Positive Developments, 3 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 1007 (2005); Kelly D. Askin, Issues Surrounding the Creation of a Regional Human
Rights System for the Asia-Pacific, 4 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 599 (1998); Kelly D. Askin,
Judgments Rendered in 1999 by the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugosla-
via and for Rwanda: Tadi (App. Ch.); Aleksovski (ICTY); Jelisi6 (ICTY); Ruzinkana &
Kayishema (ICTR); Serushago (ICTR); Rutaganda (ICTR), 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 485
(2000); Kelly D. Askin, Omarska Camp, Bosnia: Broken Promises of "Never Again", 30
HUM. RTS. 12 (2003); Kelly D. Askin, Part IV-ICTY (2001), 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 20 (2001);
Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 81; Kelly D. Askin, Reflections on Some of the
Most Significant Achievements of the ICTY, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 903 (2003); Askin, Sexual
Violence, supra note 95; Kelly D. Askin, The International War Crimes Trial of Anto Fu-
rundtija: Major Progress Toward Ending the Cycle of Impunity for Rape Crimes, 12 LEIDEN
J. INT'L L. 935 (1999); Kelly D. Askin, The Quest for Post-Conflict Gender Justice, 41
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 509 (2003) [hereinafter Askin, The Quest for Post-Conflict Gender
Justice].
160. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE DE BROUWER, SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF
SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE ICC AND THE PRACTICE OF THE ICTY AND THE ICTR (2005); Ju-
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tion-style handbooks purport to restate the work of the ICTs and the
Rome Conference but instead are permeated with feminist advocacy
moves. No one who wants to know what the official documents say
should rely on them. Though unreliable sources of the ICTs and Rome
Conference, they are extremely useful when read as guides to the struc-
ture of feminist ambition.
And then there are general restatements, such as Roy S. Lee's com-
pendious handbook The International Criminal Court: Elements of
Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence. This volume presents it-
self as an authoritative interpretive guide to these ancillary law texts,
providing the history of their negotiation and describing and settling
many questions about how to interpret them. But Lee's volume is, from a
GFeminist perspective, an unreliable reporter of the negotiations produc-
ing the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. At
one point, Copelon even denounces Lee for altering a GFeminist au-
thor's contribution to his collection of purported restatements.'
6'
Copelon's evidence that someone modified it seems watertight, but I
have not personally inspected the relevant unpublished materials. Here is
her claim. The provision at stake is the last sentence of the definition of
gender in the Rome Statute: "The term 'gender' does not indicate any-
thing different from the above." 62 As we will see in Parts II.D and II.E
below, this provision was the site of intense GFeminist advocacy and
intense conservative resistance, one of the biggest conflicts in the entire
Rome process. At issue for Copelon is whether this second sentence
narrows the Statute's definition of gender, so that, for instance, it could
not be interpreted to include sexual orientation. Her quarrel with Lee
arises because the published version of C. Steains' "Gender Issues," a
contribution to his collection of restatements, legitimates a conservative
reading of this provision, one that Steains herself would not endorse.
63
Copelon's charge of editorial interference is as follows:
The published article concludes at 374: "Although many dele-
gates felt that the second sentence was superfluous, it was
ultimately included to forestall any implication that the issue of
sexual orientation could be raised in connection with Article
DITH G. GARDHAM & MICHELLE J. JARVIS, WOMEN, ARMED CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2001).
161. Rhonda Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes Against
Women into International Criminal Law, 46 McGILL L.J. 217 (2000) [hereinafter Copelon,
Gender Crimes as War Crimes].
162. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 7.3.
163. See Cate Steains, Gender Issues, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 357 (Roy S. Lee ed.,
2002).
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2.1.3" of the Rome Statute. The published version is completely
inconsistent with the draft submitted by the author, which states
in the pertinent part: "The second sentence was included upon
the insistence of the 'anti-gender' delegations, despite arguments
by the 'pro-gender' delegations that it was superfluous."'"
The publication of unreliable GFeminist codifications is surely and un-
derstandably motivated by a desire to counteract the danger posed by
this sort of incident-but it does mean that anyone uninterested in spin
should forego resort to this politically tremulous body of work.
Very often, and to my mind less objectionably, the law reviews have
allowed themselves to be the venue for less transparent representation of
the legal materials. Feminist literary fiction amounted (usually) to repre-
senting the legal materials as more positive than they were. Early on in
the work of the ICTs, for instance, proponents of the feminist reforms
reported indictments as though they were on par with judgments.'6 5 Users
of law review and journal articles that do this have to be willing to check
to ascertain whether the cases invoked actually ended up issuing hold-
ings consistent with these claims.
And judgments are often represented to install feminist-inspired re-
forms into the positive law when good arguments lie ready to hand that
those reforms were actually being rejected. Three examples may suffice.
First, Askin persistently refers to the Trial Chamber Judgment in Kuna-
rac as the first legal authority making sexual slavery a violation'66-but,
as she conceded elsewhere, 6 that is exactly what the Chamber did not
164. Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes, supra note 161, at 237 n.60 (quoting C.
Steains, Gender and the ICC (July 1999) (unpublished draft); Memorandum from C. Steains
to R. Lee (July 2, 1999)).
165. See generally Askin, Sexual Violence, supra note 95.
166. Askin, A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes, supra note 50, at 18. Askin
described Kunarac as
the first international trial in history to adjudicate rape and enslavement for crimes
essentially constituting sexual slavery .... [A]lthough the ICC Statute specifically
enumerates sexual slavery as a crime, the ICTY Statute only lists rape and enslave-
ment; hence, these offenses were combined to prosecute the accused for the sexual
enslavement of women and girls.
Id. (emphasis added); Askin, The Quest for Post-Conflict Gender Justice, supra note 159, at
520 n.43 (summarizing Kunarac as achieving a "conviction for ... indicia of enslavementfor
sexual slavery....") (emphasis added).
167. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 81, at 337 (reporting that the Kuna-
rac Trial Chamber "found two of the accused guilty of rape and enslavement as crimes against
humanity for acts essentially amounting to sexual slavery") (emphasis added)). But see id. at
340 ("Regrettably, the term 'sexual slavery' was never used in the Judgement."). Askin added,
The facts of the case demonstrate that the enslavement and rape were inseparably
linked, and the accused enslaved the women and girls as a means to effectuate con-
tinuous rape. Since a primary, but not necessarily exclusive, motivation behind the
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do. To be sure, the defendants were convicted of enslavement on facts
that included sexual assaults, forced nudity, and the like. The ICTY Stat-
ute, though it did authorize the ICTY to try charges of enslavement, did
not include the term "sexual slavery." This was in strong contrast with
the recently adopted Rome Statute, which did include the contested
term. "'68 Perhaps not surprisingly, the ICTY proved unwilling to engraft
the feminists' preferred term onto a statute from which it was, by com-
parison with the Rome Statute, so conspicuously absent. Insisting that
Kunarac had, instead, handed down a conviction for "sexual slavery"
would make that case a direct precedent in the ICC. It remains to be seen
whether GFeminists so argue, and whether the new court accepts their
somewhat exaggerated reading of the case.
We can find another example of strong GFeminist spin in
Charlesworth's conclusion that "the statutes of the two ad hoc tribunals
and the ICC ... provide much fuller responses to sexual violence, con-
structing it, depending on the circumstances, as potentially a crime of
genocide, a crime against humanity and a war crime."' 69 Well, technically
and at an extremely high level of generality, that is right. The ICT stat-
utes do not use the term sexual violence, but the Rome Statute does; and,
while none of the statutes acknowledges that sexual violence is a mode
of genocide, there are two legal sources for this idea elsewhere. Akayesu,
applying the ICTR Statute, held that rape and other sexual assaults were
sufficient to sustain a conviction for genocide; and the ICC Elements of
Crimes includes a footnote indicating that "genocide by causing serious
bodily or mental harm" "may include, but is not necessarily restricted to,
torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment.'
70
How decisive are Akayesu and the Elements of Crimes for construing the
statutory regime? As the timeline in Part L.A indicates, Akayesu was de-
cided after the Rome Statute was promulgated. Whether its rape-as-
genocide holding will be repeated by the ICC remains to be seen. And
the Elements of Crimes is a somewhat ambiguous legal authority. The
enslavement was to hold the women and girls for sexual access at will and with
ease, the crime would most appropriately be characterized as sexual slavery.
Id. Compare Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovi6, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1 -T,
Trial Judgment, In 728-45 (Feb. 22, 2001) (deploring the rapes but declining to find them to
be the central purpose for the defendants' entire course of conduct and instead expressing
equal outrage that the victims, all of them women, were forced to perform housework).
168. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 7.1(g) (crimes against humanity); id. art.
8.2(b)(xxii) (laws and customs of war in international conflicts); id. art. 8.2(e)(vi) (laws and
customs of war in conflicts that are not international in character).
169. Charlesworth, supra note 93, at 386.
170. Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Addendum: Finalized
Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, art. 6(b) n.3, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/200011NF/3/Add.2
(Nov. 2, 2000) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes].
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Rome Statute provides that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence "shall
enter into force," while the Elements of Crimes "shall" merely "assist the
Court.'' l Will the Elements of Crimes be held to be binding or merely
advisory? It remains to be seen. And what about the footnotes to the
Elements of Crimes? Charles Garraway, commenting on one such foot-
note, notes that the inclusion of a rule in afootnote rather than in the text
itself indicates that some of the players wanted it badly, but that others
were either indifferent or, in the case he adresses, mildly to extremely
hostile. 72 Will the ICC read the footnotes as restrictive interpretations of
the text they adorn or as a roll call of failed legislative efforts? That, too,
remains to be seen. Not surprisingly, the footnotes repeatedly install
WCGJ agenda items on this legal periphery: is that going to be a good
thing or a bad thing for the WCGJ agenda? Again, we will not know un-
til the ICC has decided the question, if it ever does. So, under those
circumstances, Charlesworth's legal claim is potentially right.
One final example of GFeminist art in the representation of positive
law can be found in the writings of Bedont and Hall-Martinez, who con-
sistently describe the sexual violence crimes in the Rome Statute as
gender crimes even though, as they also concede, GFeminists com-
pletely failed to gain sufficient support for this language to install it
anywhere in the Statute."
In sum, I have found that you need to know the legal outcomes and
their representation in the articles in deep detail to detect the gaps be-
tween them. The little bits of spin one eventually learns to detect in the
law review archives are extremely reliable indicators that the feminists
are writing about reforms that they regarded as crucial, if difficult to ac-
complish. Sexual slavery, gender crimes, rape as genocide: I hope to
show in Part II of this Article not only that these reforms mattered to
them, but why they did.
Should we regard this bibliography as an element of GFeminism?
When it is in full (performed) consensus with the agendas of operative
GFeminist insiders, I think we should. We have already seen evidence of
a rich association between GFeminist insiders and the academics. In Part
III, I hope to show also that they engaged in intense idea-trading, and
171. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 9.1 (noting that the "Elements of Crimes shall
assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and 8," which are the arti-
cles defining genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity for purposes of determining
ICC jurisdiction). Compare Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 51.1 (authorizing the promulga-
tion of Rules of Procedure and Evidence).
172. Charles Galloway, Elements of the Specific Forms of Genocide, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE,
supra note 30, at 49, 50-51.




that many of their ideas are now ensconced in the language of the Rome
Statute. Ex post, it is clear that the immense outpouring of law review
articles on making rape and sexual violence the subject of international
humanitarian and international criminal concern was part of the reinven-
tion of feminism in NG terms. Denying this role for academic feminist
legal theory-traditionally understood by its producers and consumers to
be excluded from legal and social power and to occupy a stance opposed
to them-would, I would suggest, be not merely inaccurate but, for
feminist legal theory itself, an act of bad faith.
Taken together, nonofficial GFeminists writing in the law reviews
and publishing treatises and the like performed consensus. That does not
mean there was consensus; only that the work of feminists, especially as
they were drawn into the vortex of the Rome Conference, became more
and more compliant with the requirement that consensus be the manifest
style of all participants. Part II of this Article diagnoses the actual re-
forms sought and the arguments made for them in order to discover
whether there was any consistent feminist ideology holding the reform
consensus together.
II. FEMINIST GOALS, SUCCESSES, AND DEFEATS
IN THE STATUTORY PROCESSES
Feminists had many goals in the massive explosion of lawmaking
that attended the constitution of the ICTs and the ICC and their produc-
tion of a highly self-referential body of case law. The Green/Copelon
Working Group Proposals of 1993, for example, include sections on the
scope of the ICTY's jurisdiction, the substantive definition of gender-
related crimes, rules for imposing secondary or indirect liability and
command liability, rules about the admissibility of evidence of sex
crimes, rules about evidentiary standards for command liability, propos-
als for a special system for protection of victim witnesses, proposed
penalties, and a proposal for the compensation of victims.114
This Article studies only one of those efforts: the struggle to alter the
rules of IHL with respect to rape and other forms of sexual violence suf-
fered by women in war and armed conflict. As the Rome Statute process
got going, this morphed into an effort to establish rules in that new body
of ICL.
The initial goals were a matter of perfect consensus among the femi-
nists involved: they wanted authoritative enumeration of sexual crimes in
their own terms. They wanted to establish that rape, sexual violence, and
174. See CUNY Clinic Memorandum, supra note 37.
Fall 2008]
Michigan Journal of International Law
sexual slavery are IHL/ICL crimes. They wanted these sexual crimes to
be lodged as high up the hierarchy of IHL'ICL codification as they could
get them, and in terms that derive from their shared feminist understand-
ing of them. I will call these, respectively, their vertical and their
horizontal reform projects.
Of course, there were disagreements among the feminists both as to
goals and as to means. One early disagreement, analyzed in a brilliant
paper by Karen Engle, divided feminists working in the ICTY on the
design of specific prosecutions. Some wanted rape to be understood and
prosecuted as genocide, while others objected that this framing subordi-
nated feminism to nationalism, obscured the fact that rape was
committed "on all sides," and suggested that wartime rape was somehow
worse than everyday rape. ' As Engle also indicates, beyond this very
sharp confrontation, the very same feminists were largely in consen-
sus.176 1 hope to show here that this consensus emphasized the continuity
between wartime rape and everyday rape and was vital to the trajectory
of their work on the Rome Statute.
In this Part, I tell the story of the feminists' evolving engagement
with IHL. I will be asking: what feminist ideas animated their rulemak-
ing; where were feminists in consensus, and where were they in
disagreement about their goals; what parts of the law and what specific
outcomes show signs of the feminists' intervention; and where were they
defeated?
As I have argued in Part L.A above, the actual experience of engag-
ing in this work for any of the participants spanned a long period-from
sometime in 1994 to mid-1998-when litigation and adjudication in the
ICTs was being pursued simultaneously with debates over the Rome
Statute and its supplementary documents. These two fora formed impor-
tant political and strategic contexts for each other. I have separated the
two processes, however, because the rules are somewhat intricate and
keeping a close focus on them is crucial to my project here.
In this Part, I first set out in a nutshell, in Part II.A, the legal context
in which the feminists' effort began; then, in Part II.B, I study the early
stages of feminist reform thinking and reform goals; in Part II.C, I exam-
ine the ICTY and ICTR Statutes to detect the successes and defeats the
feminists experienced in the initial lawmaking moment of our story; and
I return in Part II.D to feminist theory and law reform as GFeminism
emerged during the run-up to the Rome Diplomatic Conference; and,
finally, I conclude, in Part II.E, with an assessment of GFeminism's suc-
cesses and defeats at Rome.
175. Engle, Feminism and Its (Dis)Contents, supra note 116, at 785-803.
176. Id. at 798.
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A. The Legal Backdrop
An immense body of IHL could be designated "the backdrop" for
the feminist reforms. These certainly included the Nuremberg Charter
prohibiting "crimes against humanity," the Geneva Conventions, numer-
ous treaties prohibiting genocide and torture, and the more diffuse
concept of international customary law supposedly governing the con-
duct of war. Each of these has a distinct trajectory through the
ICT/Rome process, and GFeminists worked hard on all of them. Here, I
will start with the Geneva Conventions because they provide an espe-
cially crisp point of departure for analyzing the ICT/Rome process and
the role of early feminist interventions, and eventually GFeminism, in it.
The Fourth Geneva Convention applies to the treatment of civilians
in international armed conflict. Article 27 states, "Women shall be espe-
cially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against
rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.""' Red Cross
Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions described enforced prostitu-
tion as "the forcing of a woman into immorality" and introduced the
term "indecent assault."' 78 The emphasis on honor in Article 27, as well
as its prohibition of "rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent
assault," reappear almost verbatim in Additional Protocols I and II of
1977. The main innovation there is the express classification of these
harms as "outrages upon human dignity."'79
Parties to the Geneva Conventions promised to legislate against
"grave breaches," but they made no such commitments about other
breaches of the Conventions.8 Grave breaches were subject to
177. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion].
178. 4 THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: GENEVA CONVENTION RELA-
TIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 206 (Jean S. Pictet ed.,
Ronald Briffin & C.W. Dumbleton trans., Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross 1958).
179. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 76(1), June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (addressing special protections for women and
children, and stating that "[w]omen shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected
in particular against rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault"); see id.
art. 75(2)(b) (listing the "[flundamental guarantees" for civilians in international conflicts, and
prohibiting "[o]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treat-
ment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault"); see also Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts art. 4(2)(e), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (entered into force
Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Additional Protocol II) (prohibiting "outrages upon personal dig-
nity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any
form of indecent assault").
180. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
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"universal jurisdiction," as IHL insiders like to say. This established
what I will call a hierarchy of prohibition within the Geneva Convention
regime. In addition, the Geneva Convention includes a list of grave
breaches, one which reads not as exemplary but as exclusive. That is, it
does not conclude by opening out to "other conduct of similar gravity."'8'
The provisions of Article 27 of interest to the feminists in the 1990s-
rape, enforced prostitution, and indecent assault-are not referenced or
included in the list of grave breaches.
Another very highly valued piece of the Geneva Conventions real es-
tate is Common Article 3-common in the sense that it is common to all
four Geneva Conventions. It is valued for that reason and because it pro-
tects noncombatants in "armed conflict not of an international character
... ,,2 This Article also prohibits "outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment .... ."83 The replication of
this language in the Additional Protocols, and the specification there in
that rape, enforced prostitution, and other forms of indecent assault
could constitute outrages upon personal dignity, made it possible to ar-
gue that Common Article 3 should be understood to embrace those
crimes as well. When the ICTs got started, however, no legal authority
had connected the dots in this way.
First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 86 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 129, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note
177, art. 146.
181. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 177, art. 147. The Convention provides that
[g]rave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any
of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the pre-
sent Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person,
compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully
depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the
present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation
of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wan-
tonly.
Id.
182. First Geneva Convention, supra note 180, art. 3; Second Geneva Convention, supra
note 180, art. 3; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 180, art. 3; Fourth Geneva Convention,
supra note 177, art. 3.
183. First Geneva Convention, supra note 180, art. 3(1); Second Geneva Convention,
supra note 180, art. 3(1); Third Geneva Convention, supra note 180, art. 3(l); Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 177, art. 3(1).
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B. Early Feminist Goals and the Emergence
of the Feminist Universalist Vision
As we have seen, feminists rapidly coalesced to influence the draft-
ing of the ICTY and ICTR statutes. But U.N. insiders did not at that time
consider them to be indispensable consultants on all matters sexual. The
early articulation of feminist goals had therefore an immediacy, even a
desperation, in its tone.
Even at this early stage, we see a high degree of consensus on the
importance of the horizontal and vertical rule reforms. Perhaps the most
urgent-you could even say hectic-argument for them came from Sell-
ers in a series of articles published while she was the Legal Adviser for
Gender Related Crimes to the ICTY Prosecutor's Office. All of these
articles come with Sellers' disclaimer that, in them, she speaks in her
personal, not official, capacity. Yet it is impossible to read them as de-
void of any intention to influence the prosecutor and judges of the ICTs.
This is the voice of GFeminism at or near its apex.
Sellers argued that the specific prohibition of rape in IHL was so
patchy, intermittent, low-level, and often entirely absent that rape during
war could not be understood to violate any peremptory norm in human
rights law. She argued that rape could not be considered a violation of
jus cogens, and might even be technically permissible:
It is questionable whether a general norm of the prohibition of
rape, in and of itself [exists] in human rights law. It is likewise
uncertain that the crime rape under humanitarian law has been
considered, in and of itself, as imposing a non derogatory obli-
gation on the community of states other than protection against
its infliction. And quite frankly, rape has never been cited, here-
tofore, as a peremptory norm.
... [C]ould one fathom two states entering into an agreement to
rape persons in a third state, without the condemnation of the in-
ternational community of States? If so,' " why has rape, whether
a commonly committed national or international crime or per-
haps an emerging human rights violations [sic] that is never
justifiable, not crossed the peremptory norm threshold? Is the
prohibition of rape's inability to meet international law's formal-
istic peremptory norm requirement the gendered legacy of a
patriarchal legal culture?'85
184. I think that she means "if not."
185. Sellers & Okuizumi, supra note 28; Sellers, Sexual Violence, supra note 137, at
303; see also Sellers, The Cultural Value of Sexual Violence, supra note 138.
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Sellers' 1997 article, "Intentional Prosecution of Sexual Assaults," co-
authored with Kaoru Okuizumi, was published while the ICTY and
ICTR were just getting going as active courts and before the com-
mencement of the final Rome Statute Conference. In it, Sellers and
Okuizumi offer a mind-bogglingly complex display of the arguments
that need to be made and accepted to make rape prosecutable under the
many heads of the ICTY and ICTR statutes that do not specify rape as a
primary form of liability:
Charging sexual assault under the above provisions of Articles 2
through 5 which do not make explicit reference to sexual assault
conduct, i.e., provisions other than Article 5(g), requires a so-
phisticated recognition of how violations of international
humanitarian law are prosecuted, as well as some mental gym-
nastics.
8 6
Their prescription for the Rome Statute discussions was as follows:
"[I]t is imperative that the subject matter jurisdiction of a permanent in-
ternational court clearly include sexual assaults committed in armed
conflicts as among 'the most serious crimes of concern to the interna-
tional community' within the court's jurisdiction.' 87 I have italicized
Sellers' and Okuizumi's statement of the two intersecting feminist goals:
specific mention of rape defined in feminist terms-"sexual assaults"-
as among the most serious crimes of concern. Once again, the horizontal
and the vertical feminist rule reform projects.
Statements of these goals are everywhere in the GFeminist literature
about the ICT statutes and the Rome Statute.'88 Almost all GFeminists
held on fast to the most authoritative IHL instruments criminalizing rape
and other sex-related harms in war-few were willing to despair pub-
licly, with Sellers, about their legal existence-but they also thought that
this body of law not only fell woefully short in recognizing sexual harms,
but also got them wrong when it did take them into account. They took the
ICT/Rome process as their opportunity to introduce feminist-defined
186. Sellers & Okuizumi, supra note 28, at 59.
187. Id. at 77-78 (quoting Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the International Law Commis-
sion on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, May 2-July 22, 1994, Draft Statute for an
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994)) (emphasis added).
188. See, e.g., Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 81, at 294 (critiquing inter-
national humanitarian law before the ICT/Rome process and commenting that "despite the
fact that many regulations protecting either combatants or civilians are often described in
minute and exhaustive detail, very little mention is made of female combatants or civilians");
CUNY Clinic Memorandum, supra note 37, app. B at 237 ("The explicit recognition of these
crimes [rape and forced prostitution] is essential to assuring their full prosecution as well as to
undoing the legacy of disregard."); id. at 185 (noting that the Geneva Conventions implicitly
prohibit rape even where they do not do so explicitly, but that "[i]t is critical that this implicit
authority be made explicit").
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crimes as high in the IHL/ICL hierarchy of crimes as they possibly
could. In the course of this work a new feminist idea was born.
A premier goal, identified very early in the feminists' work, was to
move rape up the hierarchy dividing grave breaches from breaches in the
Geneva Conventions regime. To be sure, rape could be the evidence or
the underlying conduct of one or more of the crimes constituting grave
breaches, particularly "torture" and "willfully causing great suffering to
body or health."' 9 GFeminists were willing to argue that rape was "tor-
ture" as well as that it was "willful [conduct] causing great suffering to
body or health" and, for that reason, a grave breach.' 90 But what they
really wanted was a judicial, customary, or code-based stipulation that
rape was a grave breach.' 9'
When feminists justified these reforms, they often wrote as though
they wanted merely to borrow the normative bully pulpit of positive IHL
to issue authoritative condemnations of rape.' 92 The examples in note 188
above are all about making explicit and visible: the politics of recogni-
tion. 93 Even when the horizontal reform project became engaged in
substantive revisions of the language of prohibition, feminists in the
early 1990s wrote about their aims as being limited to changing the rep-
resentation of rape and sexual violence in IHL. Two important elements
of this representation were, first, to put an end to the representation of
wartime rapes as crimes against women's honor, and, second, to repre-
sent victimized women not as members of ethnic, national, or religious
groups but as individuals.
To be sure, the idea that the wrong of rape was captured by describ-
ing it as an "outrage upon personal dignity"--or that the wrong of
"forced prostitution" was captured by describing it as an offense against
a woman's honor--did expose a problematic. To some commentators,
these formulations usefully captured what sexual crimes during war
might well mean to the victims, given the cultural presuppositions they
themselves held. For instance, Christopher Scott Maravilla argued that,
189. See, e.g., Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 72; CUNY Clinic Memoran-
dum, supra note 37, at 186; Sellers & Okuizumi, supra note 28, at 59-62.
190. See, e.g., Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 72 (reporting that feminists
were willing to put forth such arguments, but only faut de mieux); CUNY Clinic Memoran-
dum, supra note 37, at 186 (developing an early statement of the argument that rape is
torture); Sellers & Okuizumi, supra note 28, at 59-62 (constructing an argument, over four
closely argued pages, that rape is torture).
191. CUNY Clinic Memorandum, supra note 37, app. B at 236 ("Every act of rape in
war-whether a consequence of indiscipline, retaliation, or genocidal policies-is a 'grave
breach.' ").
192. See, e.g., Charlesworth, supra note 93, at 393 ("Claims based on international law
can carry an emotional and moral legitimacy that can have considerable political force.").
193. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING
THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 25-73 (Amy Gutman ed., 1994).
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[i]n the Balkans, chastity of women is a sign of family and
community honor. Rape was used as an instrument of war, used
to undermine community ties, and threaten the civilian popula-
tion into fleeing .... The Bosnian Serbs violated the women of
their hated nemesis in order to undermine their manhood by not
being able to protect their wives and daughters. It was a process
of dehumanizing the enemy to the point where the women and
children could be treated like cattle only to serve the appetites of
the conquering Bosnian Serb forces. 94
For some but not all feminists, this was a usable idea. They sometimes
objected that, because of the Muslim conception of honor, the rapes of
Muslim women in Bosnia-Herzegovina were particularly harmful and
warranted priority over other wrongs committed by Serbs and by non-
Serbs in the war.'9 In arguing that rape was torture, under rules that re-
quired a showing that the victim suffered intensely, these feminists
sometimes argued that the Muslim conception of honor caused the
Muslim rape victims to suffer intensely; in arguing that it was genocidal,
they sometimes argued that the Muslim conception of honor ensured that
the rape of Muslim women would cause the disintegration of the entire
community.9 6 As Karen Engle amply documents, however, these argu-
194. Christopher Scott Maravilla, Rape as a War Crime: The Implications of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's Decision in Prosecutor v. Kunarac,
Kovac, and Vukovic on International Humanitarian Law, 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 321, 338 (2001).
195. See Azra Zalihic-Kaurin, The Muslim Woman, in MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST
WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, supra note 108, at 170, 173. Azra Zalihic-Kaurin can be
our example of this argument that rape produces an ethnically particularized harm:
[P]eople [in Bosnia] told the story of a young Muslim woman who lived in the vi-
cinity of Sjenica during World War II. Emina took up a gun to defend her village
against the loyalist Serbian Chetniks but was not able to hold them back. When she
fell in to their hands she begged one of the Chetniks, "Only leave me my honor; I
will forgive you my death." Emina is taken as a model Muslim woman; her honor
and dignity were worth more to her than her life. She forgives the Chetniks for her
murder so that she will not be raped, humiliated, and defiled. Bosnian Muslims
wanted to dedicate one day of the year to her and make March 8 "Emina's Day."
But then a new war broke out, bringing new rapes and new sexual abuses.
Id.
196. Adrienne Katherine Wing & Sylke Merchin, Rape, Ethnicity, and Culture: Spirit
Injury from Bosnia to Black America, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 24 (1993). Adrienne
Katherine Wing and Sylke Merchd.n stated,
The systematic rape of Muslim women in Bosnia could potentially result in the
complete destruction of the Muslim social fabric. Because of the centrality of the
concept of honor, the rape of one female member of a family can bring shame and
disgrace to not only her immediate family, but also the entire extended family.
Id.; id. at 24-25 (noting that the resulting disruption of the social order, radiating ever out-
ward, could produce a "phenomenon of destabilizing and destroying the social order of an
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ments were controversial among feminists: some objected that they
enlisted feminists to a nationalist project-pro-Bosnian and anti-Serb-
and/or that they made it more difficult to focus on harm to women.117
These internal tensions notwithstanding, feminists were completely
uniform in opposing any recourse to honor in the statutory definition of
rape and other sexual violence. There was complete consensus that the
pictorial output of IHL's most authoritative statements of law must not
legitimate and entrench the ideas that the rape of a woman harmed her
because of its meaning to the men in her family or culture, or that it
harmed a wife, daughter, or sister because it impugned a husband's, fa-
ther's, or brother's honor. Charlesworth, for instance, objected that
Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, "assumes that women
should be protected from sexual crimes because they implicate a
woman's honor, reinforcing the notion of women as men's property,
rather than because they constitute violence."'' 18 Bedont and Hall-
Martinez objected that the "characterization of sexual violence as an at-
tack against a woman's honor was based on the stereotype that a woman
is shamed by being the victim of rape and denies the great physical and
emotional harm suffered as a result of sexual violence crimes."'" Rana
Lehr-Lehnardt argued that defining "rape as a crime against a woman's
dignity minimizes the physical and psychological pain she suffered from
the rape. '2°° They were vigilant against any effort to smuggle in the idea
that rape constituted an actual, rather than merely ideational, degradation
of a woman's integrity or dignity.0 ' Oosterveld, for instance, objected to
"castling] crimes of sexual violence as crimes related solely to the honor
entire population group"-a harm that they term "spirit injury"); see also ASKIN, WAR CRIMES
AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 159, at 262 n.867; Sharon A. Healy, Prosecuting Rape Under
the Statute of the War Crimes Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 327,
369-74 (1995); Jocelyn Campanaro, Note, Women, War, and International Law: The Histori-
cal Treatment of Gender-Based Crimes, 89 GEo. L.J. 2557, 2571-72 (2001). But see Engle,
Feminism and Its (Dis)Contents, supra note 116, at 809 n.184 (criticizing the argument as
both inaccurate in its description of Bosnian Muslim culture and in its understandings and
uses of Islamic law). For example, Karen Engle noted that Wing and Marchdn invoke inter-
views that they conducted in the West Bank and Gaza as authority for claims about Bosnian
Muslim cultural norms about intermarriage. Id.; Wing & Merchdn, supra, at 23 n.109.
197. See Engle, Feminism and Its (Dis)Contents, supra note 116 (surveying the debate);
see also Copelon, supra note 108, at 197-218; No Justice, No Peace, supra note 35, at 108
n.38 (arguing that rape was stigmatic for the victim in Croat and Serb communities as well).
198. Charlesworth, supra note 93, at 386.
199. Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 71.
200. Lehr-Lehnardt, supra note 80, at 341.
201. See, e.g., Samantha I. Ryan, From the Furies of Nanking to the Eumenides of the
International Criminal Court: The Evolution of Sexual Assaults as International Crime, 1
PACE INT'L L. REV. 447, 477 (1999) ("When rape is perceived as a crime against honour or
morality, shame commonly ensues for the victim, who is often viewed by the community as
dirty or spoiled.").
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and dignity of the victim."202 She concluded that seeing rape and en-
forced prostitution as "outrages on personal dignity" sends "the outdated
and potentially harmful message that these violent, physical crimes were
to be evaluated based on the harm done to the victim's honour, modesty
or chastity."203 Oosterveld objected that the Red Cross Commentaries on
the Geneva Conventions described enforced prostitution as "the forcing
of a woman into immorality ... ,,0 This was objectionable because it
endorsed the idea that women subjected to sexual assaults and enforced
prostitution were actually degraded or, worse, morally tainted. In
Oosterveld's view, IHL had no business entrenching women in such
outmoded ideologies; to do so is to "distance the crime from the perpe-
trator," concentrate attention on the victim's honor, and "overlook
consideration of sexual autonomy.
' 205
It is an odd vocabulary for drafters of a criminal code to be using.
Including language about honor and dignity in the Geneva Conventions
reinforces notions, ratifies stereotypes, denies harm, casts crimes inaccu-
rately, sends outdated and potentially harmful messages, represents the
crime as being about the victim not the perpetrator, and overlooks attrib-
utes of the victim that should instead be emphasized. The reform project
implied by these modals is entirely ideological: IHL represents rape as X
and women as Y, but it should instead represent them as A and B. Why?
Because feminism sees them as A and B. IHL should stop sending a pa-
triarchal message about the world and start sending a feminist one.
What was that feminist message? That rape is a crime of sexual vio-
lence.2 6 This seems obvious today, a mere statement of fact. But it is
actually an immense achievement of feminism itself that it should seem
so. For centuries, people thought that rape was a crime against a
woman's husband or father, a crime against her honor or dignity, a crime
against morality and social order. And, for years, feminists debated
whether rape were primarily a crime of sex or a crime of violence. The
feminist law reformers were aware of this debate and sometimes en-
202. Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery, supra note 21, at 608.
203. Id. at 613.
204. Id. at 650.
205. Id. at 651.
206. See also Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 71 (objecting that "[the] char-
acterization of sexual violence as an attack against a woman's honor was based on the
stereotype that a woman is shamed by being the victim of rape and denies the great physical
and emotional harm suffered as a result of sexual violence crimes" (emphasis added));
Charlesworth, supra note 93, at 386 (objecting that Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion "assumes that women should be protected from sexual crimes because they implicate a
woman's honor, reinforcing the notion of women as men's property, rather than because they
constitute violence" (emphasis added)).
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gaged it. For some feminists, the violence of rape predominated, 07 while
others saw it as the paradigm instantiation of sexuality understood as
male domination. 2°' When the time came to pick a feminist message
about rape to send through IHL, however, feminists reached the consen-
sus view that rape is a crime of sexual violence. As Copelon put it, "The
conceptualization of rape as an attack against honor, as opposed to a
crime of violence, is a core problem. 2° Similarly, Askin concluded,
"[T]he Conventions expressly include rape and forced prostitution, al-
though they erroneously link rape with crimes of honor or dignity
instead of with crimes of violence. Such a demarcation grossly mischar-
acterizes the offense, perpetuates detrimental stereotypes, and conceals
the sexual and violent nature of the crime."
210
As I hope these quotations make manifest, the classification of rape
as sexual violence brings some new descriptors in its train: it is a sexual
assault; it is violent and physical; it causes physical and emotional (or
physical and psychological) harm; it is painful. The trauma conception
of political injury is deeply implicated in these representational
choices .2
So far, we have described the emerging feminist consensus represen-
tation of rape as a crime of sexual violence which, if not explicitly and
vehemently condemned by criminalization, is implicitly condoned or
trivialized. IHL must prohibit it as high up in its prohibitive hierarchy as
possible.
But there was something more elusive, more structural in the femi-
nist reform ambitions, something that became clear to me only after
months of immersion in the archive of feminist writing on IHL. I argue
207. Ruth Siefert, War and Rape: A Preliminary Analysis, in MASS RAPE: THE WAR
AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, supra note 108, at 54, 55 ("[T]here are good
reasons to assume that rapes do not have much to do ... with ... sexuality. Rather, they are
acts of extreme violence implemented, of course, by sexual means. Studies show that rape is
not an aggressive manifestation of sexuality, but rather a sexual manifestation of aggression.").
208. Catharine A. Macinnon, Rape, Genocide and Women's Human Rights, 17 HARV.
WOMEN's L.J. 5, 12 (1994). Macinnon argued,
It will not help to say that this is violence, not sex, for the men involved.... One
woman was allowed to live only as long as she kept her Serbian captor hard all
night orally, night after night after night, from midnight to 5:00 A.M. What he got
was sex for him. The aggression was the sex.
Id.
209. Copelon, supra note 42, at 249 (emphasis added).
210. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 81, at 304 (emphasis added).
211. ANN CVETCOVICH, AN ARCHIVE OF TRUE FEELING: TRAUMA, SEXUALITY, AND
LESBIAN PUBLIC CULTURE (2003); Lauren Berlant, The Subject of True Feeling: Pain, Privacy
and Politics, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 105, 105-13 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley
eds., 2002); Halley, The Politics of Injury: A Review of Robin West's Caring for Justice, UN-
BOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT (2005), http://www.legalleft.org/?cat=l.
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that the vertical and horizontal reforms sought by feminists-seen across
their range as they were gradually clarified, deepened and broadened
over the course of the 1990s-became an attempt to change the very
classificatory structure of IHL. The honor/sexual violence struggle was
by comparison a minor one, and, as it turned out, easily won. The big
problem that the feminists had with the actual Geneva Conventions for-
mulation was its universalism, which of course feminists have
consistently decried as masked masculinism. 2 In response, and in a
move which, I will argue, was an important conceptual invention with
concrete law-reform consequences, feminists working in IHL in the
1990s devised an alternative legal order in which the sexual harms suf-
fered by women are universal in their scope. As we will see, they were
only partially successful in their struggle for rule reforms consistent with
this vision.
From the perspective of contemporary feminists concerned with
sending the message that rape was a violation of women's honor, Article
27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention is the great culprit. But, as the Red
Cross Commentaries to Article 27 make clear, Article 27 classifies honor
as an attribute of "man"-which clearly means not men as distinguished
from women but "man as man" 2 3-that is, humans. According to those
Commentaries, the Fourth Geneva Convention "proclaims the principle
of respect for the human person and the inviolable character of the basic
rights of individual men and women.'214 The Commentaries go on to ex-
plain that
[t]he right of respect for the person must be understood in its
widest sense: it covers all the rights of the individual, that is, the
rights and qualities which are inseparable from the human being
by the very fact of his existence and his mental and physical
powers; it includes, in particular, the right to physical, moral and
intellectual integrity-an essential attribute of the human per-
215son.
Thus, when Article 27 provides that "[p]rotected persons are entitled, in
all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family
rights... ," it attributes that honor to human beings universally.
Of course, Article 27 adds that "[w]omen shall be especially pro-
tected against any attack of their honour, in particular against rape,
212. ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 159, at 253 (arguing that interna-
tional humanitarian law is "not truly universal, but masculine...").
213. 4 THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, supra note 178, at 200.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 201.
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enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault."216 That is,
women's honor, like men's, is generally protected, and it is especially
protected against sexual violence and other forms of sexual coercion.
This pattern is reflected in the Red Cross Commentaries. Explicating
"[r]espect for honour," the Commentaries say, "[h]onour is a moral and
social quality. The right to respect for his honour is a right invested in
man because he is endowed with a reason and a conscience., 217 And then
an entire special section of the Commentaries is specifically devoted to
the "Treatment of Women."
218
I will hazard to say that there is no trace of the patriarchal concep-
tion of honor in this pattern or in the words that construct it. Rather, we
have the universal rights of man, and the claim that they require specifi-
cation because of the special harms that befall women. Rape is
represented here as an instance of a general crime against humanity, and
inviolability from rape is just one way of securing a universally shared
human integrity.
It was this classificatory structure, and not the patriarchal concept of
honor, that formed the feminists' more ambitious target in their work on
the Geneva Conventions. To understand the scope of their engagement,
we need to get clear on what they did and what they did not like in the
Geneva Conventions approach to rape. Here is the key passage on the
"Treatment of Women" in the Red Cross Commentaries on the Geneva
Conventions. I italicize all the language to which feminists involved in
the ICT/Rome Statute process would have objected, and underline all of
the language that they could have written themselves:
Paragraph 2 denounces certain practices which occurred, for ex-
ample, during the last World War, when innumerable women of
all ages, and even children, were subjected to outrages of the
worst kind: rape committed in occupied territories, brutal treat-
ment of every sort, mutilations etc. In areas where troops were
stationed, or through which they passed, thousands of women
were made to enter brothels against their will or were contami-
nated with venereal diseases the incidence of which often
increased on an alarming scale.
These facts revolt the conscience of all mankind and recall the
worst memories of the great barbarian invasions. They underline
the necessity of proclaiming that women must be treated with
special consideration ....
216. Id. at 199.
217. Id. at 202.
218. Id. at 205-06.
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The provision is founded on the principles set forth in paragraph
1 on the notion of "respect for the person", "honour" and "fam-
ily rights[.]"
A woman should have an acknowledged right to special protec-
tion, the special regard owed to women being, of course, in
addition to the safeguards laid down in paragraph 1, which they
enjoy equally with men.
The Conference listed as examples certain acts constituting an
attack on women's honour, and expressly mentioned E en-
forced prostitution, i.e. the forcing of a woman into immorality
by violence or threats, or any form of indecent assault ....
rW]omen ... have an absolute right to respect for their honour
and their modesty, in short, for their dignity as women.219
As we have seen, the feminists involved in the ICT/Rome Statute proc-
esses were eager to retire the italicized terms and to endorse the
underlined ones. They wanted the intense denunciation of rape and other
sexual wrongs against women; they have consistently championed the
aggressive commitment to securing women from sexual violence. The
urgent denunciation of rapes in World War II was exactly what feminists
wanted from the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials but did not get.
Over the course of the 1990s, the feminists' goal of horizontal visi-
bility-add security from rape to the universal rights of human beings-
was dramatically expanded. The goal became changing the very classifi-
catory scheme of universal justice. The feminists involved in this work
did not want women's physical integrity to be a subset of universal hu-
man integrity, and they did not want the protection of women to be
special. To them, the right of women to be secure from sexual assault
was itself fundamental, central, and of universal scope. In opposition to
the Geneva Conventions' universal/particular schema, they wanted
women's security from rape to be universal. I will call this idea feminist
universalism (FU).
FU thinking was legally inchoate in the early years of feminist IHL
activism in the United Nations. The most articulate statements of it come
from Copelon. In debates over the ICTY reform agenda, she actively
resisted other feminists' classification of rape as an instrument of geno-
cide or as persecution based on ethnicity, arguing instead that if
feminists were to understand accurately the rapes that happened in the
Balkan War, they had to identify
219. Id. at 205-06 (emphasis added).
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... rape as a crime of gender as well as ethnicity. Women are
targets not simply because they 'belong to' the enemy, but pre-
cisely because they keep the civilian population functioning and
are essential to its continuity. They are targets because they too
are the enemy; because of their power as well as vulnerability as
women, including their sexual and reproductive power. They are
targets because of hatred of their power as women; because of
endemic objectification of women; because rape embodies male
domination and female subordination.22 °
This formulation radically re-envisions the Balkan War. The classic,
mainstream understanding of that conflict would identify it as ethnic
cleansing followed by partition: an ethno-nationalist conflict that pro-
duced the existence of and the antagonism of Serbian, Croatian, and
Muslim social forces and their territorial separation. What Copelon asks
us to see is another war, simultaneously happening on a plane entirely
different and completely orthogonal to the ethno-national conflict: a
"war against women' '211 imposing male domination on female subordina-
tion. To get this right in your head you have to try to imagine the Balkan
conflagration as a war of men-Serbian, Croatian, Muslim-against
women-again, Serbian, Croatian, Muslim. Unless you are a radical
feminist, seeing it that way will take an effort of sympathetic imagina-
tion. If you can do it, you have entered into the consciousness of FU.
Copelon also grokked the consequences of this consciousness for the
war/peace distinction that is so central to the separation of IHL from the
national legal orders that it only intermittently claims to govern. The
eruption of a war against women in the Balkans was not a special case.
That war is "ubiquitous";222 it goes on "everyday":
Emphasis on the gender dimension of rape in war is critical not
only to surfacing women as full subjects of sexual violence in
war, but also to recognizing the atrocity of rape in the time
called peace ....
From a feminist human rights perspective, gender violence has
escaped sanction because it has not been viewed as violence and
because the public/private dichotomy has shielded such violence
in its most common forms. The recognition of rape as a war
crime is thus a critical step toward understanding rape as vio-
lence. The next is to recognize that rape that acquires the
220. Copelon, supra note 108, at 207 (underlined emphasis added).
221. Id. at 213.
222. Id.
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imprimatur of the state is not necessarily more brutal, relentless,
or dehumanizing than the private rapes of everyday life ....
Every rape is a grave violation of physical and mental integrity.
Every rape has the potential to profoundly debilitate ... Every
rape is an expression of male domination and misogyny, a vehi-
cle of terrorizing and subordinating women.223
Extend the thought experiment. If the Balkans conflict is untethered
from its ethno-nationalist manifestations, if instead it is a war of men on
women, then it is available for re-envisioning-for re-representation, if
you will-as a part of the war against women that is happening in places
in which there is no ethno-nationalist conflict to confuse the picture. In
this formulation, the Balkan war against women was continuous with the
war against women that permeates everyday life in the form of privatized
and tolerated rape in bars, dormitories, public parks, and marital homes.
This war against women is waged everyday, even in the time that men
experience as peace, and everywhere, even in places where IHL does not
apply because there is currently no armed conflict. As we will see in Part
II.D below, Copelon's instinct that human rights law would be the lever
for extending the feminist IHL vision to everyday rape was right on tar-
get. Moreover, as we will see in Part II.E, this shift to a human rights
approach had concrete consequences in the drafting of the Rome Statute.
Copelon played a direct role in drafting the first concrete reform
agenda reflecting this FU vision. She was one of the four authors of the
CUNY Clinic Memorandum, which argued that "it must be recognized
and charged that apart from ethnic cleansing, forced prostitution and
forced pregnancy [and, afortiori, rape] constitute war crimes and crimes
against humanity because they are crimes of gender hatred, violence,
discrimination, and dehumanization perpetrated against women as a
class.224 The CUNY Clinic Memorandum, and Copelon writing sepa-
rately, argued that persecution "based on gender must be recognized as
its own category of crimes against humanity.' 225 Copelon fully intended
this prohibition to extend to everyday rape. As she explained, all rapes
are per se persecutions on the basis of gender: "[I]t is not enough for
rape to be viewed as a crime against humanity when it is the vehicle of
some other form of persecution: it must also be recognized as a crime
against humanity because it is invariably a persecution based on gen-
der.
,2 6
223. Id. at 212-13 (emphasis added).
224. CUNY Clinic Memorandum, supra note 37, app. B at 237.
225. Id.; Copelon, supra note 108, at 206 (emphasis added).
226. Copelon, supra note 108, at 208 (emphasis added).
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In subsequent Sections, I will show that the ICTs did not adopt the
idea that persecution based on gender was a crime against humanity, but
that the Rome Statute did. The idea that rape is per se discriminatory on
the basis of gender did find its way into the reasoning of the ICTY in
Kunarac.2"
I would like to offer two further thought experiments to help specify
the radical potential of these reforms. First, just imagine that you are a
prosecutor deciding what to charge when you have facts telling of the
violent ethnic separation of two populations. Imagine that armed forces
on both sides took property and territory from the other; destroyed prop-
erty, both public and private, belonging to its disfavored group; detained
civilians from that group on a mass scale in lethally inadequate facilities;
subjected the men in those facilities to beatings, mutilations, and kill-
ings; and subjected the women in them to rape. Imagine a conflict in
which the armed forces of the gradually prevailing group preferentially
killed men and boys of age to fight, both individually and in large mas-
sacres, and that these armed forces deported women, old men, and young
boys by the tens of thousands outside the region that they claimed for
themselves. The feminist agenda for you is that you should prosecute the
rapes as matter of top priority, in a distinct trial, as crimes against hu-
manity, because they constitute persecution based on gender.
Later, as we will see, feminists added other ways of doing this to
their reform agenda such as prosecuting the rapes as grave breaches of
humanitarian law because they constitute a widespread and systematic
attack on women, or simply because they are rapes and this violates the
individual women's right not to be raped.
There are some differences between these approaches. The shift to
an individual rights approach is particularly suggestive. Persecution is
intrinsically group-based, large-scale, and intentional, and grave
breaches are by definition widespread and systematic. Both imply a large
social impact. However, individual rape charges would drop the Damo-
cles sword of IHL enforcement on purely individual wrongs and harms.
To reach everyday rape using persecution charges and/or grave breach
charges, feminists would have to convince the IHL intelligentsia that
everyday life involved high levels of systematic male sexual assault on
women. An individual rights approach would make that visionary shift
unnecessary.
We are used to making these distinctions. What they share is harder
to see because it is so new and so big: all three strategies will make your
227. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovid, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A,
Appeals Judgment, 218 (June 12, 2002); see Engle, Feminism and Its (Dis)Contents, supra
note 116, at 804-05 (offering a discussion of this holding).
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prosecution fully orthogonal to the alignment of antagonism in the war
itself. It will not be "about" how to fight the ethno-nationalist war. In-
stead, you will be prosecuting the persecution of women, a widespread
and systematic attack on women, or the individual rape of a woman. You
will be prosecuting rape crimes within an ethnic conflict as a "war
against women." It is only through radical feminist lenses that such a war
can be visible.
The second thought experiment takes us to "peacetime." '228 If indeed
the war against women in the ethno-nationalist war is continuous with
the war against women conducted everyday and everywhere, then the
requirements that IHL limit itself to genocidal attacks, widespread
and/or systematic attacks, and/or armed conflict seems absurd. Some
way around those requirements will be needed. At this point, Copelon's
instinct to reach out to human rights law is the right move for the rights-
maximizing international lawyer. Signatory States are obliged to protect
human rights in war and in peace. So, the question becomes: how can
IHL annex human rights and reach the everyday? As we will see, feni-
nist thinking on this point was to become far more elaborate over the
course of the 1990s.
The FU vision thus caused feminists to imagine a restructuring of
the architecture of humanitarian law on a dramatic scale. It also caused
them to redefine individual crimes such that rape was no longer a mere
example of a more generally defined crime but stood at its definitional
core. At the Rome Conference, for instance, feminists argued that muti-
lation should be included as a discrete crime against humanity because
rape is the prototypical mutilation: "Rape is the paradigmatic, but often
ignored, form of mutilation, constituting as it does a gross inva-
sion/splitting of the body which is usually health- or life-threatening and
produces long-term damage to body and health. 2 29 The argument is not
that mutilation is an apt metaphor for rape or that rape and physical mu-
tilation have similar effects; it is that rape is the quintessential
mutilation, of which, for instance, amputation is a derivative and secon-
dary example. This micro-restructuring is perfectly homologous with the
macro-restructuring implicit in the war-against-women framing of the
Balkans conflict.
A brief conclusion of this section before we turn to the ICT statutes.
Very early in the ICT process, feminists developed a series of ideas
about how to criminalize rape about which they had substantial agree-
ment. They performed even if they did not reach a consensus resolving
an earlier debate within feminism about whether rape was sex or vio-
228. Charlesworth, supra note 93, at 390-91.
229. WCGJ, 3/98 Recommendations on Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 106, at 7.
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lence (it is both), and a consensus resolving an earlier debate about
whether rape was better classified as an assault simpliciter or as a dis-
tinct, sexual, assault (it is the latter). Feminists resolved that rape is
sexual violence and should be criminalized under two rubrics: rape and
the almost redundant "sexual violence." They agreed that they wanted
rape, understood to be criminal because it is sexual violence, to appear in
the IHL hierarchy at the highest level of generality possible. They had
begun to see that this goal could not be satisfied by treating rape as a
special harm subsidiary to the false universals of masculinist humanitari-
anism. They had begun to realize that they sought a new universe of
wrong: the wrongs women suffer in time of war must be classified sepa-
rately from the wrongs men suffer in time of war. In the new FU vision,
women do not share these wrongs with men, but rather suffer them in
their own universe and at the highest level of rights generality. With the
exception of Copelon's remarkable invention of a crime against human-
ity based on persecution based on gender, and her even more remarkable
idea that every rape is per se a persecution based on gender, they did not
yet realize what it would mean to put these ideas into operation. Clarity
about that did not come until they ran up against the deficits of the ICTR
and ICTY statutes as faits accomplis and as impediments to their work
on the ICT litigation. We will see that clarity emerge in Part II.D, but
first, we turn to an assessment, in Part II.C, of the feminists' successes
and defeats in the drafting of the ICT statutes.
C. Feminist Successes and Defeats in the ICTY and ICTR Statutes
The feminist efforts to rank-order up and to redefine-the vertical
and horizontal reform projects-have been partly successful. Mostly
defeated in the drafting of the ICTY and ICTR statutes, they were far
more successful in the drafting of the Rome Statute. Rape and sexual
violence appear in these instruments and have moved up the hierarchy of
criminality. But, as we will see in Part II.E, even at Rome, the feminists'
most expansive classificatory ambitions were almost consistently foiled.
The ICTY Statute specifically includes "rape ' (along with "mur-
der," "extermination," "enslavement," "deportation," "imprisonment,"
"torture," "persecution on political, racial and religious grounds," and
"other inhumane acts")23' as crimes against humanity. The ICTR Statute
does precisely the same.32 Vertically, the effect of this new legislation is
to classify "rape" as a "crime," which is a "crime against humanity"
230. ICTY Statute, supra note 14, art. 5(g).
231. Id. art. 5(a)-(i).
232. ICTR Statute, supra note 14, art. 3(a)-(i).
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when committed in armed conflict.233 Horizontally, these new rules re-
lieve rape of its retro dignity and honor baggage, and repackage it, in
abstracto at least, as a freestanding crime of the same gravity as murder,
extermination, enslavement, and so on. Rape as rape has entered the pan-
theon of IHL crimes, but with the proviso that it is punishable in IHL
only when it is the predicate crime of a crime against humanity.
As feminists repeatedly noted, rape, even rape in war, is rarely so
clearly connected to such an attack. Instead, it is frequently "sporadic."23 '
The ICTY Statute provides that crimes against humanity can be estab-
lished only if they are committed in the course of "armed conflict. 233
The ICTR Statute gives a narrower definition of the kinds of armed con-
flict included: to be a crime against humanity, the offense must be
"committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any ci-
vilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious
grounds. 236 The ICTY Statute, seemingly at least, has broader authority:
it can prosecute the listed crimes "when committed in armed conflict,
whether international or internal in character, and directed against any
civilian population. 237 In the Rome process, feminists would seek re-
forms to the Geneva Conventions' heritage that would minimize the level
of armed conflict required, and loosen the requirement of a nexus be-
tween armed conflict and individual violations. Assuming this was a goal
in the ICTY/ICTR processes, how did the feminists do? Not too well.
The ICTR Statute broke significant new ground in many ways. Most
dramatically, it established an international criminal tribunal to enforce
carefully drafted selections from the law of armed conflict in an inter-
nal-not international---conflict. This meant that the only element of the
Geneva Convention regime that the ICTR could draw on for authorita-
tive, non-retrospective war crimes was Common Article 3 and Additional
Protocol H."238 Although the specific violations listed in those instruments
include many fragmentary elements that can be tracked back to Article
147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which lists the grave breaches,
most of the drafting is new."' This means that an international court, not
233. Id. art. 3; ICTY Statute, supra note 14, art. 5.
234. Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 70; WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations,
supra note 105, pt. Im, Recommendation 2, Commentary WC.2.3.
235. ICTY Statute, supra note 14, art. 5.
236. ICTR Statute, supra note 14, art. 3.
237. Id.
238. Id. art. 4; First Geneva Convention, supra note 180, art. 3; Second Geneva Conven-
tion, supra note 180, art. 3; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 180, art. 3; Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 177, art. 3; Additional Protocol II, supra note 179.
239. ICTR Statute, supra note 14, art. 4. The Statute provides,
These violations shall include, but shall not be limited to: a) Violence to life, health
and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel
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merely the Member States of the Geneva Conventions, now had the
power to enforce some (but by no means all) elements of the Geneva
Conventions, to do so in an internal conflict, and to include rape as a
statutory basis for the prosecution of crimes against humanity. This in-
novation in the ICTR Statute also meant that the ICTR, unlike the ICTY,
had express statutory authority for enforcing the Geneva Conventions
against rapes. Rape as an explicitly named crime enters the pantheon of
IHL crimes.
This was an important advance for feminists, but it by no means
suggests that they- were at the drafting table or powerfully influencing
those who were. The feminists took at least two directly related losses,
and some others as well. First, the prized territory of grave breaches re-
mained out of their reach. Article 2 of the ICTY Statute, which does give
that tribunal authority to prosecute grave breaches, makes no mention of
rape.20 Meanwhile, the ICTR Statute, as we have seen, authorizes the
prosecution of violations of Common Article 3: the internal character of
the conflict put grave breaches out of reach. But it is the provision that
specifies rape.
Nor were the feminists able to replace women's honor with sexual
violence. The language giving the ICTR authority to prosecute violations
of the Geneva Conventions is taken verbatim from Additional Protocols I
and II, and extends to "[o]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any
form of indecent assault. 2 '
However defective the ICTR Statute, at least it gave feminists their
first opportunity to argue that IHL was committed to punishing rape in
conflict. Nowhere else were they so happy. The ICTY Statute did not
include any sexual crimes in its "laws and customs of war" and genocide• 42
provisions. The ICTR Statute makes no provision for enforcement of
treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; b) Collec-
tive punishments; c) Taking of hostages; d) Acts of terrorism; e) Outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced
prostitution and any form of indecent assault; f) Pillage; g) The passing of sentences
and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recog-
nized as indispensable by civilised peoples; h) Threats to commit any of the
foregoing acts.
Id.; see also id. (listing several elements that go beyond the Geneva Conventions' definition of
grave breaches, such as violence to mental well-being, violence to well-being (not "body and
health"), mutilation, corporal punishment, collective punishment, acts of terrorism, outrages
upon personal dignity, pillage, and threats to commit the above). Compare Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 177, art. 147.
240. See ICTY Statute, supra note 14, art. 2.
241. ICTR Statute, supra note 14, art. 4(e).
242. ICTY Statute, supra note 14, arts. 2, 4.
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the former and is silent on sexual crimes in its article on the latter.23 If
more vertical or horizontal progress were to be made in the ICTs under
these silent chapeaux, GFeminism would have to persuade the Prosecu-
tor to charge in particular cases, and to take their victories in the form of
case law and convictions. All of the arduosities detailed by Sellers and
Okiuzumi would have to be undertaken.2"
The ICT statutes thus gave feminists a small vertical victory-one
that was soured by its retro horizontal content. Otherwise the statues
taught a stern lesson: if you are not at the table when the drafting begins,
you cannot influence the line-by-line construction of a court-establishing
statute.
D. Feminists at Rome
Feminists did not have to wait long to show that they had learned the
harsh counsel of their many defeats in the ICT statutes. By the mid-
1990s a grand convention was planned to establish a new International
Criminal Court. A new body of law was about to be drafted, derived
from IHL but taking the institutional form of ICL. Here was a chance for
feminists to draft legislation on what might. have seemed to be a clean
slate, but was actually a battlefield. This time, as we have seen, the femi-
nists were ready.
The law review advocacy literature shows that, by the advent of the
Rome Statute debates, feminists understood the feminist-universalism
position better, advocated it more articulately, and knew more clearly
what kinds of legal reforms would put it into positive law. I will set out
their thinking and reform proposals in two Sections, one devoted to the
academic elaborations of FU, and the other to the WCGJ's specific re-
form proposals.
1. The Feminist Universalist Vision Comes of Age
One of the chief visionaries for the FU project was Hilary
Charlesworth, who picked up on Copelon's formulations and ran with
them.
Charlesworth criticized the ICTY and ICTR statutes for tethering the
prosecution of rape as a violation inside a widespread and systematic
attack and assailed the Akayesu tribunal for holding that the rapes were
violations of IHL because they were genocide. In an article published
after the Rome Statute was promulgated, she assessed the earlier stat-
utes:
243. ICTR Statute, supra note 14, art. 2.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 185-187.
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Thus the "new" international criminal law engages sexual vio-
lence only when it is an aspect of the destruction of a
community .... [R]ape is wrong, not because it is a crime of
violence against women and a manifestation of male dominance,
but because it is an assault on a community defined only by its
racial, religious, national or ethnic composition. In this account,
the violation of a woman's body is secondary to the humiliation
of the group."'
Charlesworth greeted this secondariness with indignation. The rapes
must be not only mentioned and made explicit, but also ranked as crimes
against humanity and war crimes in themselves. In addition, the univer-
sal class against which they are aimed-women-must be framed into
the construction of the IHL regime. Charlesworth's point, in sum, was
that "[r]ape and sexual assault should be analyzed in international law as
crimes against women, rather than offenses against their communities. ,
246
Like Copelon, Charlesworth understood that "the consequence of
defining certain rapes as public in international law is to make private
rapes seem somehow less serious. 247 What Copelon called the "ubiqui-
tous war against women" requires a profound extension of the
jurisdictional predicates for crimes against humanity-currently limited
to armed conflict-and war crimes-currently limited to widespread and
systematic attack. Thus, "[t]he notions of conflict and attacks are them-
selves contingent and controversial. When do they begin and end? For
many women, violence is not reduced with the cessation of military hos-
tilities, and ostensible times of peace may be full of conflict for women
and produce serious human rights violations. '248 Like Copelon,
Charlesworth used derisory scare quotes to mock the peacetime/wartime
distinction, seeing instead "the continuity between the ways women are
treated in 'peacetime' and in times of 'conflict' . . . ." Indeed, according
to Charlesworth, the acceptability of rape in "peacetime" causes rape in
"conflict."2'4 9
Publishing in 1999, Charlesworth had many of the same, but also
many more, ideas than Copelon had offered in 1993 about how to opera-
tionalize FU in IHL. She was joined toward the end of the decade and in
the early years of the new millenium by other academic/activist feminists
with equally concrete reform proposals. What follows are the feminist
245. Charlesworth, supra note 93, at 387.
246. Id. at 394.
247. Id. at 388.
248. Id. at 389 ("[R]ape in armed conflict is made possible by the prevalence of rape in
times of peace.").
249. Id. at 390-91.
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rule proposals, ranked by scale from small fixes to large structural shifts.
Only the latter would deliver in any holistic way on the FU vision.
a. Classify Rape as a Grave Breach not a
Crime Against Humanity
Writing together in 2000, Charlesworth and Chinkin argued that the
ICT prosecutors should avoid charging rape as a crime against humanity.
Instead, they argued, it should be charged as a grave breach. Why?
Crimes against humanity implied that rape harmed humanity-that it
was a general wrong in the humanist universalism that we have attrib-
uted to the classificatory scheme of Article 27 of the Geneva Convention.
Charging rape as a grave breach would individualize the wrong and al-
low its gendered focus to emerge.250
b. Criminalize Persecution on the Basis of Gender as
a Crime Against Humanity
Charlesworth's generally critical review of the Rome Statute in-
cluded one exception: the inclusion of gender among the grounds of
persecution constituting a crime against humanity. Charlesworth argued
that "[r]ape and sexual assault should be analyzed in international law as
crimes against women, rather than crimes against their communities.
International legal recognition of persecution based on gender offers the
possibility of challenging the narrow conception of the social order pro-
tected by international criminal law.' 25' For feminist-universalist reasons,
Charlesworth approved Copelon's 1993 proposal, and liked the fact
that it is now part of ICL.
c. Classify Rape as Rape
In place of rape as an insult to women's honor or to humanity, femi-
nists animated by the FU vision increasingly advocated the classification
of rape as rape, located at the highest level of the IHL/ICL hierarchy.
Rape and other sexual violence crimes should become freestanding
crimes in IHL/ICL. This idea was a late development: all of my exam-
ples are from published reports looking back on the Rome process.
250. Cf HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 315-21 (2000) (arguing for inclusion of rape as a
"grave breach"); see also Lehr-Lehnardt, supra note 80, at 341 ("[Listing rape as a war crime
... [is] an advancement for women, because it reinforced the notion that the injury was suf-
fered by the individual instead of by the society, or even more generally, by humanity, which
is inferred by listing rape as a crime against humanity.").
251. Charlesworth, supra note 93, at 394.




Bedont, for example, argued:
[I]t is insufficient to subsume sexual violence under torture or
assault. This hides the sexual aspect of the crime and denies the
particular harm suffered by a victim of rape. For this reason the
objective of the Women's Caucus [for Gender Justice] was to
identify separately certain sexual and gender crimes in addition
to rape in the Rome Statute."'
The ultimate goal here was succinctly stated in a section heading of a
student note: "Rape Should Be a Crime of Rape, Not a Subsection of
Another Crime. 254 Its author explained:
Rape should be prosecuted as rape, as a crime in itself, not as a
subset of a war crime or a crime against humanity. Rape is not
less harmful to the victim if she is raped in an isolated incident
and not part of a systematic attack or large-scale commission of
rape. It seems that rapists still do not have to answer for the vio-
lence toward the individual woman but instead for the violence
toward the community.
25
Or, as Samantha L. Ryan put it, looking back on the Rome Statute in
1999, "sexual assaults should have been given a separate article under
the Rome Statute."256 That is to say, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, genocide, aggression, and sexual assault should have been the
chief headings of the new ICC's subject-matter jurisdiction.
2
51
d. Use IHL/ICL Criminal Enforcement to
Vindicate Human Rights
As we have seen, in 1993, Copelon had the breakthrough intuition
that achieving a FU legal order in IHL would require annexing human
rights law to humanitarian law. In 2001, one feminist codification de-
scribed this project as "The Utopian Vision. 258
At first blush, to an international law outsider, this sounds perfectly
reasonable and a little anodyne. If, as a human being, one has human
rights to be free from certain kinds of harms, why should those rights not
253. Bedont, Gender-Specific Provisions in the Statute of the International Criminal
Court, in I ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra
note 51, at 183, 196-97.
254. Lehr-Lehnardt, supra note 80, at 346.
255. Id. at 347.
256. Ryan, supra note 201, at 450.
257. Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 72 (claiming that "the general practice
of the Prosecutor at the ICTY and more recently at the ICTR has been to charge the crime of
rape both as rape and as a constituent act of another crime under the statute").
258. GARDHAM & JARVIS, supra note 160, at 254-56.
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be secured by humanitarian law? And it is a perfectly commonplace rec-
ommendation in late- 1990s feminist advocacy in IHL/ICL contexts. But of
all the feminist reform proposals listed so far, this one is the most structur-
ally dramatic. The goal was to extend the reach of IHL from armed
conflict to "peacetime" (during which human rights law does apply) for
the purposes of getting accountability in the ICC for the everyday rape
and sexual assault of women.
Again, Charlesworth carried Copelon's idea forward:
International law has traditionally drawn a distinction between
the principles of individual conduct that apply in times of armed
conflict [IHL] and those that operate in peacetime (human rights
law) .... From a feminist perspective, the distinction has al-
lowed IHL, with its bases in codes of warriors' honor, to factor
out issues that do not relate to the warrior caste.259
If IHL-enforcing entities were to dissolve that false dichotomy, they
could enforce human rights. For instance, Charlesworth suggested that
the International Committee of the Red Cross, in its IHL-enforcing ca-
pacity, should have been able to take action against the Taliban's
exclusion of women from the workplace.26
e. Extend IHL (With its Substantive-Law Annexation
of Human Rights) to "Peacetime"
Charlesworth sometimes seems to concede that human rights viola-
tions must be connected to armed conflict if they are to be prosecuted in
an IHL tribunal. For instance, at one point she seeks "accountability for
human rights violations in internal armed conflict." 26' Additionally, her
Taliban example may imply that the exclusion of women from the work-
place in Detroit would not be within the reach of her ideal ICC. But
elsewhere, as we have seen, she decries the wartime/peacetime distinc-
tion as an effect of masculinist consciousness, describes "peacetime" as
a state of war against women, and argues for the prosecution of everyday
sexual violence in IHL. Although she does not explicitly say so, this
logic would allow IHL and even ICC enforcement of human rights viola-
tions occurring in States at "so-called peace." Indeed, she sees how the
Rome Statute's criminalization of persecution based on gender can be
used to dissolve the international/national and war/peace distinctions that
entangle IHL in the implicit legitimation of peacetime violence against
women. In her view, "[m]ost fundamentally, international lawyers need
259. Charlesworth, supra note 93, at 386.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 385.
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to understand that the way that our discipline has legitimated the use of
violence by accepting it is an inevitable aspect of international relations
and the implications that this has for our daily lives. 262
Other feminists argue that the reach of IHL must extend to "peace-
time." Ryan, for instance, argues that the Rome Statute should have
provided that human rights violations were triable in the ICC. 63 She
notes that the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women has re-
ported myriad instances of sexual violence against women in States that
are devoid of armed conflict, States in which no IHL-cognizable wide-
spread or systematic attacks are under way.264 Thus, Ryan concludes that,
where national criminal justice systems refuse to vindicate women's
human rights to be free of sexual violence, the ICC should have the
power to intervene: "These crimes cannot go unpunished. Where the na-
tional courts are unable or unwilling to do so, the international
community must rise to the responsibility.9
265
The resulting legal vision matches feminist universalism to a kind of
legal universalism. Human rights are protected by a penal law enforce-
able both in armed conflict and in "peacetime": the world is paved with
law; the law it is paved with is criminal law; and "these crimes cannot go
unpunished." Taken literally, this is a call not just for universal jurisdic-
tion but universal liability for rape and sexual violence.
The visionaries writing in the law reviews thus did a lot to extend the
FU vision and to hammer out discrete rule proposals consistent with it
for feminists to seek at Rome. What did the activists working in Prep-
ComI and the Rome Diplomatic Conference actually seek?
2. WCGJ Operationalization of the Feminist Universalist
Vision as Legal Rule Proposals
Like all of its predecessor feminist organizations, the WCGJ had a
broad agenda, far broader than the criminal provisions under examina-
tion here. It sought procedural rules such as requiring special protection of
witnesses, receipt of amicus briefs, and the appointment of a special advi-
sor on gender crimes to the Prosecutor's Office.266 It sought to narrow
262. Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
263. Ryan, supra note 201, at 474.
264. Id. at 483.
265. Id. at 485; see also id. at 453 (objecting that classifying sexual assaults under exist-
ing rubrics of IHL imposed on victims of sexual violence the burden of showing that "the
additional and complex contextual requirements under international law" had been met).
266. See, e.g., WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. V, art. 44 (protection
of witnesses); id. art. 50 (amicus briefs); WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, art.
50 (amicus briefs); WCGJ, Gender Justice and the ICC, supra note 106, at 32 (special advisor
on gender crimes).
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and/or eliminate a long list of defenses.267 It sought to secure heavy sen-
tences for convicted perpetrators and reparations to victims.
26
Most generally, the WCGJ supported the formation of a strong, in-
dependent ICC with the power to try individuals for a wide range of
important crimes. What may be the first circulated WCGJ position paper
calls for these central CICC and Like-Minded Group aims.269
Here we are interested in the WCGJ agenda for the redefinition of
IHL crimes to be inserted into the new ICL regime, and in a few addi-
tional reforms that carry over to the Rome process the advocacy
feminists had developed in the ICTs. Once again, the agenda can be di-
vided into vertical and horizontal reforms. Our questions: what did the
feminists want and how much did their agenda coincide with the "uto-
pian" agenda of the visionaries?
a. Vertical Reform Agenda
The vertical reform agenda was rich with new ideas about how to
operationalize the FU vision. I start with the more familiar proposals and
proceed to the more structural and inventive.
i. Push Rape and Other Sexual Violence Crimes
up the Hierarchy of Crimes
The WCGJ worked to push sexual violence crimes up within the ar-
ticles on war crimes and crimes against humanity. The vertical reforms
for war crimes include the specification of sexual and gender assault as
an explicitly included type of every single enumerated form of miscon-
duct-I will call this line-by-line specification-and a new, general
chapeau allowing the prosecutor to charge sexual and gender crimes in
any prosecution for war crimes.270 Both proposals would have made it
possible to claim that gender and sexual violence, including rape, was a
grave breach, the former explicitly, the latter implicitly.
ii. Classify Rape as a Grave Breach
As we would expect, the WCGJ described the inscription of rape and
other forms of sexual violence into the grave breaches prosecutable as
war crimes in the ICC as "of 'fundamental importance' ,,271
267. See, e.g., WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. II, arts. L-N, P-R.
268. See, e.g., id. pt. IV.
269. WCGJ, 8/97 Recommendations on the Court, supra note 106.
270. WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. In, WC7.1.
271. WCGJ, Gender Justice and the ICC, supra note 106, at 18.
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iii. Add Persecution Based on Gender to the Predicate
Crimes Against Humanity
As we have seen, this reform was one of Copelon's first FU aims.272
The WCGJ persistently advocated this reform at the PrepCom and at
Rome.273
iv. Classify Rape as Rape?
I have been unable to find any evidence that the WCGJ sought to
make rape and other sexual violence a separate article of ICC criminal-
ity, on par with war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and
aggression. The proposed general chapeau was as close as the WCGJ got
to advocating the criminalization of rape as rape.274 But it may have in-
tended the latter reform to accomplish reclassification of rape as rape. Its
explanation of the general chapeau argues that it was needed because,
"even while sexual violence can meet the elements of the other enumer-
ated crimes, criminal law provides definitions of rape, enforced
prostitution, and forced sterilization and other forms of violence and
abuse that are different from that of the enumerated crimes." '275 If "enu-
merated crimes" is construed to refer, say, to torture, then the insertion of
the general chapeau would not have been a big structural overhaul of
IHL. But if it refers to war crimes and crimes against humanity, the im-
plication would be that the ICC should be authorized to prosecute sexual
violence crimes using national law, as a new and independent species of
war crime.
v. Reach "Peacetime"
Neither war crimes nor crimes against humanity should be limited to
armed conflict. The WCGJ consistently sought extension of ICC en-
forcement to "peacetime."
For war crimes, the WCGJ proposed to eliminate the requirement of
some connection to a widespread and/or systematic attack or a plan
adopted by a State or other belligerent entity. Most wartime rapes, they
argued, are more sporadic and could not be charged or punished if these
requirements were retained.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 220, 225-226.
273. WCGJ, 3/98 Summary of Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. 11.4.
274. WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. II1, WC7.1.
275. Id.
276. Id. pt. I1.
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Similarly, by the March 1998 PrepCom, the WCGJ had proposed
that crimes against humanity should not be mandatorily linked to armed
conflict.277 The new statute should "[r]eject any linkage to war."278 Why?
The linkage to war would exclude from prosecution most official
perpetrators of massive violence through repressive dictatorial
regimes such as in Chile and Latin America [sic] in recent dec-
ades. All that should be required is that they occur on a
widespread or systematic basis .... References to the "civilian
population" should be replaced with a reference to "any popula-
tion. 279
Specifically, persecution based on gender should not be linked to
war.2 ° Under these reforms, ICC enforcement of widespread unofficialrape during "peacetime" would be prosecutable.
vi. Annex Human Rights Law to IHL/ICL
As we have seen, from the early 1990s, feminists saw the annexation
of human rights law to IHL as a large structural reform that would en-
able them to use the criminal enforcement capacities of humanitarian
law to reach the everyday. This was, as we have also seen, its largest,
most ambitious reform idea. At Rome; the WCGJ vigorously advocated
specific rules that would effect this change.
In December 1997, the WCGJ drew up a general chapeau setting
forth interpretive principles for the entire statute: "The application and
interpretation of the general principles of law must be consistent with
international human rights standards and the progressive development
thereof, which encompasses the prohibition on adverse discrimination of
any kind, including discrimination based on gender and gender-
stereotyped assumptions.' '21' This proposed chapeau is packed with inno-
vations.
First, the chapeau would make human rights law-human rights law
as it is "progressive[ly]" understood-the overarching source for general
principles governing the Statute. The authorities cited in the WCGJ's
footnotes include a plethora of human rights conventions, the reports of
277. WCGJ, 3/98 Recommendations on Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 106, at 3
("Crimes against humanity should... encompass the enumerated crimes of official as well as
non-state actors when committed on a widespread or systematic basis against any population
whether in war or peace...."); see also WCGJ, Gender Justice and the ICC, supra note 106,
at 14.
278. WCGJ, Gender Justice and the ICC, supra note 106, at 4 (emphasis added).
279. WCGJ, 3/98 Summary of Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. HI.2.
280. WCGJ, 3/98 Recommendations on Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 106, at
12.
281. WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. II, art. L-T, § 2.
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Special Rapporteurs on Human Rights, and law review articles address-
ing human rights in the mode of literary nonfiction and advocacy. All of
these are cited as sources of human rights law to which the ICC could
legitimately turn for interpretive guidance.282
Second, the WCGJ's proposed language would require that all appli-
cations and interpretations of the Statute be nondiscriminatory on the
basis of gender. The chapeau not only invoked human rights as a con-
straint on interpretation of IHL/ICL but added a requirement that
IHL/ICL be applied and interpreted without discrimination of any kind,
including discrimination on the basis of sex. According to the WCGJ,
nondiscrimination on the basis of sex was a, perhaps the, core principle
of humanitarian law. 283 The intense FU focus of this proposed reform is
made manifest in its gender-exceptionalism: the commentary lists other
impermissible bases of discrimination, including sexual orientation and
health, but none of these was included in the draft chapeau.8 The pro-
posed chapeau thus carries the FU torch to the very pinnacle of the
proposed Statute's interpretive hierarchy.
In the WCGJ's supporting commentary, we find a very strong, posi-
tive-rights understanding of nondiscrimination. It was the WCGJ's
position that the "minimization of sexual violence and the failure to con-
demn sexual violence violate humanitarian law's core principle against
discrimination based on sex., 28 ' That is, non-prohibition of sexual vio-
lence and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to prosecute it
would violate the principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of sex. In
order not to discriminate on the basis of sex, the ICC would be required
to indict and prosecute sexual violence crimes. This odd new bit of draft-
ing actually operationalizes the mandates of feminist politics of
recognition.
Nothing in the law review literature prepared me for this element of
the chapeau. It is a surprise and seems to be the brainchild of the WCGJ
itself. The WCGJ justification for it derives directly from the FU vision,
however. It invokes feminist universalism explicitly when it claims that
"the prohibition on adverse discrimination and reliance on stereotypes
based on gender is of particular importance to the integrity of the ICC
and its capacity to render universal justice.
' 286
How could such a requirement ever actually constrain the ICC
prosecutor? The WCGJ also proposed rules providing for review of the
Prosecutor's decision not to investigate or indict. A comprehensive
282. Id.
283. Id. pt. HI, § II, Introductory Note.
284. Id.; see also id. pt. II, Recommendation 5, Suggested Text.
285. id. pt. III, § II, Introductory Note, 2 (emphasis added).
286. id. pt. II, GP 12.2 (emphasis added).
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statement of its positions that the WCGJ probably completed in June
1998 proposed that victims and other interested parties-presumably to
include expert NGOs-be able to seek review of the prosecutor's deci-
sion not to investigate or prosecute.287 Thus, "victims and interested non-
governmental organizations" would be empowered to appeal prosecuto-
rial inaction to the Pre-Trial Chamber.28 This provision would make the
general chapeau requiring nondiscrimination on the basis of gender en-
forceable to the extent that the reviewing chamber could actually reverse
the Office of the Prosecutor's decision.
vii. Expand the Scope of ICL Vis-A-Vis National Law
At several points, the WCGJ agenda assumes such an expansive
concept of gender and coercion that it implicitly incorporates into ICL
criminal conduct that had theretofore been solely subject to national law.
For example, the WCGJ would have included sexual harassment in the
scope of ICL prosecution of "humiliating and degrading treatment.
' 289
Elsewhere, it recommended giving the ICC jurisdiction to protect
women and children from marriage practices that constitute enslave-
ment.29" Thus the WCGJ's vision for the ICC would have endowed it
with jurisdiction over violations of gender and sexual violence even in
peacetime, by displacing national law and national institutions tasked
with its enforcement.
b. Horizontal Reforms Agenda
None of the vertical reforms comes with any sign of internal dis-
agreement within the WCGJ. And most of the horizontal reforms were
also matters of smooth actual or performed consensus. But there was
disagreement about several of the horizontal reforms, disagreements that
were sometimes about strategy, but sometimes about substantive feminist
ideology.
A very interesting feature of these disagreements is their near-
complete erasure from the available materials. One must infer that the
CICC command to produce consensus was reproduced among the femi-
nists working inside the WCGJ.
287. WCGJ, 8/97 Recommendations on the Court, supra note 106, at 18.
288. WCGJ, Gender Justice and the ICC, supra note 106, at 24.
289. WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. III, Recommendation 6,
Commentary, WC.6.3.
290. Id. pt. III, Recommendation 8, Commentary, WC.8.2 ("[W]omen and girls are not
only sold into forced marriage, but also kidnapped, coerced, threatened or deceived into 'ac-
cepting' it."). I will discuss below the implications of the substantive position stated here, that




Another interesting feature of these disagreements is that they arose
between more radical and more liberal feminist political visions-and
that it was the radical vision that the WCGJ presented as its public face
at the Rome Conference. Except on issues that could produce resistance
by States committed to regulating abortion, lines that were more liberal
were submerged under lines that were more structuralist and that pur-
sued the FU vision. In this Section, I read the WCGJ materials to show
that GFeminism at Rome was far more radical and structuralist than
some of its own most prominent proponents.
i. Delink Honor and Dignity from Sexual
and Gender Violence Crimes
The WCGJ was vigorous in its denunciation of the idea that rape is
an insult to women's honor and dignity. At one point it indicated that
Caucus members would take it as a personal affront-an affront that they
describe in specifically criminal terms-if the two were not firmly dis-
tinguished once and for all:
This underestimation of both the purpose and effect of sexual
violence is shocking today and deeply discriminatory now that
the violent, terrible nature of rape and other sexual violence
against women has finally been recognized .... To continue the
linkage of rape, enforced prostitution (which ... is usually at
least serial rape) with "ridicule," "calumny" or "being forced to
perform degrading acts" when what is being punished is the in-
fliction of some of the most extreme and traumatizing forms of
physical and psychological violence, amounting to sexual torture
or slavery, is itself humiliating and degrading to women and re-
inforces the stigma that it is the purpose of justice to prevent.
2 9'
For all its denunciation of the idea that sexual assaults were wrong be-
cause they were humiliating and degrading, the WCGJ did not advocate
for the elimination of "humiliating and degrading treatment" from the
Statute. Deletion of that crime might have made it harder to prosecute
sexual harassment short of forced nudity or forced sexual performance.292
Instead, the WCGJ's strategy was to ensure that honor and dignity provi-
sions lack any reference to sexual and gender crimes and that sexual and
291. Id. pt. I, Recommendation 6, Commentary, WC.6.2 (conflating prohibition, pun-
ishment, and prevention); see also id. pt. IH, Recommendation 5, Commentary, WC.5.2.
292. Id. pt. I, Recommendation 6, Commentary, WC.6.3.
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gender crimes provisions lack any reference to honor and dignity. They
called this procedure "delinking.
29 3
ii. Add "Crimes of Gender Violence"
As we have seen, over the course of their struggles with the ICTs,
feminists redrew the poster-child injury at the center of their remedial
activism so that rape became sexual violence. A further big shift in the
language of sexual injury happened in the Rome process. The WCGJ
advocated adding, at a still higher level of generality than sexual vio-
lence, gender violence.
"Gender violence" was an entirely new goal. Bedont and Hall-
Martinez, both of them self-declared supporters of the WCGJ, explain
the thinking that motivated this shift:
The Women's Caucus pushed for the term "gender" as opposed
to "sex" because the latter is restricted to the biological differ-
ences between men and women, whereas gender includes
differences between men and women because of their socially
constructed roles. Similarly, "gender crimes" is preferable to
"sexual violence" because it includes crimes which are targeted
at men or women because of their gender roles which may or
may not have a sexual element. 94
This was a significant departure from the understanding that had devel-
oped during the years in which the overarching feminist rubric was
sexual violence. In the WCGJ's thinking, sexual violence is a kind of
gender violence, and gender violence is a far more expansive real-world
problem. IHL/ICL should criminalize sexual assaults on men as well as
women-a reform that is, of course, achievable under the rubric of sex-
ual violence-but above all should target gender-based assaults on
women that are not "sexual" in the sense that rape is "sexual." What
could they have meant by this?
By the mid-1990s an extremely abstruse debate in elite Western
feminist theory295 had been reduced to a formula that was often invoked
in the human rights context in precisely the terms the WCGJ uses: sex is
the bodily or natural distinction between men and women, and gender is
293. Id. pt. HI, Recommendation 6; id. pt. Ill, Recommendation 6, Suggested Text; id.
pt. II, Recommendation 6, Commentary, WC.6.1-6.4 ("[d]elinking sexual and gender vio-
lence from humiliating and degrading treatment").
294. Bedont, supra note 51, at 183 (disclosing that Bedont was a lawyer for the WCGJ);
Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 68.
295. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY (1990); JAY PROSSER, SECOND SKINS: THE BODY NARRATIVES OF TRANSSEXUALITY
(1998); Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political Economy" of Sex, in To-
WARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF WOMEN 157-211 (Rayna R. Reiter ed., 1975).
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a vast array of cultural meanings given to that distinction, including the
roles prescribed for its performance. Sex is having a penis or a vagina;
gender is wearing pants or a skirt-or having to wear pants or a skirt.
The sexual straddles the sex/gender distinction. Sex is clearly sexual
when, for instance, a penis enters a vagina; but it may not be sexual
when, for instance, custom requires that men and women use segregated
bathrooms. And gender is sexual when, for example, women are required
to dress modestly in order to avoid blame for any sexual assaults they
may suffer; but it is less clearly sexual when, for instance, men are ex-
pected to work in paying jobs and women are expected to work in the
home. Of course, anything can be eroticized; hence my hesitation about
designating any manifestations of sex and gender "not sexual." Again,
elaborate and important theoretical debates worry this question,96 de-
bates which have been completely ignored (for good reasons, no doubt)
by feminists working the international beat. The point is rather that
GFeminism has fully assimilated and operationalized a feminist
sex/gender distinction, simplified to a distinction between sex as nature
and/or the body and gender as culture.
Given these understandings, the shift in the feminist reform agenda
from sexual violence to gender violence entailed an ambitious-one
might say massive-expansion of the number and kinds of social events
that would fall within the pale of their carceral project. The WCGJ's ar-
guments about this are somewhat garbled but give us an indication of
what they were reaching for:
Gender violence also includes non-sexual attacks on women or
on men based on their gender-defined roles; the physical or psy-
chological targeting of women or their livelihoods to undermine
the civilian population during war; attacks on reproductive integ-
rity such as forced pregnancy or forced sterilization; the
enslavement of women through forced marriage or otherwise for
domestic as well as sexual service; and intentional or negligent
disregard for the consequences of warfare on women-e.g., the
impacts of chemical warfare.297
Well, that was a muddle of bodily and cultural targets for violence
against women. Perhaps this argument--explaining the WCGJ's advo-
cacy of the inclusion of sexual slavery, a project we will examine in
detail shortly-will help clarify the force of the shift to gender violence:
296. See Janet Halley & Andrew Parker, Introduction to After Sex?: On Writing Since
Queer Theory, 106 S. ATLANTIC Q. 421 (2007).
297. WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. III, Recommendation 4,
Commentary.
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Enslavement is also gendered when it exploits women's or
men's traditional roles. When... women are impressed into ma-
ternity, this is a form of gender enslavement. The same is true
when women are impressed into providing domestic services
whether on a large-scale or individualized basis (forced tempo-
rary marriage) basis.9
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that WCGJ lawyers imagined the
shift to gender violence as a definitional reform that would accomplish
much of what Charlesworth and the WCGJ wanted to achieve by annexing
human rights to IHL/ICL: make cultural practices differentiating be-
tween men and women subject to IHL/ICL even when they are not
plausibly connected to armed conflict. For example, the Taliban's ban on
women's employment in the paid workforce.
What, then, is at stake in the shift from the "war against women"
framing to "gender violence"? Perhaps the most salient implication is
that the new formula includes more practices affecting men. Note that
the descriptions of gender violence just quoted mention "women and
men." The WCGJ acknowledged that it intended to include, as types of
gender violence, the targeting of homosexuals and people with HIV for
separate detention, other maltreatment, and even discrimination.9 Occa-
sionally, an example of gender violence affecting only men is
showcased. "Gender-based persecution," for instance, "is involved ...
when young boys are either killed to prevent their becoming soldiers or
coerced and humiliated into becoming killers."3° The WCGJ advocated
an increase in the minimum age at which soldiers could be put in uni-
form-a rule that would, if enforceable and enforced, primarily and
predominantly benefit boys who do not want to fight, and maybe also
those who do. '
These new elements of the GFeminist agenda raise a second ques-
tion: had the FU vision been eclipsed in the push to intervene in the
cultural politics of gender?
I think not. Instead, the "war against women" vision, in which war is
about women and wartime rape is continuous with everyday rape, in-
fused almost all of the WCGJ explanations of what "gender violence"
looks like. Consider the WCGJ's justification for raising the minimum
recruitment/impressment age. Its trajectory takes us on an actual, not
experimental, trip into FU consciousness.
298. Id. pt. III, Recommendation 5, Commentary, WC5.6-13.
299. Id. pt. HI, Recommendation 4, WC.4.6; see also Bedont, supra note 51, at 188.
300. WCGJ, Gender Justice and the ICC, supra note 106, at 18; see also WCGJ, 3/98
Briefing Paper on Gender, supra note 106.
301. WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. IIH, Recommendation 9.
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In its December 1997 submission to the PrepCom, the WCGJ argued
for prohibition of military recruitment of minors by morphing a world in
which boys suffer into one in which only women suffer, and suffer at the
boys' hands, not only in war but continuously from war to peace. We
begin with the WCGJ's objection to the use of child soldiers because of
its "pervasive gender impact." '3 2 At first this includes trauma to the boys
who must fight, but they are soon sifted out of the mix:
Military service, despite its pervasive glorification in many so-
cieties, is often profoundly traumatizing for those who perform
it either because they must or cannot become inured to killing
and to death. Military recruitment and service thus operate to di-
vide society by gender and reinforce stereotypes about strength
and weakness, protection and dependency, superiority and infe-
riority in violation of international norms designed to eliminate
discrimination against women.3°3
Trauma to the boys is problematic because it produces an ideology of
"masculinity," ratifying "patriarchal values,"3°4 and thus discriminates
against women. Indeed, it conjoins wartime rape to everyday rape, re-
turning us in the end to the war against women:
Women are frequently the victims of this militarization, as tar-
gets of sexual and gender violence when used or tolerated as
instruments of war. They are also targets of violence in war's af-
termath: women suffer equivalent forms of violence in refugee
camps created by war and are battered and raped-tortured in
fact-by intimate partners and family members in their homes.3°5
So much for the trauma suffered by those boys. In March 1998, the
WCGJ explained gender violence to men in much the same way:
Sexual violence, whether directed against women or men, is
usually a form of gender violence, since it is an attacked [sic]
based on and intended to destroy one's gender identity, whether
masculine or feminine. That is, women are raped, for example,
to control and destroy them as women and to signal male owner-
ship over them as property; men are raped to humiliate them
though [sic] forcing them to experience the position of women
302. Id. pt. II, Recommendation 9, WC9.2.
303. Id. pt. III, Recommendation 9, WC9.2 (emphasis added).
304. Id.
305. Id. (emphasis added); see also WCGJ, Gender Justice and the ICC, supra note 106,
at 13 (offering a similar rationale).
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and, thereby, rendering them, according to the prevailing stereo-
types, weak and inferior.3°
This rendering of injured male masculinity is structuralist-feminist. It
starts from the assumption that sexuality and gender are structurally
committed to male domination and female subordination. If a man-or
boy-is injured in sexuality or gender, that cannot be because masculin-
ity has become a site of harm. To concede that would relinquish not the
commitment to seeing domination in sexuality and gender, but the com-
mitment to seeing that domination as structurally committed to male
domination and female subordination. The move we see the WCGJ's
gender violence arguments make-to identify the injury as suffered only
in feminine places-restores the structural assumption to its full upright
position.
The Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice (WIGJ), the successor
organization to the WCGJ that is carrying on its work as a feminist
watchdog guarding the ICC, explains the difference between sexual and
gender violence by once again making the classic structuralist-feminist
operation we have just witnessed. It discusses an episode arising during
the Balkan conflict in which a Muslim man was forced to bite off the
testicle of another Muslim man in the Omarska prison camp. Then-
Prosecutor Goldstone-before his change of heart-described this epi-
sode as "what was worse" than rape.07 Explaining the difference
between gender violence and sexual violence, the WIGJ expresses con-
cern about the victim because he is like a woman:
Men may also be raped to humiliate them by forcing them into
the position of women and thereby rendering them weak or infe-
rior according to the prevailing stereotypes. In one incident
described in the Tadi6 case [before the ICTY], a man was tor-
tured when another prisoner was forced to bite off his testicle.
The sexual organs of the man were targeted in order to take
away his male identity and make him like a woman.308
We can analyze this description of the assault at Omarska as a liter-
ary event-that is, as embodying a range of choices about how to
represent an event, how to pictorialize it. In the ICTY's version, two men
were forced into unwanted sexual contact: the first command was that
306. WCGJ, 3/98 Recommendations on Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 106, at
10.
307. See supra text accompanying note 44.
308. Erb, supra note 88, at 426 nn.98-100 (attributing the text to a "Briefing Paper on
Gender" produced by the WCGJ during the Rome Conference and "on file with the author");
see also Beth Stephens, Humanitarian Law and Gender Violence: An End to Centuries of
Neglect?, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SyMP. 87, 87 n.3 (1999).
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the one man "lick the bottom" of a second man; then the former was
forced to sexually mutilate the latter; the second man suffered intense
pain, physical mutilation, and, then, according to the prosecutor, death;
the crowds of detainees-most, if not all, men-who watched and/or
heard this event were put on notice of how hostile their captors were and
how defenseless they themselves were.3°9 Of course, the men involved on
both sides may have seen old village and town rivalries and alliances
played out, religious identity transformed into nationalist identity, pro-
found personal psychic fears enacted-the range of possible framings
for such a story is probably impossible to exhaust. The WIGJ looks at
this picture and sees a man losing his male identity and becoming like a310
woman. This representation is not only structuralist; it is a classic ex-
ample of the FU vision at work.
The WCGJ's effort to redefine sexual crimes as gender crimes pro-
voked fierce resistance from at least sixteen States and had the steady
support of only four."' The opposition to gender crimes was ferocious-
and perhaps understandable. States in which Islamic law makes an im-
portant contribution to the legal order often maintain a strong
differentiation between the legal rights and responsibilities of husbands
and wives; faced with a feminist reform expressly designed to transform
cultural differences in the legal treatment of men and women into the
material for ICC prosecution, they quite plausibly saw a threat. Their
opposition could only have been fortified by the WCGJ's opposition to
linking crimes against humanity and war crimes to armed conflict situa-
tions and its inclusion of marriages which women and girls "accept"-in
scare quotes, a structuralist gesture-within the scope of sexual slavery.
The WCGJ fought a short but intense battle on behalf of this reform.
In the process, the WCGJ issued four emergency position papers, at first
placidly defining gender in the voice of feminist expertise, then asserting
309. Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1 -T, Trial Judgment, U 193-477 (May 7, 1997)
(recalling the factual findings generally); id. U 194-244 (reporting the factual findings about
the forced sexual mutilation of one detainee by another).
310. To be sure, in the battle over gender violence waged at the March PrepCom de-
scribed immediately below, the WCGJ issued a briefing paper that acknowledged that male
masculinity could be the site of male gender violence. The briefing paper indicated that
"[e]xamples [of gender violence] include the forcible recruitment of young boys into the army
who are put through violent indoctrination, and then made to perform suicide missions in
order to prove their masculinity; and the killing of pregnant women by the slashing of their
wombs and removal of their fetuses." WCGJ, 3/98 Briefing Paper on Gender, supra note 106.
But an analysis of the Omarska incident virtually identical to that just quoted from the WCGJ
website immediately follows.
311. Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 67, 81 n.7 (listing the opposing States to
be Qatar, Libya, Egypt, Venezuela, Guatemala, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Ku-
wait, Syria, Turkey, Sudan, Bahrain, Iran, Yemen, Brunei, and Oman, and counting Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and Samoa to be among the consistent supporters).
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that gender violence had been condemned in a range of human rights
documents that made the term not only legitimate but almost obligatory
on the Rome Conference, and, finally, issuing a "[c]all to delegates" to
"fight the attack on gender justice.""3 2 In this progress, the WCGJ shifted
from the de rigeur composure required by its role as advi-
sor/consultant/expert to an explicitly political posture, both embattled
and belligerent.
The collective resolve to fight for "gender violence" must have been
intense-suggesting a large, if not uniform, consensus within the WCGJ
on its behalf. But, eventually, the WCGJ caved. Bedont and Hall-
Martinez summarize the reasons for this decision: "The dispute regard-
ing terminology threatened the inclusion of certain gender crimes, of a
non-discrimination clause, and of special protective measures under the
procedural provisions."3"3 That is, the battle for gender violence crimes
was so sharp and the delegation-level support for it so sparse, that the
WCGJ abandoned a highly desired term for purely strategic reasons. In-
deed, I have been unable to find any trace of internal controversy either
about the desirability of including crimes of gender violence or about the
FU structuralist vision implied by the WCGJ's explanations of the term.
Instead, even when, after it had thrown in the gender-violence towel, the
WCGJ proposed statutory crime-defining language silently omitting
"gender violence," it proceeded to explain the provision as if the fraught
term were still there.3t4 Gender violence went underground and continued
its fight for recognition.
iii. Defend and Relabel Enforced Pregnancy
As far as I can tell, the idea of introducing a crime of enforced or
forced pregnancy into the list of sexual violence crimes punishable by
the ICC originated from feminist activists."3
During the Rome Conference, the Holy See sought to delete en-
forced pregnancy from the draft statute on the ground that it threatened
to criminalize enforcement of national laws discouraging or criminaliz-
ing abortion. 3 16 The documents that I have been able to obtain strongly
312. WCGJ, 3/98 Briefing Paper on Gender, supra note 106; WCGJ, Negotiated Defini-
tion of Gender, supra note 106; WCGJ, Need to Reaffirm Gender Violence, supra note 106;
WCGJ, Call to Delegates on Gender, supra note 106 (listed in this surmised chronological
order to track the arc of increasing embattlement described by Barbara Bedont and Katherine
Hall-Martinez).
313. Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 68.
314. WCGJ, Gender Justice and the ICC, supra note 106, at II (proposing to the Rome
Conference that war crimes include "rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced preg-
nancy, enforced sterilization and any other form of sexual violence.. "(emphasis added)).
315. WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. III, Recommendation 7.
316. Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 74.
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suggest that the WCGJ's stand-pat consensus position was to defend this
provision by limiting its scope. What I cannot glean from the available
documentation is whether this tactic was chosen in order to disable the
religious conservative attack, to prevent disagreement from emerging
within the WCGJ itself, or both.
The WCGJ made two moves in this direction. First, it argued that the
better term was "forced pregnancy" because that term would clarify that
the crime under definition "is a violent crime, committed with a violent
intent .... Second, it offered a narrowing definition "in the spirit of
compromise": "[f]orced pregnancy" should be defined to mean "rape or
other sexual abuse carried out with the intent or having the effect of
making a woman pregnant and/or confiniig, controlling or coercing a
pregnant woman because she is pregnant."38 I am aware of no other
WCGJ recommendation to protect national gender policy from the reach
of the ICC.
The resulting compromise language-which would include impreg-
nation by rape or other sexual abuse even if the victim were not detained
with the intent of making it impossible for her to obtain a timely abor-
tion-would have been controversial with some feminists if they had
known about it. An intra-feminist debate did exist, in the aftermath of the
Balkan War, about the assumption of some feminists that such pregnan-
cies imposed a particularly onerous form of suffering on the victims. The
opposition worried about the homology of this view with that of the rap-
ists themselves and about the implicit and sometimes explicit
endorsement of the nationalist representation of the resulting fetus or
child was an ethnic deviant.319 I can see no trace of that debate in the
available literature on the Rome Statute, published or unpublished.
iv. The Struggle over Enforced Prostitution,
Trafficking, and Sexual Slavery
This was a complex set of related reforms, and-unlike "gender vio-
lence" and "enforced pregnancy"-they reveal a rift within the WCGJ,
one that the norms supporting coalition and the submergence of dis-
agreement could not completely suppress. It was the same split that
divided structuralist from liberal feminists in the sex-trafficking side of
penal GFeminism. In order to understand the feminist ideologies at stake
here, a brief introduction is in order.
317. WCGJ, 6/98 Crime of Enforced Pregnancy, supra note 106.
318. WCGJ, Priority Concerns (Enforced Pregnancy), supra note 106.
319. See R. Charlie Carpenter, Surfacing Children: Limitations of Genocidal Rape Dis-
course, 22 HuM. RTS. Q. 428 (2000).
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Feminist disagreement about trafficking and slavery. I have been un-
able to discover exactly when sexual slavery was included in the draft
Statute's list of enumerated sexual violence crimes. It was not included
in the lists of sexual crimes that Hall reported from the Third Session.2
The WCGJ advocated its inclusion in its December 1997 Recommenda-
tions." ' At the Fifth Session, held that month, the inclusion of "sexual
slavery" had-according, again, to Hall-the "overwhelming support"
of a Working Group on definitions and elements of crimes chaired by
Adriaan Bos.322 It is hard to avoid the inference that the criminalization
of sexual slavery was the WCGJ's idea, and that its ready acceptance
was a mark of the WCGJ's legitimacy as an authority on sexual violence
crimes.
I also have been unable to discover when or at whose behest "en-
slavement" was defined to include "trafficking in persons, in particular
women and children. 3 23 As we will see below, the WCGJ objected to the
term at the March 1998 PrepComl, and so this definition must have been
introduced prior to that meeting. 24
The two terms have a vexed history inside U.S. feminism, a new
chapter of which was written at Rome. It is impossible to understand this
history without a glance back to the classic in radical feminist activism
that put the term "female sexual slavery" on the second-wave feminist
map: Kathleen Barry's 1979 book by that title.325 And we need to glance
sideways, at the highly successful GFeminist work, contemporaneous
with the IHL/ICL work I am concentrating on here, targeting sex traf-
ficking as sexual slavery outside the context of armed conflict.
The contemporary practice of equating sex trafficking with sexual
slavery has its origins, of course, in nineteenth-century moral campaigns
against the traffic of women into the "white slave trade" and the very
tense relationships between the campaign for emancipation of black
326slaves and for the protection of white women. Those ideas were re-
shaped in the 1970s by U.S. radical structuralist feminists, who argued
that not white women, but all women lived in conditions, not of a racial
"slave trade" but of "sexual slavery." Barry's Female Sexual Slavery-
320. Hall, supra note 60, at 127 (quoting from the Third Session draft, the following list
of enumerated sexual crimes: "rape or other sexual abuse of comparable gravity, or enforced
prostitution").
321. WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. III, Recommendation 7,
Commentary, WC.7. 1.
322. Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 19, at 6 (date of the Fifth Session); Hall, supra
note 75, at 331, 333, 336 (support for inclusion of "sexual slavery").
323. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 7.2(c).
324. See infra text accompanying note 334.
325. KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL SLAVERY (1979).
326. Halley, Kotiswaran, Shamir & Thomas, supra note 4, at 338-39 n.7.
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the flagship statement of this idea-was an almost fully structuralist ac-
count of women's domination. Again, by structuralist I mean that a
commitment to the view that the subordination of women is coextensive
with male/female relations-is their structure. In a fully structuralist
feminist view of sexuality, no sexual interaction between a man and a
woman is free from the effects of male domination. In a classificatory
gesture that is typical of structuralist feminism, Barry assimilated every
sex-related harm suffered by women to sexual slavery: prostitution, por-
nography, "gynocide," the family, domestic battery, rape, incest, veiling,
and bride purchase.3 27 And then she summed it all up in a statement that
shies just a nuance short of full structuralism:
Female sexual slavery is present in ALL situations where
women or girls cannot change the immediate conditions of their
existence; where regardless of how they got into those condi-
tions they cannot get out; and where they are subject to sexual
328
violence and exploitation.
What makes this definition less than fully structuralist is that it posits a
limit to sexual slavery. Barry insisted that it was not feminism's business
to eliminate prostitution itself: if women could "freely leave their work
any time they choose," they should be understood to have chosen it of
their own accord.329
In 1995, Barry recanted the idea that women could choose prostitu-
tion freely and credited this change of heart to her work with feminists
working in human rights NGOs on global prostitution-what we are
now accustomed to call sex trafficking. Her new book, The Prostitution
of Sexuality: The Global Exploitation of Women, asks:
Can women choose to do prostitution? As much as they can
choose any other context of sexual objectification and dehu-
manization of the self .... [The] harm ... takes the form of
forcing distinctions between what are essentially nonchoices.
This is how women actually do not consent to prostitution or any
other condition of sexual exploitation-in rape, in marriage, in
330the office, in the factory, and so on.
Barry's response to her italicized question is a decisive "no." Barry
learned this, she tells us, during her work with international feminists
culminating in the 1992 Plan of Action for networking on the part of
the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women and the U.N. Education,
327. See BARRY, supra note 325.
328. Id. at 40.
329. Id. at 279.
330. KATHLEEN BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY 33 (1995).
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Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 3' In order to frame
this new, more complete, more structural domination, Barry declared
that she was "shifting from [her] previous work on the sexuality of pros-
titution to [her] new work on the prostitution of sexuality. [She is] taking
prostitution as the model, the most extreme and most crystallized form
of all sexual exploitation." '332 But the shift in terms by no means re-
nounced earlier equations. The index entry for Female Sexual Slavery
directs us to "[s]ee also Prostitution; Trafficking in women." '333
In this updated structuralist-feminist framing, there is no difference
between prostitution, trafficking, and sexual slavery.
As Chantal Thomas, Janie Chuang, and others have demonstrated,
feminists have been active in advocating, legislating, and managing an
increasingly widespread criminal and regulatory regime targeting sex
trafficking. But this effort has been controversial within feminism de-
voted to the trafficking nexus. That is, Barry's structuralism has feminist
opposition. There is a sharp divide between feminists who see "sexual
slavery" and those who see "bargained-for exchange" when a woman
accepts money or some other benefit in exchange for having sex; be-
tween those who see "sexual slavery" and those who see "migratory sex
work" when a woman crosses state lines and ends up engaged in the sale
of sexual services. Thomas calls the latter "individualists." They seek
reforms that limit criminalization of the pimp's and the John's activities
to instances in which the woman is coerced, and leave open the category
of "nonforced prostitution. 334 Thomas calls the former structuralist for
the same reason that I describe the strong depictions of gender violence
analyzed in Part II.D.2.b.ii structuralist: male domination and female
subordination are extensive terms, reaching for the descriptive horizon.
When depicting what other feminists would describe as sex work, they
see coercion. For them, prostitution and trafficking are always coerced.
Their goal is abolition, and their rallying cry has become sexual slav-
335
ery.
Let us return, now, to the feminist activism in the Rome Statute
process. In the remainder of this sub-section, I trace the struggles within
the WCGJ over trafficking, and two crimes that became ideologically
linked for WCGJ feminists: enforced prostitution and sexual slavery.
331. Id. at 5.
332. Id. at 11.
333. Id. at 372.
334. Halley, Kotiswaran, Shamir & Thomas, supra note 4, at 351-60.
335. Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions to
Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 437 (2006); Halley, Kotiswaran, Shamir &
Thomas, supra note 4, at 348-51 (indicating that Kathleen Barry co-founded one of the most




Delete "trafficking, in particular in women and children." One of the
most striking annexations of human rights to the ICC enforcement arse-
nal appears in the definition of the crime of enslavement, a predicate
crime against humanity, to include "trafficking, in particular in women
and children. 336 An offense that has been designed and enforced in the
human rights domain would be enforceable also in the ICC.
I had always assumed that the inclusion of trafficking in women and
children had been an objective of the WCGJ. After all, structuralist
feminists had made sex trafficking a central focus of their GFeminist
activism over the course of the 1990s. It seemed obvious that they would
think the Rome process a rich opportunity to extend their abolitionist
campaign. The opposite, however, occurred: the WCGJ at first advocated
alternative language and then actually opposed the inclusion of traffick-
ing in the statute.
In its December Recommendations to the PrepCom, the WCGJ
sought to prohibit "enslavement and slavery-like practices in all their
forms, including by sale, deception, coercion or threat.'33 7 The will to
reach cultural gender, the will to reach "peacetime," and the strong struc-
turalist vision of male domination are evident in the rationale for the
"including" clause: "For example, women and girls are not only sold
into forced marriage, but also kidnapped, coerced, threatened or de-
ceived into 'accepting' it."33
No mention of trafficking appears here. The WCGJ was not advocat-
ing its inclusion. Moreover, by the March 1998 PrepCom, the WCGJ
actively opposed inclusion of trafficking in the Statute. Its new definition
of enslavement included "sexual slavery, forced labor and domestic ser-
vice, trade in and coercive or deceptive transport of persons, and other
slavery-like practices"'339 The proposed language made no mention of
trafficking and it came with a positive reason to omit trafficking: "Be-
cause of the need for review of the international definition of trafficking,
the Women's Caucus suggests instead that the crime be described as
'trade in and coercive or deceptive transport of persons." '34° Clearly dis-
agreement about the range of the term trafficking had emerged within
the WCGJ. As we will soon see, the same disagreement emerged over
the term "enforced prostitution."
336. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 7.2(c).
337. WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. III, Recommendation 8.
338. Id. WC.8.2.
339. WCGJ, 3/98 Recommendations on Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 106, at
14.
340. Id. at 15; see also WCGJ, Gender Justice and the ICC, supra note 106, at 16 ("Be-
cause of the need for review of the international definition of trafficking, the Women's Caucus
suggests instead that trafficking be later defined as 'trade in and/or coercive or deceptive
transport of persons.' ").
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What had happened? The annexation of human rights to ICL was, as
I have deduced and argued above, motivated by the FU vision, with its
structuralist understanding of women's sexual subordination and its ho-
rizon-wide reach from war to "peacetime." One of the paradoxes of this
development in the strand of GFeminism committed to installing femi-
nist-derived rules into 1IHL and ICL was that it brought to the fore
human-rights-based feminists who were veterans of the intra-feminist
sex-trafficking wars of the early-to-middle 1990s. This cadre included
liberal feminists who opposed structuralist feminists in those struggles.
Three of the nineteen signatories to the WCGJ's encyclopedic June 1998
submission to the Rome Conference, Gender Justice and the ICC,M had
just a few months earlier participated in a human-rights/liberal-feminist
roundtable which resulted in a highly sophisticated published position
paper.,4 ' Disagreement emerged, I would infer, and was muted by a deci-
sion to offer only wan objections to the inclusion of trafficking in the
ICC Statute.
The problematics of consent in enforced prostitution and sexual
slavery. The 1993 CUNY Clinic Memorandum had insisted on the sepa-
rate criminalization of enforced prostitution, and the 1993-94
Green/Copelon Working Group Proposals had quite composedly offered
definitions of forced prostitution for inclusion in the ICTY Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence. 3' But Oosterveld documents the surge in feminist
desire to use the Rome Statute process to retire "enforced prostitution."'
At the March PrepCom, the WCGJ advocated precisely this position, and
precisely for structuralist reasons:
[E]nforced prostitution is often a misnomer-it usually applies
to situations where women (and sometimes young men) are, in
fact, subjected to sexual slavery even though the individual per-
son taking advantage of that thinks it is enforced prostitution
which does not reflect the degree of possession and control im-
plied by sexual slavery.4
5
Structuralists like Barry thought that all prostitution-and certainly any
sex between enemies in wartime-is forced, rendering the distinction
341. Ali Miller & Alison N. Stewart, Report from the Roundtable on the Meaning of
"Trafficking Persons": A Human Rights Perspective, 20 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. It, 19 (1998);
WCGJ, Gender Justice and the ICC, supra note 106, Introduction.
342. Miller & Stewart, supra note 341, at 16 (reporting that "the notion that one could be
trafficked even with one's consent was ... rejected").
343. CUNY Clinic Memorandum, supra note 37, app. B at 236-37; id. at 185, 192-93
(Green/Copelon Working Group Proposals).
344. Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery, supra note 21, at 616-22.
345. WCGJ, 3/98 Recommendations on Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 106, at 8.
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between legitimate and forced prostitution invidious. That position
clearly had support in the WCGJ.
But other WCGJ documents manifest disagreement over this posi-
tion, combined with a ready willingness to paper this intra-feminist
tension over. For example, the December 1997 WCGJ submission to the
PrepCom argued both the structuralist and the liberal positions on prosti-
tution:
[S]exual enslavement has been diminished by calling it only
"enforced prostitution."
The term "enforced prostitution" muffles the degree of violence,
coercion and control that is characteristic of sexual slavery. It
suggests that sexual services are provided as part of an exchange
albeit one coerced by the circumstances. When, as in the Geneva
Conventions, forced prostitution is equated with the "perform-
ance" of degrading acts, the term also suggests that sexual
services are offered rather than brutally exacted. It hides the fact
that this is rape, serial rape, physically invasive and psychologi-
cally debilitating in the extreme, and that women are reduced to
and sexually bludgeoned as property, and that they are com-
pletely under the control of the perpetrator.
History has taught us that most so-called "forced prostitution"
during armed conflict constitutes sexual slavery.
3 46
In denouncing enforced prostitution as sexual slavery, identifying it with
rape, and insisting that women participate in it "completely under the
control" of male attackers, the WCGJ merges enforced prostitution into
rape and sexual slavery: Barry's structuralist position exactly. But when
these paragraphs proceed to a conclusion that most forced prostitution is
sexual slavery, they open up the possibility that some acts of forced pros-
titution are not enslaving or the equivalent of rape. The December
position paper advances both positions, well understood to be the subject
of intense feminist disagreement in other contexts, as if they were con-
sistent.
This puzzling contradiction tracks precisely the structural-
ist/individualist tension, but deducing substantive disagreement from it
may be hasty. Bedont and Hall-Martinez indicate that the WCGJ faced a
tactical concern: what if sexual slavery ended up being defined too nar-
rowly to encompass everything included in "enforced prostitution"? 347
346. WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. III, Recommendation 5,
WC5.6-9--6.11 (emphasis added).
347. Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 73.
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Clearly the structuralist legal ideal was to include as many sexual
wrongs as possible under the most stigmatic term that they could find.
The WCGJ strategists knew, however, that they would not necessarily
control the ICC's eventual definition of rape, sexual slavery, sexual vio-
lence, or gender violence. If those were defined narrowly, a lesser
included offense of enforced prostitution might undergird broader crimi-
nal liability. This strategic hesitation seems to animate the WCGJ's
December 1997 rule recommendations that some coerced sex might not
constitute slavery and that prosecutors should have the discretion to
charge the lesser crime and still prosecute less obviously coerced prosti-
tution:
But even in cases where women are free to go home at night or
even to escape, the conditions of warfare might nonetheless be
so overwhelming and controlling as to render them little more
than sex slaves. The decision whether to charge someone with
forced prostitution, sexual slavery or serial rape, would depend
upon a thorough analysis of the facts in each case from the per-
spective of the woman.348
The WCGJ position, then, was that enforced prostitution should be re-
tained but that sexual slavery should be added, "to highlight the
importance ... of distinguishing sexual slavery from enforced prostitu-
tion which requires different, and a lesser degree of proof than slavery or
serial rape." '349
Was this a concession to legal practicalities or a sign of emergent
liberal-feminist voices within the WCGJ core? The opposition to "traf-
ficking, in particular in women and children," on grounds that its
definition is contested, strongly suggests the possibility that liberal femi-
nists were at the table. We know from other traces in the record that they
were indeed there. Oosterveld, for instance, argued that rape is a viola-
tion not of a woman's honor or dignity but of her bodily integrity and
autonomy"5 This thinking is consistent with the notion that a woman can
consent to prostitution and that the law should respect her choice. And
the annexation of a human rights agenda brought to the table human-
rights-based GFeminists, a cadre which was, by the mid-1990s, highly
348. WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. III, Recommendation 5,
WC5.6-12 (emphasis added).
349. WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. 1I1, WC7.2, Commentary to
Recommendation 7.
350. Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery, supra note 21, at 650-51; see also Kristin Boon, Rape
and Forced Pregnancy Under the ICC Statute: Human Dignity, Autonomy, and Consent, 32
COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 625, 630-31 (2001) (calling for "a new paradigm for the interna-




familiar with the intra-feminist structuralist/individualist conflict on the
trafficking battleground and which, as we have seen, included people
committed to the individualist camp. It is not to be imagined that they
forgot their position on trafficking when time came to work out the
WCGJ's position on the very same issue and on the related term "en-
forced prostitution."
The introduction to Gender Justice and the ICC alludes to consensus
formed in the context of individual and group disagreements, and it
seems plausible to infer that some of these disagreements tracked the
structuralist/individualist divide.5 What is so striking is how muted
these disagreements were. In the context of trafficking, opposed camps
exist and are willing to go public with their disagreements. Feminist
NGOs dedicated to conflicting views are easily visible even to an out-
sider and feminist struggle goes on within the law-making processes."'
Yet none of this fractiousness-often thought to be virtually definitive of
feminism itself-is detectable in GFeminism at Rome. It has taken me
many weeks of sleuthing through the record to construct the highly in-
ferential argument just set forth.
Let us take Oosterveld once again, as an example of GFeminist
thought in the Rome process. As we have just seen, her highest-order
commitment is to female sexual autonomy-a liberal feminist ideal. But
she was also entirely sympathetic with the WCGJ's structuralist posi-
tions, from the broad scope of "gender violence" to the inclusion of
"sexual slavery" in the Rome Statute. Her express position on sexual
slavery is exactly analogous to that of the structuralist NGOs in the anti-
trafficking effort. For the latter, here is Thomas's description of their po-
sition on consented-to prostitution:
351. WCGJ, Gender Justice and the ICC, supra note 106, Introduction. The Report indi-
cated that
[t]he Causus' [sic] structure has been fundamental to creating a document that re-
flects the consensus of participants in the Women's Caucus who have attended the
Preparatory Committee meetings, and many others, throughout the world, who par-
ticipated in inspiriing [sic], developing, vetting or subscribing to the
recommendations. This means that on particular points, some individuals or groups
may differ with the Caucus's position but, on the whole, the Core Principles which
form part of these recommendations, are supported by thousands of men and
women around the world ....
Id.
352. Halley, Kotiswaran, Shamir & Thomas, supra note 4, at 348-60, nn.29-83. Ann
Jordan, a member of the Miller/Stewart roundtable and the WCGJ, testified before the Home-
land Security Committee of the House of Representatives against the structuralist position on
trafficking. See Testimony of Ann Jordan, Director, Initiative Against Trafficking in Persons,
Global Rights, Before the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime and Global Counterterrorism,
http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070320165954-38416.pdf (last visited Nov. 4,
2008).
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Structuralists called for a definition that included all commercial
sex automatically within the ambit of sex trafficking-an ex-
plicit finding of coercion would not be necessary since,
according to the structuralist approach, all commercial sex was
necessarily coercive. The structuralist proposal also called for an
explicit statement disregarding any manifestation of apparent
consent by the trafficking victim. Just as one cannot legally con-
sent to one's own enslavement, consent could not be a basis for
validating commercial sex since it was "female sexual slav-
ery.
353
Now compare Oosterveld's position on consented-to sex in ICC prosecu-
tions for sexual slavery:
By definition, an exercise of ... [the powers attaching to the
right of ownership] involves a negation of consent, which is why
the Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery and
slavery-like practices in armed conflict stated:
As a jus cogens crime, neither a State [n]or its agents,
including government or military officials, can consent
to the enslavement of any person under any circum-
stances. Likewise, a person cannot, under any
circumstances, consent to be enslaved or subjected to
slavery. Thus, it follows that a person accused of slavery
cannot raise consent of the victim as a defense.
If a judge finds that the actions of the perpetrator fall within the
first element of the crime of slavery, an evaluation of whether a
defence [sic] of consent can apply to the sexual acts of the sec-
ond element is not necessary .... The fact that consent cannot
serve as a defense to the crime of sexual slavery is another ad-
vance in international law.
54
Oosterveld performs the structuralist argument as choreographed by
Thomas with on-point precision. And Oosterveld's thinking is, in turn,
perfectly in line with the WCGJ December 1997 position on sexual slav-
353. Halley, Kotiswaran, Shamir & Thomas, supra note 4, at 351.
354. Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery, supra note 21, at 640 (quoting ECOSOC, U.N.
Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Hum. Rts., Contemporary
Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices During Armed
Conflict, Update to the Final Report Submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur,
T 51, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.212000/21 (June 6, 2000)) (citations omitted).
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ery: "Under international law, it does not matter whether a slave-like
status was initiated by an 'agreement' or involved some exchange.
'3, 5
Note an important implication here on another issue that has been
highly contentious inside legal feminism: should there be a defense for
consent in rape prosecutions? As I explain elsewhere, the hard-line struc-
turalist feminist position on litigation in the ICTY was that there should
be no consent defense at all. The argument was that women who had sex
with combatants from the other side of an armed conflict were operating
in coercive circumstances, and any consent they gave was meaningless,
not real consent at all. Evidence of it should be inadmissible because no
valid inference of actual consent could be drawn from it.356 The ICTY
very briefly adopted the no-consent-defense position, only to shift rap-
idly to a complex of rules that presume non-consent from the coercive
circumstances and that allow defendants to offer their proof on the issue
only after it had been found to be probative in an in camera hearing and
to be devoid of any admissions by the complaining witness.357 The
WCGJ sought only to keep the Rome Statute from being more permis-
sive to the defense than the ICTs had been,3 8 thus accepting a partial
defeat for the structuralist feminist position on evidence of consent in
rape cases. But Oosterveld's understanding of sexual slavery suggests
that some WCGJ elements may well have intended this new crime to
offer an alternative to the rape rules. In our most authoritative report on
the WCGJ line on sexual slavery, Oosterveld insists that consent is not a
defense to sexual slavery.35 9 The implicit prescription for WCGJ/WIGJ
355. WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. III, Recommendation 5,
WC5.6-7.
356. Halley, Rape in Berlin, supra note 1, at 86-91.
357. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.41 (Mar. 8, 2008). Rule 96 states that, in cases of
sexual assault,
(i) no corroboration of the victim's testimony shall be required;
(ii) consent shall not be allowed as a defence if the victim
(a) has been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear violence,
duress, detention or psychological oppression, or
(b) reasonably believed that if the victim did not submit, another might be so sub-
jected, threatened or put in fear;
(iii) before evidence of the victim's consent is admitted, the accused shall satisfy
the Trial Chamber in camera that the evidence is relevant and credible;
(iv) prior sexual conduct of the victim shall not be admitted in evidence.
Id.; see also Sellers, The Context of Sexual Violence, supra note 138, at 310-16.
358. WCGJ, Gender Justice and the ICC, supra note 106, at 45.
359. Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery, supra note 21, at 640.
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influence on ICC prosecutions: make an end run around rape, with its
consent defense, by charging sexual slavery.
It is perplexing to see such an illiberal line being implied if not ex-
plicitly adopted here, by one of the Rome process's liberal feminists.
Oosterveld's positions leave us with a complex ideological picture. She
supported structuralist reforms in structuralist terms. She argued for a
shift to autonomy that would strengthen the liberal feminist variant, but
the implications of that shift are latent in her published GFeminist writ-
ings. Her interventions during the Rome Diplomatic Conference-as a
scholar, as a member of the WCGJ, and later as a member of the Cana-
dian delegation to the Conference-are strongly structuralist. Consensus
at Rome meant performed solidarity with the structuralist line.
c. Conclusion
Looking back over the vast expansion of the feminist sexual violence
agenda in the Rome process, what can be said in retrospect? Let us note
the omissions first. Neither Charlesworth nor the WCGJ advocated an
emphasis on rape as genocide. Here, Charlesworth and the WCGJ were
heirs to the Copelon line. Copelon had opposed the genocidal rape fram-
ing pursued by Catharine A. MacKinnon and others; Copelon led what
Engle calls the "everyday rape camp" in the early 1990s. But Engle is
right that the feminist disagreement over genocide was followed by con-
sensus on almost everything." I have uncovered nothing to indicate that
the WCGJ was interested in reopening the questions about genocide that
had so agitated feminists in the early 1990s.
Most striking, however, is the coherence of the positive agenda over
the course of the 1990s. When the WCGJ train got going, it left not a
single piece of the Copelon/Charlesworth agenda at the station. Though
controversy among feminists did emerge, the performed consensus was
dominated by structural feminism. The FU vision animated almost every
legal novelty. The 1990s saw a rich elaboration of what this worldview
meant for ICL reform: the re-imagination of conflicts in which rape oc-
curs as continuous not with those conflicts, but with a male war against
women going on all the time and everywhere; and a very capacious con-
ception of male domination. This is a very radical line. That it became
virtually the only visible feminist line represented at Rome by the lead
feminist organization, the WCGJ, is one of the most remarkable findings
of this research.
360. Engle, Feminism and Its (Dis)Contents, supra note 116, at 798.
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E. Feminist Successes and Defeats in the Rome Statute
So how did the feminists' agenda fare in the Rome process? The
Rome Statute gave the new ICC jurisdiction to prosecute and punish
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression. Crimes
of aggression were not defined and their negotiation was postponed."'
Feminists did not intervene in the construction of the article prohibiting
genocide, but they made significant inroads in the definition of crimes
against humanity and war crimes, and in many ways influenced the insti-
tutional provisions. What follows is a rule-by-rule summary of their
gains and losses, taking up the panoply of reform goals explained in Part
II.D above. I reverse my normal procedure here by looking at the hori-
zontal reforms first, because they provide the political backdrop against
which the vertical reforms become intelligible. This Part concludes with
a brief summary assessment of feminist influence on the ICC Rules of
Procedure and Evidence and the Elements of Crimes.362
1. Horizontal Reforms
The structure of the article defining war crimes is divided into four
main subparts, each of which derives from a distinct body of IHL.
Article 8.2(a) grants the ICC jurisdiction to try individuals for grave
363 fobreaches of the Geneva Conventions and, for this reason, presumably
applies only in international conflicts. Article 8.2(b) is expressly limited
to international conflicts and gives the ICC jurisdiction to try individuals
for violations of the laws and customs of war. Both set forth definitive
lists of predicate crimes. 64
Articles 8.2(c) and 8.2(b) apply to armed conflict "not of an interna-
tional character. 3 65 The former gives the ICC jurisdiction to try individuals
for violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, and is
therefore aimed expressly at the protection of noncombatants. The latter
gives the ICC jurisdiction to try individuals for violations of the laws and
customs of war. Again, both subparts set forth definitive lists of predicate
crimes.
One item on those lists is of particular interest to us here-the
subsections criminalizing specifically sexual offenses. Both of the
361. See Sadat & Carden, supra note 22, at 437 (discussing the "rather clever compro-
mise" over a particularly contentious issue); see also Benedetti & Washburn, supra note 19, at
19.
362. See also Brook Sari Moshan, Women, War, and Words: The Gender Component in
the Permanent International Criminal Court's Definition of Crimes Against Humanity, 22
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 154, 176-79 (1998) (assessing feminist victories and defeats).
363. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 8.2(a).
364. Id. art. 8.2(b).
365. Id. arts. 8.2(c), 8.2(e).
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laws-and-customs-of-war sections codify this body of law for purposes
of ICC enforcement, and both include a distinct subsection dedicated to
sexual offenses. The two lists of specific crimes are identical: they make
it a crime to commit "rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2(f), enforced sterilization,
or any other form of sexual violence. . . .366 "[A]ny other form of sexual
violence" is further limited: when committed in international conflict, it
is criminal only if it "also constitute[s] a grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions 3 67 and in internal armed conflicts, it is criminal only if it
"also constitute[s] a serious violation of article 3 common to the four
Geneva Conventions.
'368
Finally, Article 7 defines crimes against humanity as subject to ICC
jurisdiction when they are "committed as part of a widespread or sys-
tematic attack directed against any civilian population .,,369 Article 7
includes a subsection on sexual offenses that is virtually identical to that
appearing in the laws and customs of war articles. The enumerated
crimes are: "[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced preg-
nancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity."37
Within that framework, what did the feminists gain and where were
they defeated? In this Part, I set out the specific horizontal reforms, turn-
ing to feminist triumphs first, and ending with feminist defeats.
a. Delink Honor and Dignity from Sexual
and Gender Violence Crimes
The Rome Statute makes it a war crime-a violation of the laws and
customs of war in international conflicts-to commit "outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.
' 37'
The next enumerated predicate crime separately houses the sexual of-
fenses. The Rome Statute thus significantly modifies the equivalent
language in the ICTR: "Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any
form of indecent assault." One of the original grievances of feminists
looking at IHL during the formation of the ICTs has been addressed
here. The WCGJ won its goal of delinking honor from sexual offenses.
Bedont and Hall-Martinez quite properly credit the WCGJ with creating
"a separate category for rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, en-
366. Id. arts. 8.2(b)(xxii), 8.2(e)(vi).
367. Id. art. 8.2(b)(xxii).
368. Id. art. 8.2(e)(vi).
369. Id. art. 7.1.
370. Id. art. 7.1 (g).
371. Id. art. 8.2(b)(xxii).
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forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual
violence." '372 Relieved not only of the offending specifics but also of the
Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions and of the Additional Proto-
cols, the Rome Statute has no necessary commitment to the distinctive
sorts of sexual dignity traditionally accorded to women. Feminists may
have to work to keep those associations delinked, but for the first time
there is nothing in the statutory language to invoke them.
b. Reforms of the Enumerated Crimes
As we ascertained in Part II.D above, the WCGJ had a complex
horizontal reform agenda for the enumerated crimes. And as we have
seen, this agenda was subject not only to external controversy, but also to
real if muted internal debate. I take up the terms on the laws-and-
customs-of-war list of sexual offenses first, and then turn to sexual
crimes that appear elsewhere in the Statute.
i. The List of Sexual Offenses
The specification of sex-related crimes that can constitute crimes
against humanity and war crimes clearly shows the influence of the
WCGJ agenda. "[R]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity" are predicate crimes of crimes against humanity.
3 73
To be sure, the limitation on "any other form of sexual violence" varies,
but it is always there.
The GFeminist hand can be seen clearly here. Count the victories:
rape is specifically included. Sexual slavery ditto. Forced pregnancy and
forced sterilization are also new. As noted above, there is no mention of
outrages on human dignity, to honor or to morals. Instead the new over-
arching rubric is "sexual violence." Although the WCGJ did not get
"gender violence," they did install the term that had been central to
feminist thinking on the subject for much longer.
Defeats? "Enforced prostitution" is on the list. As we have seen,
structural feminist thinking had worked itself pure enough by the time of
the PrepComl to realize that this terminology was problematic. But, as
we have also seen, feminists had decided not to oppose its inclusion.
Feminists were also aggrieved at the language requiring "other
form[s] of sexual violence" to be "of comparable gravity." This limita-
tion had been insisted on by States objecting that, without it, the ICC
could legitimately prosecute sexual harassment and genital mutilation.374
372. Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 73.
373. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 7.1 (g).
374. Sadat & Carden, supra note 22, at 433 n.316.
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That might seem fanciful, but feminists objected to this language pre-
cisely because they wanted the ICC to have apparently unlimited
jurisdiction over sexual harms. Thus the WCGJ argued that "of compa-
rable gravity "would potentially limit the range of sexual and gender
violence and abuse" that the ICC could punish.375 Jocelyn Campanaro
specifically regretted the WCGJ's defeat here, on the grounds that the
provision "makes prosecutions more difficult and, even more worrisome,
implies that some amount of sexual violence is expected and tolerated in
times of war."'376 Unlimited jurisdiction over "other sexual violence"
emerges in this ex post feminist assessment of their achievements at
Rome as a new goal with a strong feminist-universalist cast. The (de-
feated) aim was to give the ICC plenary jurisdiction to prosecute people
for sexual violence, but not other violence, without any limit as to its
gravity.
Forced pregnancy is new also, although it is given a narrower defini-
tion than the WCGJ sought in its proposed compromise text. States
seeking to protect restrictions on abortion, including the Vatican, were
active in limiting the scope of this new crime. Apparently, the WCGJ did
not have enough state allies on this point to stop them.377 In the statutory
definition, "'[florced pregnancy' means the unlawful confinement of a
woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic
composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of
international law. This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as
affecting national laws relating to pregnancy.' '178 As we have seen, the
WCGJ had objected to making confinement a necessary element. And it
had at first resisted the conservative States' protection of national laws
governing abortion from attack in the ICC, but ultimately conceded de-
feat.
None of the other new crimes is defined in the Statute. I have de-
tected no trace of a debate over whether and/or how to define these new
crimes, so it is impossible to say whether the WCGJ was satisfied or not
with their non-definition. They are, however, defined in the Elements of
Crimes.379
375. WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. II1, Recommendation 7, Com-
mentary, WC.7.3 (objecting to the use of a standard rather than a rule here: "of comparable
gravity" would "sow confusion"); see also WCGJ, 3/98 Recommendations on Crimes Against
Humanity, supra note 106, at 8; WCGJ, Gender Justice and the ICC, supra note 106, at 17.
376. Campanaro, supra note 196, at 2590.
377. See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
93 Am. J. INT'L L. 22, 31 (1999); Bedont, supra note 51, at 196-99; Bedont & Hall-Martinez,
supra note 32, at 74; Sadat & Carden, supra note 22, at 433 n.316.
378. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 7.1(f).
379. See infra Part II.E.I.e.
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Looking back over the enumerated crimes together, how did the
feminists fare? Let us take as a template Askin's 2003 list of crimes that
she wanted to read into the Geneva Conventions for ICT purposes: "...
other forms of sexual violence, including sexual slavery, forced impreg-
nation, forced maternity, forced abortion, forced sterilization, forced
marriage, forced nudity, sexual molestation, sexual mutilation, sexual
humiliation, and sex trafficking. ''380 The crimes on Askin's list that did
not make it into the Rome Statute's three lists of sexual offenses were
forced maternity, forced abortion, forced marriage, forced nudity, sexual
molestation, and sexual humiliation. The WCGJ had not advocated for
any of these."" Almost across the board, the WCGJ sought what it could
get and got what it sought. The one great exception was "gender vio-
lence."
ii. Gender Violence
As we have seen, the WCGJ effort to include "gender violence" in
the list of criminal sexual offenses drew fire from an adamant cohort of
States. With a large contingent of friendly States, the WCGJ pushed
back. The result was an intense controversy at Rome--controversy that
aroused indignation among WCGJ stalwarts and that provoked them to
break out of their comportment as advisors/consultants/experts and to
dig in for battle.
Oosterveld was a member of the Canadian delegation at this moment
in the Rome process, and her article explaining and defending the out-
come is my source for the rest of the story. Oosterveld helps us to see
that the definition of gender became the terrain for the crucial compro-
mise. Battle lines were drawn between the feminists, for whom "gender"
referred to the "socially constructed" dimensions of the male/female dis-
tinction, and conservatives, who would tolerate use of the term only if it
referred to the sheer biological fact of maleness and femaleness. The
standoff was resolved by the adoption of a definition of gender that gave
both sides what they wanted: "For the purpose of this Statute, it is under-
stood that the term 'gender' refers to the two sexes, male and female,
within the context of society. The term 'gender' does not indicate any
meaning different from the above. 38 2 This compromise includes the con-
servatives' crucial point-gender is "the two sexes, male and female"-
and the feminists': "in the context of society." The ferocious tautology
with which the definition closes was, Oosterveld reports, drawn up to
380. See Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 8 1, at 304-05.
381. But see WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. IH, Recommendation
6, Commentary, WC.6.3 (advocating that forced marriage be triable in the ICC not as an enu-
merated crime, but by defining sexual slavery broadly enough to include it).
382. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 7.3.
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stave off a last-minute revolt by the conservatives.383 This patently
patchwork provision has been lavishly assailed by feminists, always on
the ground that it gave up too much criminalization (never that it sought
too much). Oosterveld collects this literature, offers a strategic apologia
for the compromise, and points the way to feminist-friendly interpreta-
tions for future use.3
Why define gender if "gender violence" was not included in the lists
of sexual offenses? One gender crime did make it into the Statute: it is a
crime against humanity to commit persecution on the basis of gender."" I
discuss this achievement in the next subsection as the very highest-order
vertical reform gained at Rome. But as we have seen, "gender violence"
hit the cutting room floor. It does not appear in any of the crime-defining
lists of enumerated crimes.
I think it is clear that the WCGJ paid a heavy toll to fight out the
definition of gender violence because, however roundly defeated at
Rome, it has long-term ambitions for this new crime. As I indicated
above, even after taking this reform off of the table, the WCGJ continued
to use the term when it explained what it meant by "sexual violence."
And it was vigilant to include the defeated term "gender violence" in
other, non-criminal provisions of the ICC. For example, the prosecutor is
required to appoint advisors with expertise about gender and gender vio-
lence.38 6 The prosecutor and the ICC are required to take into account the
gender of witnesses in protecting their safety, especially in cases involv-
ing charges of gender violence.387 These non-criminal provisions of the
383. Oosterveld, The Definition of "Gender" in the Rome Statute, supra note 54, at 58-
66. Oosterveld notes that, as of July 11 and 13, 1998, the delegations in alliance with the
WCGJ were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Finland, France,
Greece, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, Mozambique, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Samoa,
Senegal, Slovenia, South Africa, and the United States. Id. at 63 n.48. Those opposed were
Bahrain, Brunei, Egypt, Guatemala, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,
Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Yemen. She also indicates that the
conflict was unusually fraught. Id. at 83 n. 164 ("In the author's experience, some have viewed
the debate on the term 'gender' as overly confrontational (and emotional) within a U.N. con-
text that works on the basis of consensus.").
384. Id. at 70-84.
385. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 7.1(h).
386. Id. art. 42.9 (requiring the prosecutor to "appoint advisors with legal expertise on
specific issues, including, but not limited to, sexual and gender violence and violence against
children").
387. Id. art. 21.3 (requiring the Court to apply the law "without any adverse distinction
founded on grounds such as gender, as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, race, colour, lan-
guage, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth,
birth or other status"); id. art. 54. 1(b) (requiring the prosecutor, in conducting investigations,
to "respect the interests and personal circumstances of victims and witnesses, including age,
gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, and health, and take into account the nature of the
crime, in particular where it involves sexual violence, gender violence or violence against
children"); id. art. 68.1 (requiring the Court, during trials, to "have regard to all the relevant
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Statute may-but need not-give the defeated term some legitimacy as
the object of feminist expertise in the office of the prosecutor.
GFeminist law review publications are carrying on the campaign for
gender violence. Bedont and Hall-Martinez blaze the feminist literary
fiction trail forward by describing the Statute to include "gender
crimes. ' Well, it does-persecution based on gender is a crime. But
gender violence crimes were otherwise defeated. On this front, the
WCGJ returned from Rome bloodied but unbowed. We can expect the
ICC to be the next forum in which GFeminists joins battle over gender
violence.
iii. Enslavement, Trafficking, and Sexual Slavery
"Enslavement" was included as a predicate crime of crimes against
humanity389 and was defined with specific reference to trafficking in
women and children: "'Enslavement' means the exercise of any or all of
the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes
the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in par-
ticular women and children.,,390 As we have seen, the WCGJ did not
advocate for the inclusion of enslavement as a crime, and offered mild
but consistent demurrals from the inclusion of trafficking.
I would offer three observations about this interesting reform. First,
as Bedont points out, the Rome Statute contains a broader definition of
391trafficking than exists in the 1951 Traffic in Persons Convention, in
which it is limited to sex trafficking. 392 Sex-work and liberal feminists
consistently argue for this shift. They want the international law of labor
migration to consider all forced labor and labor migration to be
problematic to the extent that it is forced, confined, brutal, unpaid,
and/or underpaid, all without reference to whether it involves sexual
services. But the Statute goes on to specify trafficking in persons, "in
particular women and children," language which those tendencies in
factors, including age, gender as defined in article 2, paragraph 3, and health, and the nature of
the crime, in particular, but not limited to, where the crime involves sexual or gender violence
or violence against children").
388. Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 68. According to Bedont and Hall-
Martinez, "As a result of this negotiated definition, the terms 'gender' and 'gender crimes'
were utilized in many provisions of the Rome statute instead of the narrower terms 'sex' and
'sexual violence.'" Id.
389. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 7.1(c).
390. Id. art. 7.2(c) (emphasis added).
391. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of
the Prostitution of Others, Dec. 2, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 271 (entered into force July 25, 195 1).
392. Bedont, supra note 51, at 200 (arguing for an expansive interpretation that includes
"trafficking in persons for other forms of exploitation, such as forced domestic services,
should be included in the crime of enslavement").
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feminism unequivocally oppose. The ideological possibilities of this
term in ICC enforcement are quite open-ended.
Second, note that trafficking, and especially sex trafficking, have
heretofore been a matter of human rights law. This reform installs di-
rectly in the Rome Statute a positive nexus between the two regimes. It
may well be the first place that the Copelon/Charlesworth project, inter-
weaving ICC criminality with the complex skein of regulatory structures
enforcing feminist-defined human rights,393 will begin.
Finally, "sexual slavery" ranks right after rape in the three lists of
sexual offenses. It can be charged as a war crime in international and
internal conflicts and as a crime against humanity. It remains to be seen
how feminists inside the ICC and those putting pressure on it from the
outside will manage the structuralist/individualist tension in the WCGJ's
interpretations of this crime.
2. Vertical Reforms
The WCGJ agenda for horizontal reforms was, on the whole, very
successful. By comparison, the vertical reforms were less so.
a. Push Rape and Other Sexual Violence
Crimes up the Hierarchy of Crimes
As we have seen, since the beginning of our story in the early 1990s,
feminists have wanted to install sexual violence crimes at the highest
possible echelon in the hierarchy of international crimes. I assess their
achievements on this project at Rome, starting with their successes.
i. Add Persecution Based on Gender to the
Predicate Crimes Against Humanity
As we have seen, the WCGJ encountered intense resistance to the
inclusion of "gender violence" in the lists of sexual offenses. But it is a
crime against humanity to engage in persecution, and persecution was
substantially redefined:
Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on po-
litical, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as
defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally rec-
ognized as impermissible under international law, in connection
393. See generally Halley, Kotiswaran, Shamir & Thomas, supra note 4 (describing the
patterns of regulation and the feminist politics that helped to produce them).
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with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court ....
There are, in all, four new grounds of prohibited persecution: national,
ethnic, cultural, and gender. There seems to have been no controversy
over the single "gender crime" that appears in the crime-definition arti-
cles of the Statute. It not only delivers horizontally, but may well be the
WCGJ's most important vertical-agenda victory.
Persecution based on gender alone is now prosecutable as a crime
against humanity. The orthogonal framing of an ethno-national conflict
as a war against women is now a possibility for ICC prosecutors. The
only statutory fly in the ointment for the feminists here is the invocation
of the Article 7.3 definition of gender. Feminists have expressed their
concern that it will hamper the use of this provision going forward.395
ii. Classify Rape as a Grave Breach
The list of grave breaches that the ICC can prosecute is virtually
identical to that in the Geneva Conventions: no sexual violence crimes
were added. At first glance, it appears that the feminists have been abso-
lutely denied this long-standing desideratum yet again.
To constitute crimes against humanity, "other forms of sexual vio-
lence" must be "of comparable gravity" to the specified ones, and to
constitute a violation of the laws and customs of war in non-international
armed conflict, they must "also constitute a serious violation of article 3
common to the four Geneva conventions., 396 The WCGJ consistently op-
posed these provisions for "singling out" sexual violence and for adding
to the burden of proof borne by the prosecutor. But it did not oppose the
parallel condition on "other forms of sexual violence" constituting a vio-
lation of the laws and customs of war in international conflict. There, the
Statute requires-without WCGJ opposition-that they "also constitute.. ,,397
a grave breach of the Geneva Convention.
No other violation of the laws and customs of war is saddled with
this heavy additional burden of proof, so, at first glance, this looks like a
394. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 7.1(h) (emphasis added). The WCGJ opposed the
restriction to universally recognized grounds. WCGJ, Call to Delegates on Gender, supra note
106.
395. Campanaro, supra note 196, at 2591. According to Campanaro,
Specifically qualifying only gender, and not the other forms of persecution listed,
implies that gender-based persecution is in some way different than other forms of
persecution. Implications of this sort encourage the attitude that harms committed
on the basis of gender are of a lesser quality and do not demand equal attention.
Id.
396. Rome Statute, supra note 23, arts. 7.1 (g), 8.2(e)(vi).
397. Id. art. 8.2(b)(xxii).
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loss, plain and simple, for the WCGJ. The WCGJ clearly was concerned,
in part, it seems, because Amnesty International took this pessimistic
view and advocated deleting what it saw as a purely burdensome re-
quirement:
Amnesty International has raised a concern that if the terms
"also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions"
are understood as restricting the scope of "any other form of
sexual violence," this would inappropriately limit the coverage
of the Statute by excluding the broader protections offered by
Protocol I. It might also be read as limiting the scope of jurisdic-
tion over sexual violence in international conflict to exclude
such forms of sexual violence that qualify as "humiliating and
degrading treatment" .... If, as Amnesty suggests, the negoti-
ated language intends to make clear that the range of sexual
violence is itself a grave breach and can also be charged as grave
breaches as well as violations of Protocol I, then the language is
acceptable. Since in our view, the latter is the only logical inter-
pretation, we do not advocate any change in the Statute.398
Thus the WCGJ construed the additional requirement as a boon, pre-
cisely because it was the first international law acknowledgement that
"other forms of sexual violence" can "constitute a grave breach of the
Geneva Convention." A fortiori, perhaps, the specified sexual crimes can
too constitute a grave breach. To be sure, feminists will not have netted
their quarry until they get positive holdings in the ICC, but it is just a
matter of connecting the dots. So a chief reform near to the heart of
feminist reform efforts in IHL/ICL is now invited by the Rome Statute
itself.399
398. WCGJ, Gender Justice and the ICC, supra note 106, at 11-12.
399. It is unclear whether the "of comparable gravity" provisions will be interpreted to
aid or impede feminist aims in ICC prosecution and adjudication. In the aftermath of Rome,
some feminists have argued that the grave breaches provision actually declares that the listed
sexual violence crimes are grave breaches. See, e.g., CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note
250, at 333 (arguing that this provision declares that these sexual violence crimes are grave
breaches); Bedont & Hall-Martinez, supra note 32, at 72 (arguing the same). Technically that
is incorrect: Article 8.2(xxii) requires the prosecutor to show that the particular crimes in a
particular case are grave breaches. See Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 8.2(xxii). Feminist
litigators are likely to seek an ICC holding that this element need not be shown because the
sexual crimes are grave breaches per se or as a matter of law-but that has not happened yet.
It is also unclear whether the other two restrictions on "other forms of sexual violence"
will actually hinder prosecutors. The "comparable gravity" language in Article 7 (crimes
against humanity) is a completely open-ended standard. See id. art. 7. There is more law to the
requirement that, in an internal-conflict, war-crimes prosecution, conduct constituting "other
forms of sexual violence" also violates Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Given
the huge range of conduct that arguably does violate Common Article 3-it includes not only
the four specific prohibitions, but also a positive requirement that noncombatants "be treated
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b. Annex Human Rights Law to IHL/ICL
Here, the WCGJ made significant inroads, opening up connections
between the ICC and the human rights legal order that are rife with fu-
ture possibility for mutual enmeshment.
i. Install Human Rights and Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex
in a Chapeau Applicable to the Entire Statute
The Rome Statute does not include a statement of general principles.
The language that the WCGJ would have introduced in a general cha-
peau lived on, however, in Article 21 of the statute. Here, for ease of
comparison, is the WCGJ's hyper-chapeau:
The application and interpretation of the general principles of
law must be consistent with international human rights standards
and the progressive development thereof, which encompasses
the prohibition on adverse discrimination of any kind, including
discrimination based on gender and gender-stereotyped conclu-
sions.400
And here is Article 21.3 of the Rome Statute:
The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article
must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights,
and be without any adverse distinction founded upon grounds
such as gender, as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race,
colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion,
national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.40 '
It is quite clear that this final language is a modification of the chapeau
provided by the WCGJ. The WCGJ scores a number of clear victories
here, but also suffers several defeats.
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth
or wealth, or any other similar criteria"-this provision could open up rather than restrict the
scope of the Statute. See First Geneva Convention, supra note 180, art. 3; Second Geneva
Convention, supra note 180, art. 3; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 180, art. 3; Fourth
Geneva Convention, supra note 177, art. 3. It does seem clear that, though there was an upside
for GFeminism in the requirement that "other sexual violence" be shown to constitute grave
breaches, there is no such upside here. It has always been clear that sexual crimes are within
the purview of Common Article 3. The 1958 Commentaries explicitly addressed sexual crimes
long before the Additional Protocols added their voices to the chorus. See supra text accom-
panying notes 178-179.
400. WCGJ, 12/97 Recommendations, supra note 105, pt. II, art. L-T, § 2, Suggested
Text.
401. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 21(3).
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ii. Invoke Human Rights Law
Perhaps the most important, most structural reform introduced in Ar-
ticle 21(3) is the requirement that all applications and interpretations of
the statute be governed by human rights law. This language invites a
large annexation of human rights law to IHL/ICL. The ICC is instructed
to interpret law-a classification that is much broader than the Rome
Statute itself-to be "consistent with internationally recognized human
rights." °2 Note that a more conservative interpretive norm is adopted
than the WCGJ wanted: human rights as "internationally recognized" is
presumably less saturated by GFeminist ideas than human rights in their
"progressive development." Nevertheless, this is an extremely open-
ended requirement and it may produce much litigation. It may authorize
the full-scale downloading of the immense body of human rights instru-
ments into the interpretive process affecting the sexual violence crimes
in the ICC, the scope of persecution based on gender, and all of the gen-
der violence provisions scattered throughout the non-crime-defining
articles of the Statute. Everything from the Beijing Conference to the
U.N. Trafficking Protocol4°3-if deemed to be "internationally recog-
nized"--could be held to be relevant to the interpretation of all law in
the ICC. The ICC could refuse to give this provision any real teeth, of
course. It could give a permissive interpretation to "consistent" and an
expansive one to "internationally recognized," and so on. But the door is
open to bringing human rights instruments, doctrine, and experts into the
IHL/ICL regime.
Article 21(3) falls far short of full annexation, however. It only
leaves the Rome Statute subject to interpretation by human rights con-
cepts, norms, and assumptions. Full annexation would have opened the
door from IHL/ICL to human rights law as well, authorizing criminal
enforcement in the ICC of violations of human rights, both in war and in
peace. That aspect of annexation did not happen.
iii. Reach Peacetime
As we have seen, an important motive for annexation was the
WCGJ's ambition to extend war crimes and crimes against humanity
jurisdiction to "peacetime." The WCGJ argued that war crimes should be
prosecutable whether or not they occur in armed conflict. It wanted
crimes against humanity to be prosecutable if committed in widespread
402. Id.
403. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, G.A. Res. 25, annex II, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc.
A/45/49 (Vol. 1) (2001).
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or systematic attack, not just on a civilian population, but on any popula-
tion. The goal was to reach the war against women that extends from
wartime to "peacetime."
These proposals had no success at Rome. All of the restrictions ob-
jected to appear in the statute °4 And there is further limiting language:
armed conflicts "not of an international character" are expressly defined
to exclude "situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots,
isolated or sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.
' 405
The section that codifies laws and customs of war for internal con-
flicts-this is the section that includes sexual violence crimes-is further
limited so that "[i]t applies to armed conflicts that take place in the terri-
tory of a [S]tate when there is protracted armed conflict between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups.' 4' To be sure, genocide is not tethered to armed conflict but has
its own demanding threshold requirements.4 0 ' Articles 7 and 8 provide a
lot of law to invoke against the feminist war against women in "peace-
time" line.
iv. Add Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex
Far more successful was the WCGJ effort to require that all applica-
tions and interpretations of the statute be nondiscriminatory on the basis
of gender. Article 21(3) requires that the ICC apply and interpret law
"without any adverse distinction founded on ... gender.' 408 This is a sig-
nificant victory and will doubtless be part of the feminist litigation
strategy before the ICC.
The language actually adopted does, however, include three changes
that the WCGJ must have mourned. One leaches out some of the femi-
nist normativity in the WCGJ's language: its "discrimination" has
become "adverse distinction." Second, gender is not the only prohibited
ground of discrimination, and Article 21(1)-(2) invoke other, more gen-
eral norms of interpretation. 4°' And, third, gender is subject to the
compromise definition and is the only prohibited ground with a special
definition. Feminists have deplored the last of these modifications as
potentially sending the message that discrimination on the basis of gen-
der is less serious than the other listed forms of discrimination.
404. Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 7.1; id. arts. 8.2(a)-(c), 8.2(e).
405. Id. art. 8.2(d) (limiting Article 8.2(c)).
406. Id. art. 8.2(f) (limiting Article 8.2(e)).
407, See id. art. 6.
408. Id. art. 21(3).
409. See id. arts. 21.1, 21.2 (directing the Court to apply the Elements of Crimes and
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, applicable treaties, general principles of national law, and
principles and rules established in its own cases).
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Feminists are prepared to argue that, in armed conflicts involving fa-
tal violence against civilian men and sexual violence against civilian
women, the failure to prosecute the crimes against women constituted
discrimination based on gender.1 ° In the early days of Tadie and
Akayesu, feminists had nothing but moral suasion and expertise on sex-
ual violence to wield against prosecutors with other priorities. Now they
have a legal argument. But how can they put it before the court if the
problem they face is prosecutorial failure to investigate or indict?
v. Add NGO-Initiated Review of Prosecutorial Inaction
At this point, yet another WCGJ agenda item-providing for review
of the prosecutor's decisions not to proceed-comes up for examination.
As we saw in Part II.D above, the WCGJ sought to enable victims and
NGOs to seek review of prosecutorial decisions not to investigate or in-
dict. Its concern was neglect of sexual violence cases, but the general
tendency of such review would be much broader: to tilt the whole appa-
ratus towards more prosecutions generally.
The Statute does include a mechanism for review of decisions not to
investigate and not to prosecute. Article 53 is a very complex piece of
legal machinery, and its intricacies need not detain us here. Suffice it to
say that victims and NGOs are not entitled to move for review by the
Pre-Trial Chamber: only the Security Council and signatory States may
intervene from the outside and only in cases that they have referred to
the Court.4 1 ' The Pre-Trial Chamber can initiate review sua sponte.4 12 If
the motion comes from outside of the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber can
require the prosecutor to reconsider.4 3 If, however, the motion is initiated
by the Pre-Trial Chamber, it appears that the Chamber can reverse the
prosecutor's decision.44
It is impossible to say whether these mechanisms will make it more
or less likely that prosecutorial inaction will be susceptible to political
pressure from interest-group NGOs. If the WIGJ is able to recruit a State
or the Pre-Trial Chamber to object to neglect of sexual violence accusa-
tions (it is hard to imagine the Security Council agreeing to make such
an intervention), it could invoke the antidiscrimination provision in Arti-
cle 21 as a legal basis for "requiring" prosecution.
410. See, e.g., Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra note 81, at 293; Oosterveld,
Sexual Slavery, supra note 21, at 823 n.86.
411. Rome Statute, supra note 23, arts. 53.1, 53.2, 53.3(a).
412. Id. art. 53.3(b).
413. Id. art. 53.3(b).




c. Expand the Scope of ICL Vis-A-Vis National Law
As we have seen, the WCGJ gave examples of gender violence that
would, if enforced, introduce into the ICC the review of national law on
the family, employment, public safety, and the like. Of course every in-
ternational crime enforced as such displaces national law. For instance,
the local definition of rape may require resistance by the victim, but
IHL/ICL does not. The special purpose of the WCGJ was to reach gen-
der practices that they deemed detrimental to women. Except for
persecution on the basis of gender, there is no obvious way for the ICC
to pursue this project, given the otherwise complete failure of the gender
crimes project.
d. Classify Rape as Rape?
There is no separate article granting the ICC jurisdiction to try sex-
ual violence crimes. The WCGJ did not seek this in any direct way, and
it is almost unimaginable that they could have won it if they had tried.
e. Continued Skirmishes in the Elements of Crimes and
Rules of Procedure and Evidence
The Statute provides for adoption of an Elements of Crimes docu-
ment and Rules of Procedure and Evidence by two thirds of the
signatory States in discussions subsequent to the Rome Conference.4"'
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence purport to be a code settling myr-
iad substantively important issues. The Elements of Crimes includes
definitions of many crimes that are new elements of IHLJICL traceable,
at least in part, to feminist expertise and activism. They give us new legal
definitions of enslavement, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and sexual violence. They de-
fine outrages upon personal dignity newly shorn of their primary
association with female honor. Yet clarity is, I would suggest, not what
these documents will bestow on the litigation or adjudication of these
crimes. They are instead highly ambiguous texts, the mesh of language
upon which future struggles will be waged.
First, it is not clear whether the Elements of Crimes is formally bind-
ing on the Court or merely advisory. The Statute directs that the
Elements of Crimes "shall assist the Court in the interpretation of arti-
cles 6, 7 and 8.,,416 That is, the articles defining genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes as triable in the ICC. If we compare this in-
struction with the directive that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
415. Id. art. 9; id. art. 51.
416. Id. art. 9.1.
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"shall enter into force" after being promulgated, "shall assist" seems to
fall far short of a mandate. Perhaps the Elements of Crimes is merely
advisory. Then again, it may be more binding: Article 21 provides that
"[t]he Court shall apply ... [i]n the first place, this Statute, Elements of
Crimes, and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 4 7 That sounds more
like a rule.
Further ambiguity is introduced by the fact that the Elements of
Crimes is simply littered with footnotes indicating that various interpre-
tations of the language above the line are "understood" or "intended."
One is left to infer that the contents of these footnotes secured enough
support for their inclusion as footnotes only. Either they ran into opposi-
tion, met with sheer drag, or were not particularly controversial but did
not have enough support to land in the text itself. The Court could inter-
pret their inclusion as a reason to heed them, or could interpret their
inclusion as footnotes as a reason to regard their contents with suspicion.
Third, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence sometimes veer away
from rules and toward standards in ways that indicate a failure of con-
sensus among the negotiators. Even if the Court does not detect the
weakness of PrepComII delegate support for the many standards we find
in the final document, they, like all standards, are themselves open to a
wide range of outcomes in the ICC. The rule governing the consent de-
fense to charges of sexual violence is, as we will see below, full of
mandatory factual inferences that would operate to constrain the Court
legally. Read as a rule, this provision would require the Court to adopt a
number of structuralist-feminist conclusions about the possibility of
women's actual consent to sexual encounters with men. But the very
same provision begins with the following language: "In cases of sexual
violence, the Court shall be guided by and, where appropriate, apply the
following principles ... .,4'8 The Court "shall" merely "be guided by"
these "principles" and need "apply" them only "where appropriate., 4'9 A
panel of the ICC could read this "rule" to be merely advisory or even
irrelevant, even in an unambiguous rape case.
A recorded conflict over WCGJ aims can help explain how such am-
biguous entries came to be drafted. According to Pace and Schense, the
WCGJ agenda underwent its first major period of serious conflict during
the negotiations of the Elements of Crimes at the Fifth Session of Prep-
ComlI, held in December of 1997. At that meeting, a major
jurisidictional battle about the scope of the ICC's jurisdiction over
417. Id. art. 21.1(a).
418. Int'l Crim. Ct., Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 70, ICC-ASPIlI3I (2002)




crimes against humanity was joined. A group of States in which Islamic
legal influences have produced gender differentiations that are quite le-
gitimate in the legal order-Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates420-
sought to restrict ICC jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and to
exempt religious practices and "cultural norms within families or be-
tween spouses. 42' I will call this alliance the opposing group of States.
They refused to discuss the specific sexual crimes until the PrepComlI
had drafted a chapeau that met their demands. The United States and
other States offered compromise threshold language requiring a positive
state policy to promote or encourage the charged conduct. 22 That is, the
proposed compromise would have limited crimes against humanity tri-
able before the ICC to a subset of those recognized under IHL. The
proposal was met by intense opposition from Like Minded Group States
and CICC NGOs. 23 Pace and Schense tell a story of ensuing intense ac-
tivity by the CICC and the WCGJ to resist the restrictive threshold. On
the final day of the Fifth Session, WCGJ members appeared in battle
dress, wearing t-shirts emblazoned "No compromise on justice!" and
"Gender justice now !,,424
What were the opposing States thinking, when they linked the
threshold for crimes against humanity to the definition of sexual crimes?
These confrontations emerged well before the battle over gender vio-
lence in the March/April 1998 PrepComl, and thus, before the WCGJ's
reluctant decision to concede defeat in its effort to include that term in
the crime-defining articles of the statute. In December 1997, the WCGJ
was actively arguing that marriage achieved by force or threat be in-
cluded within the scope of sexual slavery, that cultural practices that
subordinate women be included in the definition of gender, and that war
crimes and crimes against humanity be extended to peacetime. The op-
posing States were not acting arbitrarily when they linked the threshold
for crimes against humanity to the definition of specific crimes proposed
by the WCGJ. They plausibly anticipated efforts to criminalize the gen-
der-differentiating elements of their domestic legal orders. In short,
resistance that appears on its face to be general, aimed at the scope of
ICC war crimes jurisdiction, was probably also (and maybe even primar-
ily) motivated by very specific fears that the WCGJ gender agenda
would prevail and expose officials in these States to prosecution for their
maintenance of gender-differentiating legal orders.
420. Pace & Schense, supra note 126, at 721 n.37.
421. Id. at 721.
422. Id.
423. Id. at 721-22.
424. Id. at 722.
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Pace and Schense deduced from the opposing States' management of
these interventions that "the proposed exemptions for individual crimes
were meant to serve as a pressure point to secure concession on the
higher overall threshold."425 If that is correct, the opposing State group
understood support in PrepComll for the WCGJ's horizontal agenda to
be so strong that they could hold it hostage in order to obtain a major,
highly controversial restriction in the scope of the ICC's jurisdiction.
The foregoing analysis counsels us to construe the Elements of
Crimes in light of the very acute political significance that this conflict
gave to minute differentials in the definitions of sexual crimes. Not sur-
prisingly, when it comes to the WCGJ agenda, these ancillary documents
are pastiche: victories for the WCGJ lie side by side with defeats at the
level of minute detail. Predicting the actual behavior of the Court in con-
struing-or simply ignoring-the resulting language is quite impossible.
One example, the definition of rape, will have to suffice. Rule 70 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence places limits on a consent defense
to charges of sexual violence, and thus seems to assume such a defense
exists. All three limitations hew the near-structuralist-feminist line that
became the controlling rule in the ICTY Rules:
In cases of sexual violence, the Court shall be guided by and,
where appropriate, apply the following principles:
(a) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct
of a victim where force, threat of force, coercion or taking
advantage of a coercive environment undermined the victim's
ability to give voluntary and genuine consent;
(b) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct
of a victim where the victim is incapable of giving genuine
consent;
(c) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack
of resistance by, a victim to the alleged sexual offense .... 26
Consent is a defense, but it is legally precluded by a list of feminist-
inspired conditions. The Court is required to find for the prosecution if
"genuine" consent was not possible or-and this rule is probably
broader-when a victim's ability to give "voluntary and genuine con-
sent" was "undermined" not only by force, threat of force, or coercion,
but by "taking advantage of a coercive environment. ' 427 All of these rules
transform the fact of consent into a legal issue and direct the Court to
425. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 418, Rule 69.




find even express consent irrelevant. Of course, the Court can decide that
they are not rules but "principles," determine that their invocation in a
particular case would be "inappropriate," and decline to be "guide[d]" by
them.
As if that weren't confusing enough, the Elements of Crimes frag-
ments the legal picture further. There we have a definition of rape that
seems actually to preclude a consent defense:
1. The perpetrator invaded* the body of a person by conduct
resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body
of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the
anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any
other part of the body.
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force
or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, de-
tention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against
such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coer-
cive environment, or the invasion was committed against a
person incapable of giving genuine consent.**
428
The asterisk marks footnote fifteen, which reads, "The concept of 'inva-
sion' is intended to be broad enough to be gender neutral." The double
asterisk marks footnote sixteen, which reads, "It is understood that a per-
son may be incapable of giving genuine consent if affected by natural,
induced or age-related incapacity."
This formulation goes considerably further in the structuralist-
feminist direction than the ICC or the ICTY Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. It makes ill-gotten consent the legal equivalent of coercion.
"Taking advantage of a coercive environment" is no longer the prosecu-
tor's required response to a consent defence: it is the factual predicate
for a finding that the accused used "threat of force or coercion., 429 The
substantive crime has been redefined to include a positive duty to obtain
meaningful consent. Whether the Court will construe the definition this
way, and how it will reconcile it with the inconsistent provisions of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, remain to be seen.
The second footnote to the Elements of Crimes definition provides
further ambiguity. It carries many feminist messages: not merely consent
but genuine consent is needed for an acquittal; it is up to the Court's dis-
cretion ("may") to determine whether the victim's consent was vitiated
428. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 170, art. 7(1)(g)-I (rape as a crime against
humanity); see also id. arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii)-I (rape as a war crime), 8(2)(e)(vi)- (rape as a war
crime in conflicts not of an international character).
429. See supra note 428.
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by incapacity; and a person with "induced ... incapacity" cannot give
the required genuine consent. All of this is "understood." Will the foot-
note presentation of these understandings strengthen or weaken their
grip on the ICC's judicial minds? That remains to be seen.
Taken as a whole, the ancillary documents' rules on rape show
that--even though the WCGJ may have been losing its effort to reach
peacetime-it was able to introduce provision after provision suited to
its actual or performed structuralist-feminist consensus. Rarely did these
provisions come in without provisos, however. Far from settling on par-
ticular ideologies of rape and sexual slavery, the Elements of Crimes and
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence leave the ICC-and GFeminists
working inside of it and outside of it--considerable interpretive room for
further struggle over the incorporation of feminist aims in international
criminal law.
CONCLUSION
This Article has addressed law on the books. Of course, there is also
law in action. What will actually happen remains to be seen. That is, by
themselves, these rules do nothing to change the meaning of IHL, ICL,
their enforcement, or the level and types of violence in which people
engage. The degree to which one very specific set of feminists were able
to inscribe into the Rome Statute legal language compatible with their
very specific set of ideological commitments is quite remarkable. But
whether ICC will understand these words in a feminist way, and cer-
tainly whether the world will thereby begin looking more like one
envisioned by the feminist reformers, are entirely distinct questions.
There are indications, however, that the ICC Prosecutor's Office is
interested in trying out at least one of the new crimes. One of the first
cases on the ICC's docket charges Germain Katanga with war crimes
and crimes against humanity that he allegedly committed in the Democ-
ratic Republic of Congo in 2003.3' One hundred percent of the sexual
crimes alleged in this case are charged under the new rubric, introduced
by GFeminists working in the Statute's drafting process, sexual en-
slavement.431
430. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for Germaine
Katanga (July 2, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html (last visited Dec. 13,
2008).
431. Id. The same can be said of the Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo case. Prosecutor v. Ngud-
jolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/07, Warrant of Arrest for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, at 6 (July 6,
2007). As of the time that this Article went to press, several other arrest warrants had charged
defendants with rape, sexual enslavement, and, in two cases, outrages upon personal dignity.
See Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Warrant of Arrest of Jean-Pierre Bemba
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It is too soon to predict how the ICC will handle the new rules. Too
soon, also, to speculate about what they or their enforcement, if any, will
mean to men and women contemplating, engaging in, or suffering armed
conflict. Still, I close this Article with a few words about why, neverthe-
less, I worry about the institutional and legal stories told in this Article. I
provide first some comments on the ideology of GFeminism as it has
emerged in IHL/ICL institutional culture and its current legitimacy
amongst IHL/ICL-promoting elites, and second, some comments on the
rules.
Many aspects of Rome Statute GFeminism have been controversial
within feminist discussions, in the U.S. domestic context, and around the
world. Its structuralism has been rejected as magical realism by many
feminists. I have written a book giving an account of this controversy in
the United States and sided with those who want to demote the struc-
turalist thesis to a hypothesis.432 The abolitionism of this branch of
GFeminism strikes legal realists as equally magical realist.33 Its carceral
vision of feminism in power-the supreme emphasis that this branch of
GFeminism puts on criminalization, prosecution, and punishment-has
been criticized for inviting feminists to forget about having a positive
vision of human, or female, life well lived.434 Feminists have criticized it
for relying on state forms of power to the exclusion of more dispersed
ones, ones that might actually lie within the reach of actual women-and
men-leading their everyday and their wartime lives.43" The assumption
that feminists in the West know which cultural practices differing from
their own constitute gender violence has provoked intense and volumi-
nous resistance from the rest-and within U.S. feminism as well.436 The
Gembo, at 7 (May 23, 2008) (outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment); Prosecutor v. Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for
Ahmad Muhammad Harun, at 7, 7-8, 13-14 (Apr. 27, 2007) (rape and outrages upon personal
dignity); Prosecutor v. Harun & Abd-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest
for for Ali Kushayb, at 8-9, 14-15 (Apr. 27, 2007) (rape); Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-
02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony, at 12-13 (Sept. 27, 2005) (rape and sexual
enslavement); Prosecutor v. Otti, Case No. ICC-02/04-02/07, Warrant of Arrest for Vincent
Otti, at 12-13 (July 8, 2005) (rape and sexual enslavement). All of these documents are avail-
able at http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2008).
432. See HALLEY, supra note 77.
433. DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC.: ESSAYS ON THE POWER AND POLITICS
OF CULTURAL IDENTITY (1995) (providing a non-feminist version of this objection).
434. See, e.g., WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE
MODERNITY (1995).
435. See, e.g., Pamela Haag, "Putting Your Body on the Line": The Question of Violence,
Victims, and the Legacy of Second-Wave Feminism, 8 DIFFERENCES 23 (1996); Sharon Marcus,
Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory and Politics of Rape Prevention, in FEMINISTS
THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 385 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992).
436. See Engle, Feminism and Its (Dis)Contents, supra note 116, at 784-89, 794-96
(giving detailed accounts of two such encounters).
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goal of using IHL and/or ICL to displace domestic law implies a loss of
faith in domestic politics and a will to supplant domestic law and politics
with law made in deals with carceral humanitarians amongst IHL/ICL
elites.437
None of these often fractious differentials within feminism make any
mark whatsoever in the legal materials I have handled in my research on
the ICT and Rome statutes. They simply don't appear in the materials
that I have studied to write this Article. Case in point: my colleague Mar-
tha Minow has asked U.S. legal feminists to reflect on the apparent
tension between their policy choices that would uniformly forgive
women who kill their batterers and their policy choices that would uni-
formly avenge women sexually assaulted in war by men.' Why, Minow
asked, is forgiveness always right in the first setting and vengeance al-
ways right in the second? I have been unable to uncover one single law
review response to this core question.
GFeminism, at least the branch of it that is devoted to IHL/ICL
criminalization, has hewed to the CICC/NG normative commitment to
coalition formation and wise compromise. It has been willing to put up a
fight with non-feminists, but if there was tension among GFeminists at
Rome-and I argue that there was-the consensus view was that this
tension was an internal matter, best muted to virtual silence in the public
program of a quasi-official feminist entity. This is a new development in
feminism, one that I think feminists should debate about. Is this a good
thing for feminism? For women?
Of course the ascendency of these positions was made possible only
by a Gramscian hegemony involving the complicity of those of us who
might have dissented and resisted. As we have seen, controversy among
feminists, even in international law circles, is possible when the topic
was sex trafficking. Is rape so sacrosanct that it has unnerved the opposi-
tion?
I hope not. So let it be said: that the representation of the controver-
sial substantive positions taken by the WCGJ as the object of objective
expertise and smooth feminist consensus was less than forthright-and
that feminists and others who would question them (me included)-with
few •exceptions -- nave acquiesced.
437. See generally DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTER-
NATIONAL HUMANITARIANISM (2005).
438. See Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Feminist Responses to
Violent Injustice, 32 NEw ENG. L. REV. 967,972-76 (1997).
439. See WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND WAR: WARTIME VICTIMIZATION OF REFUGEES IN THE
BALKANS (Vesna Nikotid-Ristanovi6 ed., 2000); Carpenter, supra note 319; Engle, Feminism
and Its (Dis)Contents, supra note 116; Engle, Liberal Internationalism, supra note 116;
Katherine M. Franke, Putting Sex to Work, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1139 (1998); Vesna Kesic, A
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And what about the rules themselves? As I have said, this Article,
with its focus on law in the books, is not the proper place for the-I be-
lieve highly desirable-consequentialist assessment of what these rules
might actually do in the world. Elsewhere I have sketched some of the
assumptions in GFeminism that would have to be put in question for
such an inquiry to proceed.440 As for the rules themselves, I applaud the
immense achievement GFeminism made at Rome, in ensuring that the
distinctive harms that women suffer in armed conflict are expressly in-
cluded in positive IHL/ICL. But I want also to put on the table my deep
disagreement with feminist universalism and its war-against-women un-
derstanding of conflicts like the Balkan War. This framing reproduces in
reverse the blind-spotted moral vision that it contests. It is completely
inattentive to the possibility that women have been the instigators or per-
petrators of conflict. Worse, it involves a-to me absolutely chilling-
indifference to the suffering and death of men. As Nathaniel Berman and
David Kennedy have argued, in the shadow of positive IHL, critical
thought and actual armies have detected a matrix of rules for privileged
killing. 44' ICL will not be immune from this kind of effectiveness. War as
legally justified vengeance for the intensely illegal rape of women? It has
happened before and, if the Rome Statute has the moral grip on the
world that its proponents want it to have, it will happen again-but now
with the new possibility that feminist labors may stoke the fires of war.
It's not clear to me what feminists should do about this possibility. But it
is dismaying that they have so dramatically failed to worry about it.
Response to Catharine MacKinnon's Article: "Turning Rape into Pornography: Postmodern
Genocide", 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 267 (1994).
440. Halley, Rape in Berlin, supra note 1, at 110-20.
441. See generally DAVID KENNEDY, OF WAR AND LAW (2006); Nathaniel Berman,
Privileging Combat?: Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction of War, 43 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (2004).
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